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Soul Models: Rationalization and the Art of Subjectivity 
 
Abstract 
In the exchange between theory and practice, art is appropriated as a creative mode of enquiry, a 
differential form of knowledge and experience in the processes of rationalization. As a differential 
in knowledge, art is explored as the practice of composition making differences out of established 
rationales - the discrete disciplines that find stability in economic, pedagogic and scientific 
discourse. As a differential in experience, art may contain the potential to destabilize social, 
historical and political constitutions of sense, working as an interference pattern in the production 
and reproduction of rational subjects. The academic distillation of the artist’s know how into the ‘art 
of subjectivity’, draws both the subjects and objects of knowledge into this critical space of 
composition, a dynamic space of contestation in which the artist acquires the capacity to become an 
agent of cultural change. 
 
As a cultural and critical formation, the ‘art of subjectivity’ reactivates the art historical tradition of 
institutional critique. Re-evaluated through the critical and philosophical components of the 
doctoral research, the material rendition of institutional critique is configured as a series of artistic 
engagements with the procedural and regulatory codes of practice that comprise the info-structure 
of instrumental reason. Through a gradual synthesis of process and product, the ‘art of subjectivity’ 
begins to merge with the arts (techniques) of rationalization, drawing upon rather than resisting the 
bureaucratic, informational, scientific-technical and semiotic energies of political economy. In the 
aesthetic merger of productive processes there emerges an affirmative mode of critique, the 
‘constructive criticism’ of the intelligent artist whose purpose in the doctoral research is to 
interrogate the terms and conditions of knowledge and experience, and in the process open up new 
possibilities of expression.  
 
Constructive criticism foregrounds what art can do in the register of production, as opposed to what 
it means in the register of comprehension. Artwork is situated on the side of creation, whereby the 
work of art is conceived as an aesthetic process, an aggregate form of thought and action, which in 
the doctoral research develops as the ‘intelligence key’ of the combination-composition. The 
artwork as intelligence key is designed to unlock the established practices of discrete disciplines in 
an attempt to realize a more permeable, inquisitive condition of subjectivity, recomposed in a 
connective fabric of affective and perceptual understanding. In this respect, the ‘art of subjectivity’ 
is motivated by the desire to deregulate what limits the potential for expression, questioning how 
sense becomes restricted as a basis for remaking the thresholds of knowledge and experience. 
 
It is envisaged that the doctoral investigation will be of value for artists who wish to develop a 
critical role for their work in the context of academic research. Through the composition and re-
composition of method the ‘art of subjectivity’ yields a palette of practices, any one of which could 
be re-appropriated by the critically minded artist. Conversely, the techniques of constructive 
criticism provide an operating model for the perceptive critical theorist who may wish to utilize art 
as the practice of least restriction, in the strategic integration of creative thought and action.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
With the ability to predict nature comes the ability to control nature. Hence when a science 
of humanity emerges, society and individuals will likewise be subject to control. 
Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy (1855) 
 
 
This precisely is the long story of how responsibility originated. The task of breeding an 
animal with the right to make promises evidently embraces and presupposes as a 
preparatory task that one first makes men to a certain degree necessary, uniform, like 
among like, regular, and consequently calculable. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) 
 
The relationship between the modern process of rationalization and the subjects it produces, 
has greatly informed the development of my artwork over the last six years. During the 
course of the doctoral research this dynamic has shaped the artistic parameters of the 
investigation albeit after a series of adjustments and alterations. As a consequence, the 
consistency of the artwork developed as part of the doctoral research is determined by 
different but repeated engagements with specific coordinates on the socio-political 
landscape of rationalization. As a practical response to the conditions of instrumental 
rationality, the visual language has emerged as an antidote to a particular form of 
subjectivity, constituted in the mid nineteenth century in the conception of an over-coded, 
over-determined individual of modern life. The artistic encounters with this individual 
accumulate into a series of case studies, which attempt to locate, diagnose and destabilize 
established rational subjects and their corresponding subject matters. As both process and 
product, ‘the art of subjectivity’ makes differentials of knowledge and experience at the 
interface between individual and society, where the artist1 becomes an agent of cultural 
transformation and critique. 
 
As portraits of subjectivity, the subjects of rationality are the ‘soul models’ of the doctoral 
research, framed as the Research Subject in Chapter 3, The Emotional Subject in Chapter 4, 
and the Creative Subject in Chapter 5. ‘Soul model’ is a reference to the abstract/conceptual 
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models that provide theoretical grounds for constructing specifically modern individuals. 
Soul models as such are investigated as systems of thought and practice in which 
individuals are produced and reproduced as meaningful subjects/objects of knowledge. As a 
type of cultural surplus value, the lived experience of the individual is never completely 
determined by the ‘soul model’, insofar as subjectivities and models are reproduced in and 
through social practitioners who are the simultaneous expression of both the models and the 
subjectivities. Portraits of subjectivity are therefore continually reproduced as unfinished 
works in progress, which to some degree remain inherently unstable constitutions of the 
subject. In this respect, the soul model becomes a soul modulation2 in the doctoral research, 
in a series of artistic engagements with rational processes of subjectivation3. The soul 
model of ‘the artist’ is taken to be the least determined mode of existence and as such, 
potentially the most critical with the capacity to make differences (modulations) out of the 
received stability in established regimes of sense. The concepts deployed in the doctoral 
research are to some degree academic soul models, which provide intellectual frameworks 
for rethinking modern subjectivity in and through the composition of artworks. 
 
Modern subjectivity is itself a complex and contentious terrain, which in the doctoral 
research traverses three phases of analysis that correspond with Weberian, Foucauldian and 
Deleuzian models of subjectivity. Hall’s (2004) analysis of subjectivity from the Classical 
period to the present day provides a wider theoretical resource for understanding the 
historical conditions, which produce different modes of subjective experience. Hall 
evaluates historical-materialist, psychoanalytic, discursive and feminist conceptions of the 
subject, through a detailed account of the corresponding Enlightenment, Marxist, Freudian, 
Lacanian and Foucauldian models of subjectivity. The critical framework of the doctoral 
research appropriates Foucault’s conception of the subject as formulated in The Subject and 
Power in (Drefus & Rabinow, 1982), The History of Sexuality Volume 1(1978) and 
Discipline and Punish (1977) adapting it to the creative configurations of artistic thinking. 
Amy Allen’s (2000) critical evaluation of the tensions between structure and agency in 
Foucault’s oeuvre has facilitated the carving out of a position for artistic practice in the 
ongoing debates surrounding the constitution and reproduction of subjects. As a critical 
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disposition, the ‘art of subjectivity’ unfolds as a series of case studies, which aim to put into 
process the conditions of subjectivity, and at once destabilize the established constitutions 
of experience.  
 
Chapter 1 surveys the process of rationalization as integral to the social, historical and 
political terrain of Modernity. Modern subjectivity is in turn considered as the effect of 
multiple techniques for modelling individuals who are determined as components in the 
socio-political machine. A creative dynamic is set up between the ‘art of subjectivity’ and 
the arts (techniques) of rationalization, in order to develop visual techniques for making 
differences out of established systems and practices. The artistic process is proposed as a 
critical modulation of individuality, in which the artist does not stand in naive opposition to 
instrumental reason but is engaged in critical differentials of its power. Modalities of 
rationalization are interrogated as programmes for informing and reforming the lives of 
individuals, who in turn reconstitute themselves as reasonable and reasoning subjects. The 
subjectivity of the individual is first approached through the thought of Max Weber and 
Michel Foucault whose different philosophical traditions address the problematic condition 
of a fragmented modern subject, produced in the objectifying forces of socio–technological 
mechanisms. The review of Weber’s historical materialism and Foucault’s discursive 
analysis prepares the aesthetic terrain for an ‘art of subjectivity’, which permeates the sense 
of rationality and upsets the rational subject.  
 
In Chapter 2, the art historical precedent of the machine aesthetic provides a stylistic 
device, suitable for engaging with the social machines of rationalization. Introduced toward 
the end of Chapter 1, Deleuze & Guattari’s concept of ‘the machinic’ (1984, 1988), is 
adapted as a critical application of the machine aesthetic. The machinic augments the 
creative register of research, enabling critical engagements with Deleuze & Guattari’s 
‘productive unconscious’ (1984, 54), in various combinations of working relationships or 
‘machinic assemblages’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 88-91). The machinic is further 
developed as a conceptual tool for adjusting the creative disposition of the artist, allowing 
the expressive potential of the machine aesthetic to take shape in dynamic forms of 
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constructive criticism4. The role played by the machinic in the doctoral research is 
developed through Mc Mahon (2002) and Johnson (1999), with emphasis on creation above 
comprehension of artworks in ‘agencements’ (Deleuze & Guattari, in Johnson 1999, 28) of 
material production. The agencements of doctoral research are experimental productive 
processes, gradually made critical by interrogating objects of knowledge in conceptual-
creative assemblages. In Chapters 4 and 5, the artistic assemblages cohere into a critical 
semiotic method, produced and reproducing in the interconnected registers of desire, 
history and discourse. Where desire destabilizes, where histories provide events and where 
discourse generates expression, the machine aesthetic translates into the method of 
‘machinic vision…a field of decoded perceptions’ (Johnson, 1999, 27), in which the ‘art of 
subjectivity’ reprocesses its objects of investigation in creative modulations of instrumental 
rationality. 
 
The objective is to realize constructive criticism as a gradual synthesis of process and 
product, whereby the ‘art of subjectivity’ amalgamates with the art of rationalization at 
points where rational techniques are appropriated as conditions of possibility, creative 
processes in themselves that are ripe for re–engineering in the critical differential of the 
machinic artist. The differential productive space is therefore explored as the critical space, 
where the artist moves between things (practices, objects of knowledge, subjectivities) as 
an engineer of differences, breaking down the logical connections between the practices of 
instrumental rationality and the reproduction of rational egos. The purpose is to conceive of 
art as a method for re-evaluating the conditions of subjectivation, putting into process 
existing terms and conditions of experience through a subject of permutation, whose 
position is not immediately reducible to any particular practice, but remains in a dynamic 
state of composition. Art is proposed as a transformative practice, an object ‘in the 
making’, where subjectivities and rationalities move in and out of each other as soul models 
unfolding on the same plane of production.  As a technique of machinic vision, constructive 
criticism will aim to make research ‘go with the flow’, negotiating thresholds of knowledge 
and experience by investing the individual in semiotic energies that draw upon rather than 
resist the productive forces of political economy. 
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The second section of Chapter 2 rejoins the ‘sense of the individual’, which emerged as an 
area of investigation toward the end of my M.A. research. The objective in the doctoral 
research is to establish a reflexive approach to the production of subjectivity, able to 
continually evaluate its capacity for negotiating the territories of rationalization. In the 
doctoral research framework, art’s productive power is opened up as a critical force and 
situated in a creative interface between the developing conceptual and aesthetic 
components of the thesis. The artistic disposition of the ‘quantitative attitude’ emerges as a 
critical fold in the quantitative techniques of rationalization, a productive energy and 
stylistic device for shaping the form and content of constructive criticism in the remaining 
chapters. The quantitative attitude begins to function as the artistic reproduction of social 
technologies of quantification, a critical making of differences. The Heart Calculator 
(2002) is reproduced in the quantitative attitude as it transitions from soul model to soul 
modulation in the emerging ‘art of subjectivity’. The reprocessed Heart Calculator 
becomes the first character in the play of the rationalesque, in which the artist’s ‘know 
how’5 is delivered as a postscript to instrumental reason. The purpose is to forge 
constructive criticism into a sharpened critical discourse, the aesthetic instrument capable 
of cutting into fault lines inherent in the constitution of reasonable subjects. 
 
Chapter 3 contributes to the art historical tradition of institutional critique, highlighting the 
injunctions on art that govern its practice in accordance with the codes and conventions of 
holding academic office. The tension between the role ‘artist’ and ‘academic’ in the 
University machine is investigated as the discrepancy between experience and description, 
inherent in the dominant research model. The ‘know how’ of artistic knowledge is 
investigated as an ambivalent academic product, established retrospectively in the rationale 
of the written thesis. The anomalies in the constitution of the artist-researcher are figured 
out through two additional characters of the rationalesque, Melville’s Bartleby the 
Scrivener and his derivative in the doctoral research, the Emotion Officer. The purpose is to 
re-evaluate the terms and conditions of academic office by modulating them in the ‘object 
lesson’6 of the studio–office assemblage, designed to question the validity of underwriting 
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art with the intellectual currency of other disciplines. The object lessons are rendered as bits 
and pieces of method, which begin to permeate the constitution of rational authority and 
question the premises upon which certain types of knowledge are valued above others. The 
experiments in visual critique prepare the ground for a fully functioning method in 
Chapters 4 and 5, which begins to take shape as a critical practice working in and through 
itself as a mode of acting and thinking at once. 
 
In Chapter 4, material critique becomes compositional method through an investigation into 
the scientific rationalization of emotion since the early 20th Century. The scientist’s model 
of emotion is apprehended as a laboratory creation similar to an aesthetic object, allowing 
for the formulation of a critical space that questions the difference between objective and 
subjective productions of affect by reproducing them in the critical character of the 
Mechanical Freud. The aim is to develop machinic vision as a diagnostic technique, which 
in this case engages the desire of the scientist as it resurfaces in the ‘scientific image of 
emotion’ (Dror, 1999b). In keeping with the quantitative attitude, the focus in the doctoral 
research is on the isolation, measurement and graphical rendition of laboratory emotion as a 
quantifiable stream of data. In the studio–laboratory assemblage a corresponding stream of 
artworks are conceived as critical emotional data, designed to infiltrate the apparent 
symmetry between the transitory emotional event and its representation as graphical 
information. A similar technique is applied to the emotion diagram of neuroscience, in 
which scientists identify emotional data as the informational flow of an affective state. With 
recourse to the semiotic method, critical emotion diagrams generate flows of emotional 
sense, which attempt to render the affective event as an unstable and destabilizing object of 
knowledge, deferred beyond reason.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces Mainframe (2005) as the culmination of my doctoral research into the 
‘art of subjectivity’. As an intersection for the production and emission of semiotic flows, 
the information architecture of Mainframe is installed and developed as a self-organizing 
creative system, the auto-poetic program taking shape as an art machine that is built by the 
people who use it. The Mainframe assemblage is developed as a machine for creating 
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production, an attempt to materialize the differential space of the artist, and in the process 
transform viewers into creative agents. The Mainframe system is then mobilized as the Inn 
of Information, a prototype site-specific institution for realizing overtly material forms of 
information architecture, enabling creativity to take place as the process/product in 
formation. The immediate purpose is to render machinic vision in the social dynamic 
between art and the informational power of rationalization, conducting and converting the 
cultural mobility of the sign by plugging into the vast semiotic energies of the information 
society. The long–term ambition is to develop Mainframe as an intelligent public art 
platform, restoring the vitality of Renaissance invention to the 21st Century subject of 
information; opening up an info-structure of permutation in the expressive exchange 
between systems of production and exhibition.  
 
The concluding chapter considers the aesthetic horizon for the ‘art of subjectivity’ by 
developing new lines of subjectivation that are open to possibility, in local and unstable 
constellations of practice. The currents of doctoral research are channelled into emerging 
creative environments, which are introduced through a third and final phase of artworks in 
various stages of development. The works in progress are proposed as fragments, 
suggestions and intimations, working within the established frame of the doctoral research.  
Distilled as variations on a theme, the artworks pass through degrees of concept and 
composition in the search for new differences. The combination-composition for unlocking 
practices onto critical territories of production is identified as a key feature of doctoral 
research. The ‘art of subjectivity’ is in turn evaluated as the decoded mode of existence, a 
creative register and critical tool for challenging limitations on sense, which remain a 
necessary condition for the production and reproduction of reasonable individuals. Artistic 
practice is opened up as the experience of critique, the realization of possibility that enables 
unthought lines of subjectivation to emerge, just as techniques for the rationalization of life 
are increasing and intensifying. The power of art may reside in its capacity to experiment, 
to do things differently without reason, but not without purpose. 
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1. Rationalization and Modernity 
 
The doctoral research addresses the development of instrumental rationality7 as a social, 
economic and cultural process. Instrumental rationality is characterized by increased 
systematization, organization, objectification compartmentalization, standardization, 
bureaucratization and intellectualization of everyday social life8. These terms are indicative 
of the subject matter as those used most frequently to describe the major traits of 
rationalization, reflecting the ultra mundane practices of secular societies, which have a 
tendency to level down all aspects of life into economic ratios,  
 
The calculating exactness of practical life which has resulted from the money economy, 
corresponds to the ideal of natural science, namely that of transforming the world into an 
arithmetical problem and of fixing every one of its parts in mathematical formula (Simmel, 
1971, 327). 
  
This chapter begins to interrogate a modern sense of ‘individuality’ that is paradoxically 
based upon the increasing economic and technical standardization of the subject. The 
sensibilities of the individual are subjugated to the external demands of a social-
technological mechanism, to the extent that all social interaction is geared towards the 
conversion of individual qualities into useful quantities. The modern schematic of 
exclusively numerical values, fixes the individual into a system of accountability, the 
valuation of personal potential in terms of productivity and performance, in the supra-
subjective exchange of a commodified labour market. The productive worker is expected to 
bracket individual traits of personality in order to become an instrument in the 
organizational apparatus, where personal aspirations are tailored to the requirements of the 
job. The inevitable fact of work, often as something that the employee would prefer not to 
do, is the activity that guarantees the operational status of the individual as a useful social 
being. In the reasonable deferment of the self, work paradoxically provides a model for 
self–fulfilment based primarily on the efficient completion of a pre-determined set of 
impersonal tasks. 
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1.1 Weber’s Model of Rationalization 
The social historian Max Weber (1864 – 1920) develops a theory of rationalization as the 
driving force for the development of industrial capital. Weber was particularly interested in 
the effects of instrumental rationality and believed that the development of a standardized 
market economy could only be achieved through the construction of instrumental social 
machinery, which is immanent with the levelling down of life into an individuated 
aggregate of goal orientated actions. The increased division and specialization of labour 
would require a useful individual as the typical character of work. The individual is 
configured as a function of society in the historic convergence of Protestant Asceticism and 
industrial capital. Weber (1903) analyses how the ‘Protestant Ethic’ provides an existing 
code of conduct and moral justification for mid nineteenth century capitalism’s emerging 
form of economic and social relations. As industrious but not self-serving the ‘objectively 
purposeful’ (Goldman, 1988, 45) individual becomes the model citizen. The art of wealth 
creation attains moral respectability as a worldly pursuit through the reconciliation of 
money and religious belief, 
 
The worldly ascetic produced by such tension becomes a systematic rationalist. He not only 
rejects the ethically irrational, aesthetic or emotional …his goal is above all wakeful 
(wache) methodical control (Beherrschung) of his own life conduct. (Goldman, 1988, 151) 
 
As a model of restraint, the ‘systematic rationalist’ forecloses on aspects of the personality 
that are seen as ‘spanners in the works’, useless anomalies like emotion that interfere with 
rationalized systems of production. The control mechanisms of the socio–technological 
machinery inhibit self–expression by overriding independent thought and action. In 
particular the machine like character of bureaucracy is designed to iron out anomalies in the 
employee, subjecting individuals to continuous measurement of their performance as the 
basis for making quantitative assessments of their proficiency in a minutiae of tasks that 
make up a ‘position’. The bureaucratic apparatus is essential for the mass administration of 
political economy, providing day to day support for commercial and legal transactions; ‘the 
objective discharge of business according to calculable rules and without regard for 
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persons.’(Weber, 1970, 215) People are not considered as valuable in themselves, as most 
personal traits do not accord with the utilitarian requirements of the system. The ideal 
bureaucracy would reject people as flawed mechanisms, whereas the actual one must 
incorporate and objectify them as approximations of precision. The absolute ‘model of 
efficiency’ denotes a functional individual devoid of all qualities, the de-personalized 
automaton of the bureaucratic machine.  
 
A key historical development in the production of the useful individual was the American 
system of scientific management. In scientific management Weber saw a pernicious form 
of social control beginning to take hold in the rapid expansion of disciplinary mechanisms, 
‘methods of measurement… rational conditioning and training of work performances’ 
(Weber, 1970, 261). This disciplinary infrastructure of mechanization, geared towards the 
external demands of an expanding technical economy, results in the dominance of 
instrumentality and the disenchantment of the secular, modern experience. The socio- 
economic subject becomes an ‘individual function’ (ibid, 261), adjusted to the specific 
requirements of modern rationalization. The historical significance of this practice lies in 
the degree to which it proved possible to codify thought and action in a prescribed model, 
through the break down of tasks into specialized and routine operations. Time and motion 
studies were carried out as a basis for optimizing the ‘work design’ (Morgan, 1997, 23) of 
any given organization. The social engineering of the workplace amounted to the 
abstraction and pre–formation of experience, independent of the actual work situation. A 
new type of pre-destination would enable factories, offices and commercial outlets to 
function smoothly as machines with interchangeable parts, where performance could be 
measured against the pre-form of an idealized system.  
 
According to Weber the methods of scientific management, especially those pioneered by 
Frederick Taylor (1856–1915), lead to the refinement and intensification of the bureaucratic 
machine. The regime of the ‘office factory’ (Morgan, 1997, 24) is refined and intensified 
between the First and Second World Wars in a gradual shift toward mass organizations of 
interchangeable parts. The scientifically managed workplace exerts a double hold over the 
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employee who is captured in a section of work, specifically designed to process the minute 
details of the organization’s internal administration. The various administrative regimes are 
directed outward, first to monitor and evaluate the performances of other individuals in 
different parts of the same organization and then into wider society, as techniques for the 
government of subjects, recorded, documented and processed in a growing network of 
bureaucratic documentation. The fully developed, modern bureaucracy  
 
stands in a specific sense, under the principle of sine ira ac studio. Its specific nature, which 
is welcomed by capitalism, develops the more perfectly the more the bureaucracy is 
dehumanized, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, 
hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. 
This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and is appraised as its special virtue. (Weber, 
1970, 215 – 16) 
 
The specific nature of bureaucracy subjugates the individual to a disciplinary infrastructure, 
adjusting and fine-tuning everyday experience in accordance with instrumental purpose. 
The immediate goal of life is to create order and routine through technical improvements to 
the organization’s efficiency, limiting the scope for open ended, independent action. This 
‘parcellization of the soul’ (Weber in Schroeder, 1992, 116) produces diluted forms of 
subjectivity that are easily activated in a socio–economic grid of objectives. The automaton 
of the office factory has a prehistory in the early templates for modern institutions, as every 
move and every intention is accounted for in the developing administrative regime. An 
excess of social control far outstrips what is required to serve the needs of economic 
development. It represents a peculiar desire for numerical precision in personal affairs, the 
irrational underbelly of rationality that begins to assume an autonomous power to scrutinize 
every particle of the individual’s existence.  
 
Weber’s analysis of modern institutions is a pessimistic vision of the objectifying effects of 
scientific-technical knowledge. There is above all a marked discontinuity between a 
privileged rationality dating from the Enlightenment tradition and the mechanized process 
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of modern scientific rationalism. The very concept of knowledge is ‘reduced to know how 
and transformed into an informational commodity’ (Scaff, 1989, 233). All meaningful 
public spaces for the cultivation of collective understanding and dynamic cultural exchange 
are gradually erased, as the experience of modernity becomes synonymous with a singular 
materialism of technical progress and economic value. The real cost of modernity is the 
price the subject pays in accepting a primarily quantitative nature, a personality system, 
formulated in the discourse of individuality as the symbolic triumph of one. The functional 
concept of the individual unit, slides across the potential subject almost unnoticed as a 
reasonable and fitting coverage, the equation of the two, subject–individual, in the 
naturalized valuation of one. As a consequence, modernity places a heavy burden on the 
shoulders of the individual who becomes subject to an all-pervasive discourse of self-
responsibility. On one side bound by the rules of institutional procedure, on the other tied to 
the social contract, the individual is invested with a duty to act responsibly as a model 
citizen. In every domain of life there is a proliferation of containment and restraint working 
to codify psychological space, lest unreasonable action should suddenly break out.  
 
The ‘heroism of modern life’9 (Baudelaire, 1863, 395–422) is encapsulated in the artist’s 
desire to transgress boundaries, overturn conventions and to live passionately by creating 
an aesthetic attitude toward the impersonal effects of institutionalized modernity, 
‘Appropriately art turns into the model for experience, for the disassociated subject driven 
back upon itself’. (Scaff, 1989, 133) The sense of the individual prevails as the dominant 
programme for a specifically modern experience in which the subject has a ‘social life’ but 
has little experience of a life that is social. As a non-rational force for questioning the 
condition of ones subjectivity, artistic practice might realize its potential to transform a 
political state of affairs, which has fallen foul of its overvaluation of the rational ego. The 
power and purpose of art is defined as its ability to delimit situations and beliefs even when 
there appears to be little room for manoeuvre. In this respect it is feasible to conceive of the 
social function of art as a rational response to an Enlightenment project gone awry. Art is a 
legitimate act of transgression for empowering a disenchanted modern individual, for 
restoring a new sense of subjectivity, once again able to grasp modern life in all its 
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complexity and creative potential. The artist contributes to a cultural and critical 
interrogation of instrumental reason, whose objective is work against its unreasonable acts.  
 
Theodore Adorno develops a critical position for art in the historical materialist tradition, in 
which the artist’s role is to remind society of what is repressed in the subject through the 
advancement of instrumental reason and its technological supports. Art configures a 
dialectical image by making us aware of the personal costs to the subject whose desire is 
governed by the optimum deployment of discursive reason, which itself perpetuates the 
individualized self as the objectified form of experience. Art is a modality of practice 
operating within the same form of experience but is not completely subsumed by it; what is 
particular to art is both continuous with and critical of a scientific rationalism of progress 
that commenced with the Enlightenment project. Art can at least approach a re-evaluation 
of the subjective condition by re–negotiating the problem of agency in an increasingly 
objectified world, 
 
Concepts are indispensable to art as they are to language but in art they become something 
other than shared characteristics of empirical objects… Art is as little a concept as it is an 
intuition and just for that reason does it protest against their separation. The falsehood 
opposed by art is not rationality per se but the fixed opposition of rationality to 
particularity. (Adorno in Berstein, 1992, 200) 
 
By implication art is a form of affective cognition that operates as a material force capable 
of exceeding the conventions of empirical perception. Art’s cultural value is to be found in 
its realization of the non-rational, non-cognitive visual experience, a ‘field of decoded 
perceptions’ (Johnston, 1999, 27) with the capacity to put things into process and exceed 
historical limits of intelligibility. Adorno’s theory of art further qualifies the constructive 
criticism of the doctoral research as approximate to the production of affective non–
concepts, with the power to move us outside a historical frame of mind. A similar 
problematic of subjectivity can be posed for critical forms of contemporary art practice; to 
what extent is it possible to conceive of emergent forms of artistic practice capable of re-
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composing the experience of a modern individual divided and fragmented in the 
deterministic grid of instrumental knowledge. How to compose the art of ‘rationality’ as a 
condition of experiential possibility, a condition whose potential is paradoxically made 
possible by a scientific–technical paradigm of quantifiable relations, that in the first 
instance would appear to have no need for the anomalies of artistic thinking. 
 
In this socio-cultural dynamic between knowledge and experience, Weber’s analysis of 
instrumental reason and its various disciplinary mechanisms, situates him somewhere 
between the dialectical materialism of Marxist critique and Foucault’s ‘critical history of 
thought’ (Foucault, 1998, 459). Weber’s sustained critique of rationalization is undoubtedly 
shaped by the principles of historical materialism, but also has the effect of destabilizing 
them as a dogma of ‘progress’. He questions the possibility of a revolutionary freedom and 
instead argues for an evaluation of ‘the force of beliefs and ideas – or, more generally, 
culture - in shaping history’ (Gane, 2004, 1). In this respect Adorno’s position on aesthetics 
resembles that of Weber’s in its proximity to Nietzsche’s genealogy of reason, albeit in a 
model of social science that would strive to interpret a meaningful artistic practice as a 
critical reflex of rationality. As the first component in the ‘art of subjectivity’, Weber’s 
critique of the objectifying mechanisms of modern rationalization destabilizes the already 
precarious position of the individual as both subject and object of knowledge, and as such 
anticipates Foucault’s genealogy of the modern subject, captured, regulated and produced 
through local and multiple networks of power-knowledge.   
 
1.2 Foucault’s Model of Power 
The ‘specific nature’ of rationalization is for Foucault to be located in a multiplicity of 
disciplinary techniques, which are not identical with their institutions. We may speak of 
rationalizations rather than rationalization as a unity of modern practices. Institutions are 
necessary for the state government of subjects but they are not centres of power in the 
traditional sense. Instead, power should be analysed as an immanent material force like 
gravity, its differentials the effects produced through infinite and repeated encounters with 
knowledge. In this respect power gets to know its subjects and is diffused through them in a 
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bottom up model, characterized by its contingent and local distribution. Discipline in its 
modern form is a type of power that may be approximate to a style,  
 
a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, 
levels of application, targets; it is a physics or anatomy of power, a technology (Foucault, 
1977, 215). 
 
According to Foucault this matrix of power relations is both individualizing and totalizing 
because ‘the disciplinary space is always basically cellular’ (1977, 143); a feature of power 
that provides it with the informational quality of a programme. The articulations of power 
stand in relation to institutional practices as software does to the hardware of the 
computational machine. The drive towards specialization and the emergence of discrete 
medical, scientific, educational, military and legal disciplines precludes the analysis of 
rationalization in general. The relationships between power and rationalization should be 
interrogated as interfaces, site-specific applications in a state of assemblage with 
institutional machinery. This ‘microphysics’ of power (Foucault, 1977, 149) is comparable 
to energy in a dynamic state, a ‘mobile field of force relations, wherein far-reaching but 
never completely stable effects of domination are produced’ (Foucault, 1978, 102). The 
discrete formation of agencies and institutions are the ‘cumulative result of a thousand tiny 
performative struggles peppered throughout the social field’ (Massumi, 2002, xix). It 
follows that discipline needs resistance as a type of friction for power to gain traction in 
new compositions of subjectivity. Resistances are immanent with various forms of power 
that manifest themselves as disciplinary techniques, which to some extent must ‘look after’ 
subjects individually, as power can only be expressed through them. The arts of 
rationalization can be analysed as the expression of modern techniques of subjectivation; 
‘the soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy, the soul is the prison of the 
body’. (Foucault, 1977, 30) 
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1.3 Power Produces Subjects as Individual 
With reference to the motif of the ‘soul model’ we can begin to imagine a force so 
prevalent and so dependent on the subject’s being that it seems to possess a metaphysical 
quality like that of God’s will, continually informing and reforming the life of the 
individual. In modernity, the power of salvation is dislocated from its traditional domain in 
the church and redistributed in the ecclesiastical function, as the basis for its re-
administration in and through the new religion of ‘the individual’. We move from the fixed 
domain of the Ministry to the interchangeable mechanism of administration, from the cleric 
to the clerk who holds not religious office but the office of the bureaucratic official. The 
saying ‘God is in the detail’ is emptied out of its original sense, consistent with Nietzsche’s 
‘old housing’ of religion. A secular bio-logic administers a life of individual details in the 
bureaucratic government of the soul. The calculable individual exists only as an effect in 
the minutiae of facts and figures, the measured ‘distribution of the living in the domain of 
value and utility. (Foucault, 1978, 144)  
 
The accumulation and intersection of identities we adhere to as ‘individual’ are techniques 
for the procedural division of both subjective and collective experience. The new religion 
of individuality emerges with modernity as its condition of possibility, installed in the 
device of the rational ego as a precarious psychology, increasingly divided within itself and 
from others. The ‘individual’ is a positive production of power who in a particular sense is 
always subject to, that is, realized or imagined in a ‘mode of subjectivation’ (Foucault, 
1998, 459). The frame of individuation is never completely closed though, allowing critical 
practices, in this case the ‘art of subjectivity’ to produce the potential of what remains 
unfinished, anomalous and problematic for experience, through the creative re-composition 
of the… 
 
ensemble of more or less regulated, more or less deliberate, more or less finalized ways of 
doing things, through which can be seen what was constituted as real for those who sought 
to think it and manage it and the way in which the latter constituted themselves as subjects 
capable of knowing, analysing and ultimately altering reality. These are the “practices” 
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understood as a way of acting and thinking at once, that provide the intelligibility key for 
the correlative constitution of the subject and object. (Foucault, 1998, 463) 
  
Critical aesthetic practices can be remade as intelligibility keys, artistic combinations 
designed to unlock the rationale of closed systems and open them onto differentials of 
knowledge and experience, rendering visible what is implicit in their constitution and 
reproduction. Art can show how easy it is to stop thinking critically and begin reciting 
discourse, becoming the object of ones discipline and in turn subject to its specific 
rationale. The force of knowledge, its facility to produce the individual as knowing subject 
and known object, is experienced as the power to create truths over and over again in the 
making of sense. The authority of the alreadymade10 artist, scientist, teacher, bureaucrat, is 
premised on the ability to perform correctly, to reproduce oneself in the pre-formative code 
of practice. The individual’s constant inability to make differences, to exceed limits of 
intelligibility and produce the new is a problem of creativity; given the infinite possibilities 
for making sense how do we account for the stability of forms? 
 
It is important to note that subjects are made stable in the discourse of individuality, the 
aggregate form of personal responsibility as a technique for the subtle management and 
correction of subjects. Individuals are positioned on the side of a ‘pastoral power’ (Foucault 
in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, 213) that looks after them and gets to know them by dint of 
their becoming individual. Individuality is an effect of rationalization whose very aim is to 
expand the social machinery in which the government of the individual continues to unfold. 
A growing discourse of information as both an instrument for the creation of individuals 
and a means for identifying them, takes hold in all areas of life, 
 
A vast meticulous documentary apparatus becomes an essential component of the growth of 
power. Dossiers enable the authorities to fix a web of objective codification… more 
knowledge leads to more specification. (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 159) 
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Foucault argues that the modern device of the file or dossier making up the individual 
‘case’, gives rise to a whole mythology of pastoral power. The X Files motto The Truth is 
Out There contains within it a new metaphysics of detail embedded in the hermeneutic of 
conspiracy theory; one need only search hard enough and the clues will manifest 
themselves. Like a knight in the quest for the Holy Grail, Fox Mulder keeps searching for 
the truth that remains elusive, as if finding it would reconstitute a meaningful sense of 
subjectivity. The supernatural entity of God is exchanged for a modern metaphysics of the 
UFO, enabling the discourse of conspiracy theory to replace a religious hermeneutic or in 
the case of The Da Vinci Code to approximate a religion, in the absence of a meaningful 
system of belief. To offset the possibility of the unbelievable, the rational ego of scientific 
logic is characterized in Mulder’s partner Dana Scully whose doubt can only be assuaged 
by proof. In the early episodes we glimpse the UFO poster in Mulder’s office with the 
caption ‘I want to believe’, the motto of a televised faith based on a belief in an object that 
is yet to be revealed.  
 
As a ‘technology of vision’ (De Laurentis, 1989) the X Files is an example of how power-
knowledge is transferable between the technical apparatuses of different socio–cultural 
institutions. It forms part of a visual economy, in this case for the cultural exchange of the 
‘mystery function’ by providing an escape from the confines of the bureaucratic apparatus 
in the imaginary apparatus of the television. In a world short on both adventure and events, 
the televised adventure is re-negotiated in the technical creation of a psychological space. 
In a similar vein the universal popularity of the Lord of the Rings Trilogy, stems from a 
return of the epic adventure with Biblical proportions, in which no individual is more 
significant than the culmination of narrative events. Such complex relations of power: 
economic, cultural and political, do not offer the possibility of an essential freedom or the 
promise of an escape from disciplinary mechanisms. It is more a question of the modes of 
subjectivation we are prepared to accept or even create, through an ongoing series of 
manoeuvres between knowledge and power.  
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As both subjects and objects of knowledge, individuals are expressions of different regimes 
of sense, determined by the types of discourse they encounter and the knowledge they 
inform themselves with and transmit to others. There is no universal expression of power 
and no overarching political regime, rather we are constituted in regimes of sense where 
‘forms of rationalization become embodied in practices or systems of practices’ (Foucault 
in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, 133), drifting over time into less easily defined and fluid 
areas of social activity, including the cultural sphere. The cultural institution of the artist 
may itself be seen as a rationing, an injunction on creativity enshrined in copyright law and 
subject to the demands of the market, ‘the ideological figure by which one marks the 
manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning’. (Foucault, 1998, 221-222) 
Constellations of sense like ‘the artist’ and ‘the author’, in which individuals are produced 
and reproduced as practitioners of knowledge, show creativity to be working in all 
directions at once in and through the subject as a locus of comprehension, expression and 
resistance. The artist assumes authority as a cultural function for setting aesthetic values, 
which may sometimes have the effect of producing limitations where we expect creativity, 
because discrete disciplines compete for the rights to make sense, and always at the 
expense of restricting the emergence of other less established practices. 
 
As the second component in the ‘art of subjectivity’ Foucault’s model of power builds on 
Weber’s critique of rationalization and its consequences for subjectivity. Like Weber and 
the Frankfurt School thinkers he addresses the problem of reason and its production in 
rationalization, through an ethical–aesthetic dimension that lends itself to the subject matter 
of the doctoral research. Although he is working from within a different philosophical 
tradition, which posits a partial and discontinuous history, Foucault’s isolation and 
identification of the mechanisms of power offers a ‘finer grained analysis’ (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, 133) of rationalization, which amplifies and further develops Weber’s 
institutional critique. The final component in the theoretical framework is Deleuze & 
Guattari’s materialist psychiatry (1984, 22), the primary operating model for constructive 
criticism, which at points in the productive cycle connects to conceptual components in 
Weber, Foucault and on occasion Heidegger. As a ‘desiring machine’ (ibid, 32), the 
 20 
abstract machine of art combines with the socio-political machines of rationalization, in a 
mode of visual critique for situating images as material fabrications of discourse, ‘sites of 
struggle… where powers converge but are also produced’ (Tagg, 1988, 148). 
 
1.4 Machinic Production - Desiring Subjects 
Eugene Holland identifies ‘three materialisms’ (1999, 4) in Deleuze & Guattari’s 
schizoanalysis, all of which come into play during the productive phase of the doctoral 
research. The materialisms are those of Freud, Marx and Nietzsche: Freud’s concept of 
libido, Marx’s concept of labour–power and Nietzsche’s concept of will to power. It is 
arguably Nietzsche’s ‘transvaluation of difference’ (ibid, 4), one might say the differential 
that operates in the evaluation of differences, which functions as a type of conceptual 
gearing device for engaging the concepts of Marx and Freud. Instead of attempting a 
synthesis of the three materialisms, Deleuze & Guattari treat them as ‘reciprocally 
corrective… forming a pattern of interference with one another rather than a combined 
conceptual edifice’ (ibid, 14). Schizoanalysis is useful for constructive criticism because it 
opens up spaces of material production in which the subjectivity of the artist can operate as 
a pattern of interference; the compositional pattern of the productive process that may be 
considered as art’s objective, and the interference pattern of the composition, which acts 
simultaneously as a critical patterning or modulation of processes of subjectivation.   
 
The critical pattern of an artistic schizoanalysis is first determined by the nature of the 
objects it engages, which are subsequently destabilized and broken down in mutations of 
productive energy. The differential and critical space of engagement in which the ‘art of 
subjectivity’ takes place, resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the machinic 
interface. In terms of aesthetic engagements with the social machinery of rationalization, 
the machinic interface can be defined as a ‘relationship of production’ (Broeckmann, 1997), 
which in the doctoral research becomes a working relationship between practices, 
expressed in creative assemblages that become operational as mixtures of technical/organic, 
biological/mechanical, scientific/poetic compositions. The machinic presupposes that 
relations of production and reproduction, including creative processes are always already in 
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working combinations of materials, techniques, technologies, discourses, knowledge and 
desires, never completely stable and with varying degrees of instability. Simple machinic 
assemblages include the artist and the pencil, the dancer and the floor, but even these 
combinations operate in a wider complex of connections; the stage and its machinery, the 
gallery and its public, the economy and its institutions. In terms of subjectivity, the 
machinic is the dynamic and productive relationship that expresses creative agents as 
mixtures or aggregates of social, technological and historical processes.  
 
The ‘art of subjectivity’ becomes machinic when it engages the creative process as an 
object of investigation, in which the subjectivity of the artist becomes both unstable and 
destabilizing in the act of composition. Art ‘goes critical’ in the machinic differential 
between established practices, the practice making differences out of practices, in the 
search for new forms of expression. The creative register is already critical in the 
productive currents of schizoanalysis, critical at the boundary between sense and non-sense 
as it operates on the boundary and across it at the same time or to put things another way, it 
is inside and outside of the frame while negotiating the production of its edges. The 
machinic production is moulded into a critical operator, enabling the artistic process to 
dislodge and destabilize its objects of investigation by producing what is already unstable 
and unfinished in their composition. Machinic art throws its objects into the mix by 
drawing them into a differential point from where differences are made. This making of 
differences is proposed as research into the potential for emergent forms in terms of how 
they work and what they do, critical states realized in a ‘materialist semiotics’ (Holland, 
1999, 21) of production. The machinic interface is a productive combination of art (creative 
possibility), artist (the differential in creation) and artefact (the difference created), the ‘in 
the making’ of artistic production at one with itself as a critical procedure.  
 
Machinic art generates creative configurations, which ‘in the making’ resist definition. ‘By 
machinic they (Deleuze & Guattari) mean functioning immanently and pragmatically, by 
contagion rather than comparison, unsubordinated to the laws of resemblance or utility’ 
(Massumi, 1992, 192). In this respect, the artist’s function is not to represent but to produce 
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connections, to unlock creative potentials from within existing disciplines, to realize new 
practices without the instrumental straightjacket of a specific rationale. Creating 
proliferations of sense involves the machinic breakdown of the rational subject through 
utilizing the artist’s non-sense as a ‘screw loose’ within the machine of rationalization. At 
the machinic interface, production is at once creative and deconstructive, engaging discrete 
forms of practice as unfinished compositions of rationality that remain intelligible only 
through the continual encoding and reproduction of their sense. ‘The machinic tends toward 
permanent opening’ (Raunig, 2006), ‘a field of decoded perceptions’ (Johnson, 1999, 27) 
for experimenting with hegemonic practices, turning both art and its objects into new 
productive territories, freeing them from themselves and freeing up creative dimensions of 
possibility.  
 
Art in this sense is an ‘abstract machine’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 496), a distinctly non 
rational, non instrumental practice that is immanent with the connections it produces, 
evolving, mutating and reconnecting with other machines (scientific-technical, educational, 
bureaucratic, economic) which are themselves always changing, 
 
the abstract machine operates at the interstice between finite and infinite, it deterritorializes 
the concrete world, breaking matter out of its overcoded forms, to put it back into contact 
with its vitality …this is art’s infinite material dimension… constructing flows of matter 
force into expressive sensations. Here art will become a politics of lived experience, a realm 
of experimentation that opens life up to alternative modes of being, affirming new realities, 
new communities and new methods of self-organization. (Zepke, 2005, 8-9) 
 
While maintaining its objects under construction, art multiplies the potential for expressive 
action and in the process becomes a critical space of contestation, a method for putting 
realities into states of composition, throwing them into relief as experiences already created 
and recreated in practice.  
 
The following chapter will make connections with the machine aesthetic of art history, 
forming creative alliances or filiations that facilitate machinic engagements with the 
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productive power of rationalization. The ‘art of subjectivity’ will begin to take shape in the 
interstice between the quantitative techniques of capital and the compositional practice of 
art. The purpose is to re-situate practice on the side of production and de–emphasize the 
representative functions of art. The productive process itself will become the object of 
investigation in terms of its development as a critical technology of vision. The conceptual 
components outlined in the introduction are formed into a machinic assemblage11 of the 
machine aesthetic, a critical operator that emerges as the quantitative attitude of 
constructive criticism. In activating the machine aesthetic and connecting it to new 
productive territories art will be developed as an instrument of critique, a compositional 
method for manufacturing new practices in a materialist semiotic that makes no rational 
distinction between established orders of production.  
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2. The Machine Aesthetic 
 
The machine aesthetic traverses a vast field of investigation, which falls outside the 
research frame of the doctoral research. The aim of this section is to provide a reference 
palette specific to processes of rationalization in which the reader can begin to make 
connections between discourses on machines, subjectivity, and artistic production. The 
connections anticipate the technique of ‘information processing’ in Chapters 4 and 5, 
realized in artistic assemblages of laboratory science, information technology, art and 
architecture. The machine aesthetic introduces the art historical background of the research, 
which is then extended into the socio–historical apparatus that gives rise to a multitude of 
rational techniques. The artworks under discussion in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 find their visual 
consistency in an eclectic mix of diagrams, models, plans, blueprints, documents, drawings, 
paintings, film and literature; expressed in material–productive complexes formed and 
reformed in the ‘irreducible materiality of discourses, actions and practices’ (Montag, 1995, 
67). In the material development of practice, the machine aesthetic enables critical artworks 
to contaminate the social mechanics of rationalization, as art becomes both a mode of 
critique and a resistant form of subjectivation. The artist’s subjectivity is immanent with the 
machines of rationalization, but simultaneously retains the capacity to interfere with them; 
unfolding in practice, expressing production, art begins to realize the possibility of making 
differences. 
 
Rutsky’s High Techne: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman 
(1999) provides a starting point for rethinking the relations between technological 
development, technological discourse and mutations in postmodern culture. The machine 
aesthetic is elaborated as a way of life in which ‘high tech’ is defined culturally in relation 
to instrumentality but is irreducible to it,  
 
the ability to technologically reproduce, modify and reassemble stylistic or cultural 
elements becomes not merely a means to an end, but an end in itself. This process of 
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technological representation, of reproducibility, alteration and assemblage can be said to 
define high tech. (Rutsky, 1999, 4) 
 
According to Rutsky, aesthetics in general and more specifically artistic discourse are 
integral to cultural conceptions and experiences of technology. In modern histories of art 
and technology, rationalization and standardization do not lead automatically to ‘form 
follows function’; it is more a question of producing the aesthetic as a technique of culture, 
hence the mutations of ‘techno–culture’ as lived relations to ones sense of subjectivity and 
subjugation to complexes of rationality.  The ‘art of subjectivity’ then, qualifies as a 
modality of experience, articulated in the desire to make something new out of ones place 
in an increasingly complex world. The machine aesthetic, reassembled into modes of 
machinic production is the style for an agency in process; extending beyond the field of art 
it never ceases to be artistic in the creation of technique.  
 
The machinic use of the machine aesthetic is developed as a tactical mutation of 
instrumental rationality, whereby the interfering mechanism of the artistic component is 
used to upset the balance of established practices. The mechanism of interference is 
characterized as the artist’s breakdown, the critical technique of breaking down and 
decomposing a dominant knowledge system while simultaneously upgrading the artistic by 
product. The critical re-composition retains various elements of the authoritative discourse 
as a form of camouflage, whereby the artist’s interference pattern is not immediately 
distinguishable from the object of investigation. In this indeterminate space of the non-
composition, codes and conventions of sense are re-negotiated and re-combined in critical 
lines of production. Art becomes an evaluative programme for reformulating practices, as it 
foregrounds the premises upon which certain types of knowledge come to be established 
and valued above others. A machine aesthetic of evaluation utilizes the artist’s ‘know how’ 
as a critical operation of extraction and insertion. Extraction involves a considered 
abstraction of the object of investigation, a deterritorialization or decoding of perception 
which forces a practice just outside its frame of intelligibility, breaking down its component 
parts into a compositional field of potential. Insertion moves toward reterritorialization and 
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recoding and involves reproducing a mutated form of practice from the field of potentiality, 
the interference pattern of compositional knowledge freed from the constraints of the 
instrumental rationale. As Rutsky argues, reassembly becomes the technical objective as 
reproduction outstrips cultural comprehension and becomes an end in itself.   
 
The artistic treatment of instrumental practices, their reassembly and reproduction, is 
delivered through the diagnostic assemblage. The critical procedure is composed and 
administered in the machine aesthetic as the art historical style whose aesthetic frequency 
resonates with that of the arts (techniques) of rationalization. The critical technology of the 
machinic composition or interference pattern is designed to retune the historical imbalance 
between the technical–instrumental and aesthetic–human components of rational 
assemblages. At the same time, the artistic frequency interferes with the production of 
subjectivities that are immanent with the practices of instrumental rationality, drawing them 
into experiential and experimental modes of composition. A gradual shift in emphasis 
toward the informational aggregates of rationalization enables constructive criticism to 
develop as a form of informational craft12, infecting over-coded rationalisms as a friendly 
virus and reproducing them in the critical frequencies of machinic vision. The machine 
aesthetic goes critical in its revised mode of informational craft, a productive register for 
deconstructing the products of rationalization. The following section will evaluate the art 
historical device of the theory machine, as a potential delivery system for critical 
techniques of informational craft.   
 
2.1 Theory Machines 
Art historical and wider cultural influences on the stylistic development of artworks in the 
doctoral research are assembled under the umbrella of the ‘theory machine’ (Kemp, 2006, 
117). Kemp develops an art historical interpretation of Leonardo’s artworks, which re-
evaluates them as theory machines not distinct from the thought processes that give rise to 
their construction. In a broader sense, the figure of the theory machine offers an aesthetic 
model for expressing thoughts in material actions, composed and registered as material 
practices. The theory machine of ‘constructive criticism’ is developed as an aesthetic and 
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critical instrument simultaneously, through the assemblage of conceptual and artistic 
components. The multiple lines of composition that materialize at the critical interface of 
this assemblage have a tendency to overwhelm established conventions of influence, 
drenching artworks in semiotic flows that are difficult to define as linear progressions 
which accord with conventional art historical or educational models.  The theory machine 
of the doctoral research is installed as a contingency in production for processing ‘the 
influential’, a device for overriding the art historical discourse of individual artists and their 
oeuvre. The following art historical influences relate to specific aspects of current practice 
in the doctoral research, which draw upon the machine aesthetic as a complementary 
operating model in art history.  
 
Kemp (2006) considers Leonardo’s drawings, plans, sketches and diagrams13 as 
experiments in thought, the material processing of concepts that may or may not be 
rendered in three dimensional form; ‘there is no safe generalization to be made here as to 
whether the theory machines were virtual or real’ (ibid, 117), Leonardo provides us with 
models, ‘speculative designs’ (ibid, 116) that have the potential to transform a situation in 
assemblages of physical forces and materials. Sometimes the theory machines worked in 
practice, sometimes they broke down or malfunctioned, and most never came to fruition. 
All were expressions of possibility, experimental forms available for testing in and through 
the act of production. The Mainframe (2005) theory machine makes production available to 
the viewer who becomes a component in the machinic assemblage by opting to join in with 
artistic process. The Renaissance spirit of ingenuity, fuelled by a desire to make plans 
informs the information architecture of Mainframe in Chapter 5.  
 
Duchamp’s enquiry into the relation between machines and creative process provides a 
resource of models, diagrams and technical drawings14, which sustain a critical discourse 
on mechanical reproduction and its consequences for the modern subject. He develops a 
supplementary role for the artist in modes of reproduction, showing how the machine 
‘expresses in its content what it has already made clear by its form: a way of producing 
production, a willing of further machinic agencies’ (Gaffney, 2006, 31). Duchamp’s 
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techniques for tapping into the desire of the machine, treat the artist as a contingency and 
simultaneously undermine the principle of self-expression; it is more a case of how 
expression modulates the self as a component in machinic assemblages of production. 
Duchamp’s Readymades, which interrogate ‘the conditions for the existence of art in a 
given cultural formation’ (de Duve 1996, 101), have informed the diagnostic theory 
machines in Chapter 4, in terms of testing the expressive possibilities for making emotional 
sense. 
 
Francis Picabia’s ‘machinic blueprints’ (Gaffney, 2006, 55) have clarified the role of the   
artist as a builder of assemblages, in which he is both producer and produced, 
 
the role of the artist is not so much to copy the object, but to form an alliance with it; it is 
the identification of a particular pattern or movement – not its representation – that joins the 
object to a related movement in the artists association of ideas. The work of art is no more 
than a bit of code that has been separated from the order of production by the intervening 
gesture of the artist. (Gaffney 2006, 89)  
 
Picabia’s mechanomorphic pictures (Figs. 1, 2) develop a visual language from technical 
manuals and scientific revues, adapting artistic techniques to emergent forms of creative 
utility. The machinic formations take shape in a semiotic energy that finds expression in 
organic-mechanical configurations of the electrical. Unlike the Futurists, Picabia, Duchamp 
and other Dada artists were not trying to depict the machine as definitively modern. Instead, 
their machine aesthetic draws attention to already immanent forces of the machinic, the 
energetic of desire composing and conducting in the artistic becoming of machines.  
 
The natural inheritor of the Dada tradition is arguably Fluxus. Fluxus productions were 
movements of affiliations, alliances and networks in which contingent events took 
precedence over the conventional exhibition of artworks. The disposable nature of the 
artwork tapped into the semiotic detritus of everyday life and turned it into something new. 
Although a naive attempt to do away with the institutional practice of art, Fluxus did raise 
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questions about the status of the artist as producer in a culture already saturated with 
productive processes. George Maciunas’s Learning Machines, (Fig. 3a) are of particular 
interest as a series of diagrams ‘intended as the first surface for a three dimensional storage 
and retrieval system’ (Saper, 1998, 142). Maciunas’s Fluxus Box (Fig. 3b) condenses the 
expressive potential of the ‘art movement’ into the utility of the artist’s tool box, that once 
opened by the audience as producers, takes on a life of its own regardless of the artist’s 
intentions.15 In a similar vein, George Brecht’s Universal Machine (1965) was a device for 
producing variable combinations of information ‘not as part of a descriptive system (as a 
cognitive work), but as part of generative interactions’ (Saper, 1998, 145). Fluxus machines 
produce chance combinations of information and documentation just at the point in history 
where they begin to merge into a plethora of rational systems. As an interactive model for 
‘information processing’, Mainframe (2005) is a variant of the Fluxus information 
aesthetic.   
 
A diagrammatic style takes shape in the latter stages of the doctoral research from within 
the territory of the theory machine. As a potential for material production ‘the diagram… 
seems to have a distinct role, irreducible to either the icon or the symbol’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988, 531). The diagram is utilized as a shape potential for combining discourse 
and materiality into new models of practice. A procedure for organizing relations between 
words, images and objects, the diagram acts as a differential between the art of 
rationalization, (management systems, information processing, mechanisms, functions, 
techniques) and the art of subjectivity, allowing the latter to occupy the former as a critical 
practice that remains within its object of investigation and simultaneously opens up the 
potential to make differences out of it, 
 
The diagram is different from the structure in that it refers to a system in disequilibrium, 
rather than a closed system of equivalence and exchange… This image is best thought of as 
that of the problem or the problematization (Marks, 1995, 75). 
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In differing from established systems of practice the diagram becomes an abstract machine 
for producing them differently. The problematic becomes a productive energy for opening 
up closed systems and breaking them down in constructive criticism. In Chapter 4, 
diagrams in the neuroscience of emotion are reproduced as diagrams in the ‘art of 
subjectivity’, unhinging the cognitive model with a diagnostic of creative excess ‘it is as 
much a political as a scientific affair: science must not go crazy’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988, 143).  The visual language of these critical diagrams has in turn been informed by the 
abstract drawings of Sol le Witt (1993) and the diagrammatic styles of Stephen Willats 
(1973, 1976,), Peter Greenaway (1999), Simon Patterson, (2002), Langlands & Bell (1996, 
2002) and Keith Tyson (2002). Historians of graphical information such as Gerritson, 
(1979), Pedersen (1988, 1997), Richards (2000) and Tufte (2001) have provided a wider 
image resource, connecting the instrumental diagrams of rationalization to the 
diagrammatic aesthetic of art history.   
 
Finally, the socio-cultural products of rationalization provide the primary subject matter to 
be reworked and reproduced in the ‘art of subjectivity’. Readymades in the Duchampian 
sense, the diagrams of neuroscience, graphs from the physiology of affect, technical 
manuals and instructions, motifs from information technology, systems analysis, 
diagnostics, management theory and cybernetics, not to mention the economic products of 
the ‘creative industries’, films, television, books, magazines, advertisements, websites and 
popular music, all provide a reference palette of knowledge, skills and materials to be used 
and re-used in the ‘art of subjectivity’. The first readymade though, is an artwork produced 
as part of my MA research into the rationalization of emotion. The Heart Calculator16 
(2002) forms part of Boots the Chemist’s Learning Through Play range of educational 
children’s toys. Initially the object was cast in twenty different materials and re-branded 
with various logos in the Shelf Life (2002) and Still Life (2002) compositions. In the 
doctoral research the Heart Calculator is reworked and reproduced as a product of the text, 
transitioning from soul model of representation to soul modulation of production. The task 
of ‘providing an image’ is re-conceived in the textual reproduction of the Heart Calculator, 
the machine aesthetic put into practice on the production line of ‘machinic vision’ 
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(Johnson, 1999, 27). The reworked Heart Calculator is pressed into action in the search for 
a differential style of rationalization, which finds expression in the artistic disposition of the 
‘quantitative attitude’.  
 
2.2 Providing an Image: From Representation to Production 
 
What the modern (non) artwork seems most to lack in Benjamin’s eyes is the ability to 
provide an image. (McMahon 2002, 4) 
 
The philosophical and artistic problem of how to provide an image has been at the heart of 
my artistic practice from the outset. Prior to starting an MA in Contemporary Art in 2001, I 
had never made what are called artworks. I had writing, sketches, drawings, thoughts, 
perceptions, knowledge, skills, intuitions and desire, in short practices and experience but 
no artworks. Somehow art had never quite entered the frame, although in retrospect I had 
been deploying techniques of analysis and critique from the fields of critical theory, cultural 
studies and art history that were approximate to contemporary artistic strategies. The 
transition into artistic practice was therefore a material extension of theoretical frameworks 
of critical enquiry, and an opportunity to address the intellectual limitations and potentials 
of those frameworks in critical modes of visual practice. The search for a form of visual 
practice that could combine my existing knowledge of critical theory and a developing 
interest in artistic practice was initially an attempt at providing an image of an artistic 
practice capable of integrating philosophical, critical and compositional techniques.  
 
In 2002 an initial series of artworks, produced as part of my MA research into the modern 
rationalization of emotion, approached the task of ‘providing an image’ with the aim of 
locating a point of reflection for mediating between language and materiality in 
communicative aesthetic models. The artwork as soul model was designated a poetic 
representation of a subjective state of affairs, the ‘how things are’ of modernity, produced 
as a form of protest against the increasing power of rationalization. The artwork ‘figured 
out’ the consequences for subjectivity by exploring the similarities and differences between 
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historical–materialist and archaeological critiques of the Human Sciences, with particular 
emphasis on their relationship to the productive processes of rationalization. In a series of 
artistic case studies engaging with historical representations of emotional sense, visual 
practice played itself out a compositional pattern of interference between dialectical 
materialism and discursive formation, a constructive-critical analysis of the relationship 
between number and emotion in modernity.  
 
My MA thesis prised open a space between meaning and materiality that allowed art to 
function as a switch between the two. In the critical ‘writing up’ of the practical process, 
the artwork acted as a conduit between discursive analysis and dialectical materialism. 
Artworks formed a critical discourse on the commodification of emotion by apprehending 
the social production of ‘truths’ about the interior life of the individual. The Heart 
Calculator (2002) was re-evaluated as an apparently benign function of pastoral power and 
subjected to an intensive discursive analysis that would interrogate the conditions of its 
possibility as a meaningful cultural object. How did the Heart Calculator emerge as an 
objectified form of emotion and how did it come to make sense as that which can signify 
something about the emotional life of the individual? As a caption point for the extension 
of thought into materiality the Heart Calculator ‘provided an image’ for a condition of 
subjectivity and unexpectedly became the catalyst for mapping the complex intersections of 
power-knowledge which gave rise to that condition as both modern and individual.  
 
Material productions of the Heart Calculator series were made prior to the writing of the 
M.A. thesis and so remained reflective of a starting point that addressed the 
commodification of emotion. The artworks were rendered as material representations of the 
process of reification, the ‘historical replacement of meaning by abstract calculation, as the 
basis of social order’ (Holland, 1996, 241). In an attempt to produce an interdisciplinary 
critique from artistic, historical and philosophical components, the artistic event as 
production and exhibition lagged behind current thinking, which emerged retrospectively 
through the aforementioned discursive analysis of the object. Although the enterprise 
focused on making artworks, art lost its material centre of gravity in the intellectual 
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rationale and was left with only its communicative function as a thing recognized and 
‘finished off’ by the reader of the image. The discrepancy between theory and practice 
resulted in the material production of a dialectical image that maintained the convention of 
a critical distance between subject and object. The artist situated as an aesthetic sensibility 
in opposition to the machine of rationalization, the idealized position of the Romantic 
‘alienated not from the present but from life, from its present and future’ (Young, 1992, 
144). Conversely, the latter section of the M.A. thesis collapsed the critical distance of the 
dialectical image by situating the artist as always already a component in various types of 
socio–technological machines or the productive matrix of power relations described in the 
introduction to the doctoral research. 
 
Artistic and philosophical components remained out of sync and proved insufficient for 
addressing the indifference of modern mechanisms and their disregard for persons. ‘Faced 
with seemingly boundless homogeneity, how do you make a difference?’(McMahon, 2002, 
3) The doctoral research brings practice up to speed with current thinking, through the 
development of a compositional method designed to restore the material centre of gravity to 
art as a non–rational, creative mode of conception. It will be argued that this can only be 
achieved by experimenting with subjectivity as a contingency in the production of 
artworks, ‘depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator and of analysing 
the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse’. (Foucault, 1998, 221) Making 
differences will conceive of the artist’s relation to the process of rationalization in positive 
terms as the basis for producing the ‘art of subjectivity’. The frame of the rational ego as a 
point of stability and cognition will be put in process, it will ‘go with the flow’ in any given 
situation, event or circumstance of practice and open itself up to the permutations of 
possibility, which arise from the abstract forces of political economy.  
 
Melissa McMahon’s insightful essay Beauty: Machinic Repetition in the Age of Art (2002) 
identifies this contingency as Kant’s ‘any moment whatever’ and compares it to Benjamin’s 
‘here and now’, as different aesthetic responses to the indifferent and abstract mechanisms 
of modernity. The responses reflect the discrepancy between the subject positions of artist 
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and theorist in academic research, and as such have acted as a template for thinking through 
the conditions for expression in modernity as a ‘properly artistic problem’ (McMahon, 
2002, 5). Benjamin’s ‘here and now’ takes rationalization as a general state of affairs in 
which the alienated individual is unable to grasp - make sense, recognize, contemplate - the 
totality of the modern condition. Impotent in the face of a ‘gormless modernity’ (ibid, 4) 
the artist struggles to retrieve something of lived experience, to provide an image from the 
abysmal debris of a fragmented modern existence,  
 
the aesthetic as a synthesizer of values, relations and forces…a point of reflection, 
identification and orientation for the subject in relation to its community and to the world. 
(McMahon, 2002, 4) 
 
Benjamin does not conceive of the potential for affirming the modern condition, but rather 
negates it as something inhuman and de-humanizing. This subject position is literally cast 
in the Heart Calculator in an act of representation. A functional motif for the functional 
individual, the alienated soul accumulates in the Heart Calculator as a figure for the 
instrumental machinery of modern life. The rational ego also ‘finds an image’ there in the 
mirror of experience; the machine aesthetic reflected in the art of representation about a 
rationalized state of affairs. This subject position is recognized on the other side of the 
artwork as text, where meaning is paid out in the productive reading of its significance, 
both positions being identical with each other in the symbolic exchange of communication.  
 
As a representative model for experience, the Heart Calculator is identified in the M.A. 
research as a heavy sign, laden with the weight of cultural significance. The image was 
grasped in terms of Benjamin’s ‘here and now’ and unpacked in an artistic process that 
qualified as an extension of the textual practice tradition, a tradition characterized by an 
analysis of the play of signs. Everything that happened to alter the object was geared 
towards changing its meaning as a ‘sign of life’, enabling it to refract an oppositional 
artistic knowledge. The reader of images was addressed in a communicative model, based 
on the premise that artworks and texts were interchangeable as signifying systems. The art 
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object catalysed a wider critical and historical reading of the relationship between modern 
subjectivity and representation, an expansion of the singularity of the work into the 
multiples of its text.  Without exception, the creative modifications, adjustments and 
assemblages involving the Heart Calculator were designed to maximize the potential for a 
textual diagnosis, in which the artistic production was of less importance than the quality of 
readings it would produce.  
 
The art of representation was like an adapted programme for making the transition into a 
critical visual practice. The purpose of the Heart Calculator was to mediate between the 
disciplines of art and critical theory, using the language of the latter as an application that 
allowed the former to get started. A momentum of sorts was created but with hindsight the 
desire for a stability of form in the framework of the ‘here and now’ as opposed to the fluid 
composition of contingency in the ‘any moment whatever’, captured the artwork in a logic 
of representation that added another strata of rationality to the layers already under 
investigation. The arbitrary character of the sign may appear to offer an infinite potential 
for signification but in fact it becomes a trap,  
 
The entire linguistic system is founded upon the irrational principle that the sign is 
arbitrary… applied without restriction, this principle would lead to utter chaos. (Saussure in 
Chandler, 2002, 29)  
 
Utter chaos seldom ensues, because comprehension is a necessary restriction internal to the 
workings of coherent signifying systems, all of which have a rationality of their own as 
socially and historically motivated coding machines. The social injunctions on signs stave 
off chaos by allowing them to cohere into communicative systems, which are never 
completely arbitrary because total abstraction would destroy the meaningful and 
communicative function of the sign, in other words things would go mad in explosions of 
signification.  
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Techniques of representation move against an explosion of sense because they are derived 
from the dogma of the represented and representing individual. Representation serves 
rationalization as the general principle governing the unpredictable, chaotic forces of 
modernity in flux. Through the imaginary apparatus of representation (the media), the 
individual is the representing and represented formula of modern democracy. A critical and 
artistic Heart Calculator can only be sustained as an oppositional image through the 
conflation of media and communication in a synthesis of representation. To identify the 
‘provided image’ is to create its effect through the negation of the conditions that give rise 
to it. The privileged position of the critical observer immobilizes art’s potential as an 
aesthetic force by reducing it to an object of contemplation, the effect of individual 
recognition contracting expressive potential and restricting the possibility for the 
emergence of the new. There is nothing vital or affirmative in the machine aesthetic of the 
Heart Calculator because like the modern subject of representation it signs up to a long and 
drawn out analysis in the mirror of self-reflection. 
 
In contrast to Benjamin, McMahon’s reading of Kant’s ‘any moment whatever’ allows for a 
decoding of subjectivity in the aesthetic interface of modernity, refusing the Romantic and 
Humanist distinction between nature and mechanism. An aesthetic attitude is formulated in 
the modern complex, with a capacity for producing revitalized forms of subjectivity; an 
experiential shift from a recognized sign of representation to an encountered sign of affect. 
The artistic encounter with the forces of rationalization will foreground the immediacy of 
the aesthetic event, which ‘produces the dynamism of the beautiful and its capacity to 
provoke thought’ (McMahon, 2002, 7). Thought is always already in the material event, as 
that which is taking place and producing new thought. Effect precedes cause in the act of 
creation because new practices must unfold materially with themselves as actions not pre-
determined by existing relations of sense. The transition toward an encounter with the new 
is therefore also a movement from one kind of subject position to another through creative 
re–engagements with the machines of rationalization. It is a movement from a produced 
individual, represented as the effect of a calculative universe to a subject in process, whose 
art is the state of transformation itself. The art of self-process is expressed in the movement 
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between different orders of sense production, taking place in the differential that generates 
distinctions between things, ‘Modern individuality constructs itself au courant (‘on the 
run’) in a heightened sensibility to the actual that is inseparable from a movement of 
actualization’. (McMahon, 2002, 7) 
 
McMahon’s reading of Kant appropriates his concept of the aesthetic in the Critique of 
Judgement as a third term between the mechanical and the organic. The beautiful is 
manoeuvred into a contingent and mobile relation with the continual unfolding of events. A 
desire for the ‘big picture’ able to transcend the mundane and fix a point of reflection is 
supplanted by desire in process, which is immanent in modernity as that which produces 
above all else a movement of expression ‘on the run’. The fragments of modernity cannot 
be restored to a whole and the sum of its parts are greater than the whole, a doubling of 
contingency that situates the artist as an agent of transformation, producing indeterminate 
compositions or assemblages from a multitude of changing situations and things. A 
specifically modern aesthetics flourishes in the small and serial act in which the beautiful 
becomes the process itself. In the expressive sequence, the ‘art of subjectivity’ is put into 
process, the differential space of aesthetic practice as ground for a tectonics of thought and 
action. The infinite capacity for continuous engagement and disengagement, fuelled by a 
desire to exceed a state of affairs, is ‘the critical imperative’ (McMahon, 2002, 8), and it 
continues to reverberate in Deleuze & Guattari’s concept of the machinic as a philosophical 
attitude toward modernity. The remainder of this chapter develops the machinic into a 
critical style, suitable for addressing the practical content of the doctoral research.  
 
John Johnston’s essay Machinic Vision (1999), adapts Deleuze & Guaatari’s concept of the 
machinic to create the potential for a visual interface between the technical and the organic. 
Johnston develops this visual interface as a ‘field of decoded perceptions’ (ibid, 27), a 
differential space of composition in which art becomes subject to machinic processes of 
production, taking place in the breakdown of historical boundaries between mechanical and 
organic registers of sense. The opposing terms maintain received cultural differences 
between the human and the non-human or between nature and rationality as described in 
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the Romantic tradition. In order to overcome this somewhat artificial distinction, machinic 
vision engages the modern machines of rationalization in working combinations of the 
human-technical, in which the subject is always already a component in machinic 
assemblages. Subjectivity as such remains under construction and open to possibility, even 
as it meets repeated and systematic attempts to close it down; potentials of creative agency 
are available but only as social and historical differentials of experience. Johnston goes on 
to suggest that the machinic artist must continually connect with and transform the object 
of investigation, if art is to sustain the vital force it needs to be a life affirming, creative 
activity. 
 
Machinic vision provides an image not of things in themselves but of things in production, 
by conceiving of bodies and machines as ever changing aggregates of both organic and 
mechanical functions entering into ‘machinic relationships’ (Johnston, 1999, 28) with each 
other. What is interesting from an artistic point of view are the types of agency that may 
emerge in the interstice between mechanistic and organic modes of activity, creative 
processes that are the emergent possibility of machinic assemblages. In terms of artistic 
production, the machinic affords art an opportunity to encounter mechanistic, over 
determined and instrumental forms of rationality on their own territory, as opposed to the 
critical ideal of art, which is presented as the only viable alternative to Weber’s ‘iron cage’ 
of modern rationalism. In creative engagements with the practices of rationalization, the 
‘art of subjectivity’ adopts machinic production as an expressive energy that is irreducible 
to the humanist ideal of ‘self expression’, and in the process destabilizes the sense of the 
rational ego as the necessary condition for calibrating the knowing subject as individual.   
 
The ratio of the modern individual is geared up to reproduce combinations of forces that 
work to control the productive desire of the subject in particular ‘set ups’, but they do not 
form a fixed or inevitable sequence of regulation. No matter how fine-tuned the forces are 
as mechanisms of capture, anomalies are never completely ironed out and something 
always escapes. Uncertainty prevails at the interface of the machinic relationship, an 
upsetting of the balance between two opposing processes;  
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at points of instability, where a functional equilibrium gives way to movements of change 
and becoming, there … is a decoding or deterritorialization; but on the opposed face of the 
assemblage, in contrast to these ‘lines of flight’ there are processes of stratification, 
involving redundancy and recoding, or reterritorialization. (Johnston, 1999, 28) 
 
The ‘points of instability’ are windows of opportunity for the artist. Creation initially 
moves in the direction of chaos, a radical disturbance in overcoded, overly rationalized 
regimes of sense. Gradually, by various degrees of giving way to meaning, a recoding finds 
traction fuelled by the desire to make sense again. As a consequence the artwork as process 
is to some degree recaptured as the product of a partial sedimentation in meaning. The most 
affective ‘spanners in the works’ restrain certitude and maintain the charge of uncertainty, a 
charge that culminates in the force of the encountered sign. By definition it is the sign that 
moves us through its capacity to displace our desire to know and interfere with our sense 
bearings as ‘all present and correct’. In contrast, the representative sign points in the 
opposite direction toward a corrective, regulatory ground of cognition, which adheres to the 
formation of a rational ego. The machinic artist experiences the sense of losing oneself to 
the creative process, and is in the same movement revitalized as a component in the 
machinic composition, capable of deterritorializing the arts (techniques) of rationalization 
in the practice of a non-rational art. The machinic process stresses what needs to be done in 
order to convey movements of sense that become discontinuous with the representation of 
existing states of experience. By becoming a little less rational and a little more abroad the 
task of ‘providing an image’ is transformed; the problem is ‘not to render the visible, but to 
render visible.’ (Klee, in Smith, 1996, 40)  
 
In the interstice between words and things, material and meaning, is a vital and dynamic 
space for re-rendering the Heart Calculator in process with the power of rationalization. 
The first artworks in the doctoral research therefore, are expressed in the written thesis as 
possible forms of production, material potentials that are yet to be realized. The purpose of 
this heart operation is to configure a subject position for a machinic engagement with the 
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text, designed to subvert its effect as a stabilizing force of cognition, a coding machine for 
the identification and explanation of previously made artworks. The traditional role of the 
academic thesis is to provide a retrospective sense for the artworks as representations, to 
take readings that describe and qualify them according to various intellectual discourses. A 
deliberate loosening of the academic straightjacket frees up an expressive energy, an art 
movement for powering up a singularly artistic machine with the capacity for processing 
research in the compositional method. The ‘art of subjectivity’ and the productive critique 
of rationalization are brought together as interchangeable processes in the assemblage of 
constructive criticism; ‘art… grasped in terms of creators and producers, not recipients’ 
(Heidegger, 1979, 70).   
 
The thought process moving into material action is conceived as already within the act of 
material expression. Expression is apprehended as an immanent creative force, distributed 
in and through material complexes, which express the conditions of possibility for the 
subject whose subjectivity is both affect and effect within the material complex. As forms 
and contents of expression, subjects experience and may also experiment with their ideas 
and values as immanent in the irreducible materiality of discourse, actions and practices, 
 
material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are 
themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of 
that subject. (Althusser, 1971, 169)  
 
The artistic reflex is activated with the production of the doctoral ‘research subject’, as both 
academic artist and subject matter at the same time. There is a convergence between forms 
of rationalization, forms of subjectivity and forms of activity, in modes of expression which 
emerge as transformative compositional spaces, where forms and contents are continually 
moving in and out of each other and are themselves continually changing. The diagnostic 
space becomes an expressive space, becomes a critical space in Chapter 4; the informative 
space, becomes a productive space, becomes a space in formation in Chapter 5.  
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As a precursor to those chapters the Heart Calculator (Figs. 4-6) will now enter into a 
machinic relationship with the power of number. The Heart Calculator instructions (Fig. 7) 
provide a readymade machinic blueprint for devising new lines of expression, which draw 
upon the productive energy freed up by the abstract and calculative relations of exchange 
value. The destabilization of meaning in capital, its material fluxes and schisms are treated 
as moments of opportunity for re-materializing the Heart Calculator in conjunction with a 
radical decoding of experience,  
 
 the decoding linked to axiomatization, the process central to capitalism whereby streams of 
quantified factors of production (materials , skills and knowledge) are conjoined in order to 
extract a differential surplus: decoding both supports and results from axiomatization, 
transforming meaningful qualities into calculable quantities. Deleuze and Guattari disagree 
radically with both Weber and Lukacs however, in considering decoding not as sterile 
disenchantment or mystifying fragmentation but as the positive moment in the dialectic of 
capitalist development: as the potential for freedom and permanent revolution, opposed by 
the forces of recoding and capitalist authoritarianism. (Holland, 1996, 241) 
 
The ‘positive moment’ in the formation of artistic method for the doctoral research arises 
from a creative re-evaluation of the differential between qualitative and quantitative values 
in the socio-cultural field. The quantitative territory of the rational ego is introduced as a 
problematic state of affairs, only insofar as it contains a historical condition of possibility 
for art. Practice is re–engaged in the power of number, through an intensive reworking of 
the Heart Calculator, a preliminary artistic audit of rationalization. The concept of quality 
(a term for differences of meaning) passes into quantity as that which has a greater affinity 
to materiality, in this same movement the difference between quality and quantity is 
destabilized, as terms standing in opposition to each other. The machinic production sits 
between the two and leans toward the quantitative, a quantitative attitude of overproduction 
conceived as a material breakdown of meaning. The ‘differential surplus’ is the artwork, the 
significant quantity that paradoxically resists qualitative definition as a productive process. 
Hence, as Holland suggests, the artwork begins to emerge from a ‘stream of quantified 
factors’ (1996, 241) in which the strategic composition of materials, knowledge and skills, 
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yields not a product of contemplation but a critical production. Where previously the 
subjective encounter with the quantitative was experienced in negative terms, it will find 
new expressions through the productive power of rationalization. The Heart Calculator 
instructions provide not an image but a potential formula for producing the Heart 
Calculators as a quantity of art. The formula becomes an experiment of discourse, a recipe 
for the shaping and reshaping of things in and through the act of expression.  
 
2.3 Overflow Calculation: Producing the Quantitative Attitude 
In the shaping and reshaping of rationalization, the Heart Calculator instructions (Fig. 7) 
can be used to reformulate a differential object. In the machinic register, the image of 
calculation gives way to the infinite desire of number, engaging the productive power of 
rationalization to send the Heart Calculator in unexpected directions. Following the 
quantitative trajectory described above, the calculative excess of the instructions is utilized 
as the key component in an artistic assemblage of calculation, powered by the quantitative 
attitude. The Heart Calculator loses its stability of form and gets drawn into a ‘stream of 
quantified factors’, which together resist the meaningful framing of a produced ‘work’. 
Work precisely becomes artwork in the continued expression of an object that eventuates, 
an object taking place in a semiotic stream of materiality, the referent of permutation 
infused with the quantitative attitude. Knowing about the Heart Calculator has no rational 
connection to how it can be materially expressed, revealing at the same time the 
permeability of meaning as that which must be materially reproduced in never completely 
stable formulations of sense.  
 
Meaning taking place as a factor of materiality produces the artistic ‘overflow calculation’ 
as semiotic flow, creating instability of form in the visual economy of machinic process. 
The Heart Calculator of the retail economy was for sale as an educational children’s toy in 
Boots the Chemist’s Learning Through Play range, the peculiar excess of calculation in the 
operating instructions going far beyond the requirements of a young child. The Learning 
Through Play discourse is an economic function of pastoral power, designed to reduce the 
numerical force of capital to individual proportions, as it draws the child into an apparently 
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benign relationship with the unmotivated objectivity of calculation. Incorporated into 
number the child is ‘taken in’ by it, becoming acquainted with the meaning of calculation 
through ‘a schemata of constraint, applied and repeated… exercises not signs’ (Foucault, 
1978, 128). In assuming the subject position of the child the machinic artist can destabilize 
the constraints inherent in the instruction and produce a surplus of action by adopting a 
positively indifferent attitude to the statement ‘learning through play’. The injunction on 
the productive force of number is lifted by tapping into the process of the ‘overflow 
calculation’, a leakage of numeric excess through the meaningful boundary of disciplinary 
arithmetic. In the artistic ‘overflow calculation’, indifference equates to neither disinterest 
nor the alleged ‘objectivity’ of arithmetic, it is the expression of a quantitative attitude. The 
result, outlined below, is a material process that exercises the discourse ‘learning through 
play’, the practical content of the overflow calculation exceeding the instructive limit of its 
expression.  
 
The Heart Calculator cast in the machinic style delimits the calculative rationale and 
simultaneously decodes meaning in quantity, leaving only the aesthetic force of 
manufacture. The ‘overflow calculation’ displaces the semiotics of meaning with a 
semiotics of flow, streaming the Heart Calculator into the material event of expression. 
Breaking the mould so to speak, involves making a series of plaster casts over a short 
period of time. The silicon rubber mould, used for a total of just thirty casts to date, would 
be pressed into action in an intensive cycle of production, designed to test its physical 
capacity to retain a stability of form.  In theory the mould is good for about one thousand 
casts before it begins to lose its integrity, at which moment a transformative point is 
reached that continues along a trajectory of defacement and deformation, until the image of 
the calculator would no longer be recognizable on the surface of the heart. Difference 
would emerge in the positive indifference of the quantitative attitude, which finds a 
material affirmation in the accelerated creative act of overproduction. Furthermore, the 
subject position of the artistic function would also be cast as interchangeable with the place 
of the viewer. Individuals would take place in the creative process as a situation becomes 
vacant, the continual cycle of production phased over four weeks, producing well in excess 
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of two thousand casts. The casting of an artistic subject position interchangeable with that 
of the viewer becomes the basis for recasting the material condition of that position in the 
serial Heart Calculator, until it suffers a break down in form. The artistic overflow 
calculation achieves both the instability of form and the composition of a more permeable 
subjectivity in the soul modulation of the Heart Calculator. 
 
The unlimited edition of the overproduced Heart Calculator collapses the spaces of 
production, consumption, distribution and reconstitution into one productive sequence. 
Viewers/producers would be invited to take their Heart Calculators away with them as 
their own products, distributing the artwork into a thousand tiny fragments of discourse, 
circulating as a conversation of value in other social domains.  ‘I did that’ would at least 
yield the response, did what? Expressed in new terms the disseminated Heart Calculator 
would force a small but significant sideways shift from economic determination to poetic 
reproduction, achieved paradoxically in the quantitative sequence. Art emerges in the doing 
of art, subjectivity de-merges from a discernable individuality in the same process, the 
breakdown of individuated experience in the creative questioning of the agreed terms and 
conditions of socio-economic value. The Heart Calculators left in the productive space 
would be stored in modular stacks like those found in warehouses to dry out, before being 
moved to a wall covered in shelves. The strategic recalibration of Shelf Life (Fig. 5) would 
aim to reconfigure the ‘gallery’ as a sight line for the destruction of the surplus casts. 
Excess calculators are thrown at those on the shelves as artistic value is broken into pieces, 
the fragments ground down into raw material and thrown into the mix again for the casting 
process. ‘In the making’ the meaning of value is deposed, to the extent that it remains 
undecided in relation to the established terms of symbolic exchange.  
 
Reproduced in the hegemony of all things calculable, the meaning of the art object is made 
to exceed a rational limit.  In the critical breakdown of meaning art is not about things it 
produces them; it is more a question of how to make the differences of constructive 
criticism. The semiotic flux of the overflow calculation breaks the existing conventions of 
value at every point in the productive sequence, making it difficult for a meaningful system 
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to adhere. Heart Calculators in process, render visible the indifference of the quantitative 
attitude, experienced as the fleeting possibility of an emergent and deterritorialized 
experience, the non–reality of the ‘Symbolic register’s radically fluid form of semiosis, free 
from identity fixations as ‘schizophrenia’ (Holland, 1996, 243). In the dynamic between 
fluidity and fixation metaphor ‘provides an image’, metonymy produces a movement. The 
sequential force of metonymy displaces the desire to frame things by inhibiting the 
formation of cognitive scaffolds, which support artworks in acts of recognition and 
discussion. The trade off between making a difference and making a meaning is played out 
in the formation and dissolution of identities, between expression and comprehension, 
between action and description. There is an inverse relation between movement and 
meaning, producing stability of form in metaphor and instability of form in metonymy. 
Machinic vision is the analogue of this slippage, rendering visible the gaps between 
registers; the asymmetry of images to words, of signs to substance, of experience to 
knowledge. The quantitative attitude is realized as a formula of machinic vision, expressed 
in the technology of desire it does not attempt to bridge the gaps but finds a productive 
energy in them. 
 
The machinic formulated in the quantitative attitude does not adhere to the machines and 
mechanisms of instrumental technology in the usual sense. As a malleable concept it opens 
onto a field of possibility for adapting rational techniques to artistic purposes. In this 
regard, there are similarities between the machinic and Heidegger’s account of the Greek 
term techne, generally translated as art, skill or craft. In Ancient Greece, instrumental 
technology was bound up with ‘know how’ in a milieu of cultural practices which offered a 
more manifest experience of life,  
 
Greek techne is a form of unsecuring that is non-instrumental, and thus more closely related 
to artistic production (poiesis) than to the production of modern technology, which 
regulates and secures the world in instrumental terms. The world is thus set in place 
[gestellt], which is why Heidegger figures the essence of modern technology, its mode of 
representation, as a kind of Enframing [Ge–stell]. While Enframing stresses setting in 
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place, regulating and securing, the emphasis in techne is on setting free, on unsecuring, on 
allowing the world to be brought forth in non–instrumental terms. (Rutsky, 1999, 7) 
 
In The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977) Heidegger opens out a 
dynamic space between the scientific–technical and ethical–aesthetic paradigms, in which 
art does not simply stand for what is considered human in opposition to instrumental 
means. Machinic vision introduces desire into the composition of techne, as a premise for 
‘going critical’ in semiotic breaches of historical situations and boundaries. In the ‘any 
moment whatever’ of its socio-economic situation, art must make new values if it is not to 
be marginalized in the passivity of aesthetics or rationalized in the ‘rigour’ of other 
disciplines. The non-aesthetic, non-rational artistic production is able to engage the 
scientific–technical complex and reveal its limitations, only if at the same time it resists 
being classified as an object of aesthetic reflection. In other words, the institutional desire 
to quantify, calculate and classify objects of knowledge produces a frame of mind, which 
sustains art as a marginal practice. In the periphery though, art plays an important critical 
role because it also sustains the centre; it is used to secure a boundary between rational and 
non-rational subject matters, reasoning and unreasonable subjects. Insofar as this 
specifically modern threshold must be continually stabilized and reproduced it remains a 
tenuous fixation, which at ‘any moment whatever’ can be put into process in creative 
negotiations of subjective experience. 
 
In the following chapter the quantitative attitude produces the ‘research subject’ (the artist 
as researcher) through forms of institutional techne, which remain open, unsettled and 
irreducible to instrumental knowledge, only by dint of being modes of visual critique. The 
power of machinic vision is expressed in the re–evaluation of artistic thought, as it is 
conceived in accordance with the academic regulations of the University machine. The 
status of the research subject as producing artist and produced artwork begins to merge into 
a critical mass, by moving the noun of art into its verb. A productive momentum yields a 
researcher under tension, who negotiates a course between the academic constraints of the 
knowledge regime on one hand and the desire to make artworks on the other. This tension 
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is again made manifest in the quantitative attitude, which aims to dislodge the place of 
legitimate knowledge, as it strives to become stable in a ‘subject who is supposed to 
know’17 (Lacan, 1998, 230-43). Consequently, the power of rationalization is identified at 
points where it gains traction through the containment of the knowledgeable artist in the 
intellectual apparatus of the University. In a counter measure, a loosening of the academic 
straightjacket engages the intellectual imperative in the ‘agonism’, (Foucault in Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, 222) inherent in the twisting of artistic practice into academic discipline. 
The creative energy in this contortion is utilized as a mode of expression in the art historical 
model of institutional critique, which allows for the growth of artistic territory within the 
institutional machine. The anomalies embedded in the artistic ‘research question’ are 
considered against a wider background of creative responses: literary, artistic and 
cinematic, to the historic institution and expansion of instrumental regimes. 
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3. Institutional Machine – Research Subject 
 
Institutional critique is a genre of art history describing the work of artists who interrogate 
the practices of art institutions: galleries, museums, organizations and agencies, which 
sustain the production of commercial and public artworks. With certain exceptions, the 
artists tend to adopt an introspective approach, limiting their critique to reprimanding the 
bourgeois patrons and institutions that provide necessary financial and cultural support for 
their practice. The artists informing this phase of research operate across a broader political 
spectrum, investigating the material terms and conditions placed on artistic production. 
Hans Haacke’s (2004) interrogation of systems and processes of signification, and his 
collaboration with Pierre Bourdieu in Free Exchange (1995), explores the relations between 
art and political economy in terms of their constitution as cultural capital. Also informing 
the research is Andrea Fraser’s aesthetics of administration that make no distinction 
between the formation of artists and institutions in complexes of psychological space 
(Fraser, 2005). A significant stylistic influence is the technique of ‘insertion’ in Carey 
Young Incorporated (2002), developed as the practice of merging the Bueysian notion of 
social sculpture with the ‘creativity’ of a corporate avant-garde. Young’s critical strategy is 
based on the principle of camouflage, in ‘becoming corporate’ the artist is ‘creating chaotic 
structures within this flow (of corporate influence), making insertions into ideological 
circuits rather than interventions’ (Young, 2002, 43). 
 
The critical frame of reference is informed by Institutional Critique and After (Welchman 
ed, 2006), an anthology mapping the art historical and social co-ordinates of Institutional 
Critique, from the Conceptual Art of the 1960’s to contemporary visual practice. The 
critical potential of art is reassessed in terms of its capacity to subvert institutional practices 
and stimulate social and political change. From within the Conceptual Art tradition, 
Buchloch’s Conceptual Art 1962–69: From the Aesthetics of Administration to the Critique 
of Institutions develops a critical engagement with institutional forms through a post 
Duchampian model of practice. Marcel Broodthaers is perhaps the prime example of an 
artist who fully develops Duchamp’s critique of all that is implicit in arts curriculum, as the 
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instituted right to produce and evaluate objects in aesthetic terms (de Duve, 1996a 384–87 
& 420–25). The wider political dynamic between the institutional critique of art history and 
the socio–political ‘arts of governing’ are theorized in Raunig (2006) and Sheikh (2006) 
whose essays inform the ‘art of subjectivity’ in their treatment of institutional critique as 
‘an analytical tool, a method of spatial and political criticism and articulation that can be 
applied not only to the artworld, but to disciplinary spaces and institutions in general.’ 
(Sheikh, 2006, 3) In this respect, the ‘institutional critique’ of art history is reviewed as part 
of a wider history of subversion, a subset of political expressionism whose currency is 
equivalent to the ‘art of subjectivity’. 
 
Emerging from this wider history is a ‘character’ of documentation who takes shape in 20th 
Century bureaucratic structures as the subject of information. As Hayles (2005) argues, the 
subject is increasingly streamed into digital–material processes that are best understood as 
compounds of information. The artworks in the doctoral research find consistency in the 
historic character of bureaucracy becoming the character of information, a ‘bit part’ in the 
machinic assemblage for producing and distributing semiotic flows of code. The ubiquitous 
‘Ministry of Information’18 in Brazil (Gilliam, 1985), sets the expressive tone with walls of 
filing cabinets, an excess of forms, memos and procedure, and overflowing ‘in’ trays, all 
totemic of irrational bureaucratic machinery gone awry. In the same cinematic genre of 
tech-noir, The Matrix (Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999) exemplifies a cultural shift from 
bureaucratic to informational aesthetics, in the becoming information of the main character; 
the transformation of Mr Anderson from corporate programmer by day into his alias Neo, a 
computer hacker by night who seeks the answer to the question ‘What is the Matrix?’ In 
answering the question, the film offers an imaginary way out of the office and ultimately an 
escape route from The Matrix by turning the mental space of the subject inside out. Zizek’s 
(2002) reading of The Matrix impacts on the critique of the ‘subject supposed to know’, 
through an analysis of the virtual character of knowledge toward the end of the chapter.  
 
It is perhaps no coincidence that there is a management theory of ‘matrix organizations’ 
designed to introduce more free flowing forms of micro–politics into the bureaucratic 
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structure. (Morgan, 1997, 45–52)  In the doctoral research, the machinic character of 
bureaucracy makes differences out of this movement, negotiating the ‘molar and molecular’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 213) terrain of the informational matrix, a figure cutting across 
the boundaries of the institutional regime, 
 
there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between 
offices, a bureaucratic perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even 
against administrative regulations. If Kafka is the greatest theorist of bureaucracy, it is 
because he shows how at a certain level (but which one? it is not localizable), the barriers 
between offices cease to be a “definite dividing line” and are immersed in a molecular 
milieu that dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into 
microfigures impossible to recognize or identify (ibid, 214) 
 
Kafka’s technique of ‘bureaucratic perversion’ is deployed as a mode of constructive 
criticism for reprocessing Herman Melville’s character Bartleby the Scrivener (1853). 
Bartleby occupies the subject position of the Heart Calculator (2002) as synonymous with 
the non–person of institutionalized capital. The reprocessed character of Bartleby 
predisposes the critique of the doctoral ‘research subject’, enabling the quantitative attitude 
to be rendered from Bartleby’s machinic engagement with office regime. His subversive 
indifference undermines the rational authority of the office manager, a financial lawyer 
whose character is the embodiment of the ‘subject who is supposed to know’. (Lacan, 1998, 
230-43)  In taking up the subject position of Bartleby, the machinic artist is able to produce 
an aesthetics of administration designed to destabilize the ‘research subject’ in the studio–
office assemblage. In practice, the ‘art of subjectivity’ finds positive expression by 
reproducing Bartleby in the bureaucratic ‘know how’ the artist, who assumes academic 
office in the anomalous position of the non–expert.  
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3.1 Modulating the Bartleby Machine 
 
At present I would prefer not to be a little reasonable (Melville, 1853) 
 
In Herman Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street (1853) we encounter a 
man without qualities or references; ‘no materials exist for a full and satisfactory biography 
of this man…Bartleby was one of those beings of whom nothing is ascertainable’ 
(Melville, 1853, 3). The text has been described as ‘Melville’s Critique of Reason’ (Gupta, 
1974, 66) and is generally considered to be an indictment of American capitalism’s 
absolute reduction of all values to those of economic formulae. Bartleby in this respect is 
the figure of that system, a soulless automaton, who by all accounts is beyond redemption. 
The Heart Calculator finds a character in Bartleby, who at first performs like the model of 
Weberian bureaucratic efficiency,  
 
Bartleby did an extraordinary quantity of writing. As if long famishing for something to 
copy, he seemed to gorge himself on my documents… He ran a day and night line, copying 
by sunlight and candlelight. I should have been quite delighted with his application, had he 
been cheerfully industrious. But he wrote on silently, palely, mechanically. (Melville, 1853, 
11) 
 
In the narrative, the lawyer is the embodiment of Weber’s ‘systematic rationalist’, as he 
continually takes account of Bartleby in terms of a bureaucratic economy of tasks and 
outputs. Bartleby’s performance and character traits are evaluated against those of the other 
office clerks; he does twice as much work and with greater accuracy, albeit without a trace 
of emotion or anything ‘ordinarily human about him’. (ibid, 12) It is only when Bartleby 
begins to break down, when he refuses to copy, that the symbolic limits of reasonable 
behaviour come into play.  
 
The friction between Bartleby and the reasonable lawyer, unfolds as the impossibility of 
meaningful exchange, in which the scrivener underwrites his own irreducible logic in the 
statement, ‘I would prefer not to’. Deleuze considers this refusal to copy and collate as the 
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embodiment of a ‘limit function’ (1998, 68), a symbolic threshold of intelligibility 
produced and reproduced in the ‘agrammatical formula’ (ibid, 68) ‘I would prefer not to’. 
Bartleby’s formula infects the system like a virus. The functions of pastoral power are 
subject to a routine cancellation in Bartleby’s positive refusal, causing a breakdown of the 
office and disruption to the daily administration of business. Bartleby’s formula, produced 
at the threshold of sense, diffuses the individuating procedures of rationality because in 
Bartleby the mechanisms of power have no discernable individual to ‘to get to grips with’. 
At the precise point where power would gain traction, Bartleby neither refuses nor accepts 
his employer’s appeals to reason, advancing and retreating in the same sentence the 
irreconcilable preference for the non-preferred. The Bartleby formula is a singularity, 
flowing between sense and situation in a smooth logic of dissolution. A law unto himself, 
Bartleby is the formula disconnecting the bonds between words and things, discourse and 
action, he remains severed from language and all the particularities it confers. Bartleby 
produces himself from a place outside the power of reference (“I am No One”) and in doing 
so maintains a position of indeterminacy as the unthought subject yet to be known. 
 
Melville realizes the quantitative attitude in the radical indifference of Bartleby, an early 
form of institutional critique, designed to undermine the ‘objective discharge of business 
without regard for persons’ (Weber, 215, 1970). Routine business is exposed as historically 
founded on the forcible imposition of a subjective will, which comes to reproduce itself 
(copy) as the legitimate form of social relations. Bartleby’s arithmetic is to become the 
figure of number by accepting his fate as a ‘species of productive property’ (Gilmore, in 
Thompson, 2000, 395–6). No longer discernable from the soulless mechanisms which give 
rise to his condition, Bartleby exists completely for the Other, expressing his morbid desire 
in an excess of non–proliferation, the drive to become no– one,  
 
the Figure that exceeds any explicable form…a question without response, an extreme and 
non–rational logic. Figures of life and knowledge, they know something inexpressible, live 
something unfathomable. They have nothing general about them and are not particular – 
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they escape knowledge, defy psychology. …There is nothing particular or general about 
Bartleby: he is an Original. (Deleuze, 1998, 82-83) 
  
The Original is like an effect without a cause, the immanence of the absolute objectification 
that resists identification as the ‘foreign body’ moving within the system but also affecting 
it as already a part in its mechanisms. The system fails to identify Bartleby because he is 
instantaneous and identical with its model, just at the point where he begins to break down. 
In the event of breaking down, Bartleby wobbles the system, at once the spanner and the 
works, a glitch in the matrix, he becomes the critical subject of information, allowing the 
system to completely overwrite his ego programme with the code of symbolic exchange.  
 
Over-coded and isolated by the financial machinery of Wall Street, Bartleby stands at the 
‘threshold of modern American anxiety’ (Thompson, 2000, 397) about the objectifying 
effects of free market capitalism. His act of will presents a problem for the calculative 
machine, but in the end it eliminates him as just another anomaly. Faced by walls on all 
sides, Bartleby disintegrates into a ‘dead wall revery’ (Melville, 1853, 25) until he is 
forcibly removed and imprisoned. As Leo Marx notes in Melville’s Parable of the Wall’s, 
‘the difference between Wall Street and the Tombs was an illusion of the lawyer’s not 
Bartleby’s’. (Marx, 1987, 23) Bartleby comes as close to the wall as possible, revealing that 
within the legitimate borders of rationality the ideal of freedom is always particular; it 
confers subjectivity through the social imperative to be useful, the autism of specialization, 
which first objectifies and then compartmentalizes the soul. To go beyond the wall is to 
exceed the particularities of symbolic divisions, an impossible fate that can only lead to 
death. ‘Strangely huddled at the base of the wall’ (Melville, 1853, 40), Bartleby dies of 
exhaustion.  
 
Melville’s anomalous subject of Bartleby, like Kafka’s bureaucratic anti–heroes after him, 
intensifies the competing energies of a political economy in transition, sending creative 
forces along unforeseen trajectories in the power of bureaucracy. In this mode of 
expression, the ‘character’ is not distinct from life, as art is never apart from its situation on 
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the historical plane of composition, as is evident in the Belgian Government setting up a 
website (www.kafka.be) for public complaints about officialdom and absurd regulations, 
saving the taxpayer a total of $281 million dollars in the process19 (Light, 2005). Equivalent 
creative possibilities are available in the art of bureaucracy, as an extension of the continual 
re-organization of the social machine. Emergent figures are produced as the by–products of 
bureaucratic excess, going beyond the specific distributions of sense that govern a 
particular system. Both Melville and Kafka anticipate the ambivalent subject of the 
institutional regime, ‘the paradox that a formally rational system produces substantively 
irrational results’ (Derlien, 1991, 12), and in the same instant use the semiotic energy 
invested in this position to undermine its logic of over determination. The result is a 
creative dynamic that works itself into the office, as the prevalent modern domain for the 
cultural distribution of pastoral power. This interference pattern in the politics of the office 
is worked into the dynamic composition of the ‘research subject’, a critical character in the 
‘art of subjectivity’ for investigating the limitations of the academic machine. 
 
3.2 Holding Academic Office 
In the aesthetics of academic administration, Melville’s ‘critique of reason’ is worked into 
the studio–office assemblage, generating bits and pieces of practice that begin to build a 
method for the coherent expression of constructive criticism. The resumption of academic 
office re-encounters the tension between the production and comprehension of artworks in 
the University codes of practice.20 Where the Heart Calculator was filtered back into the 
creative process as a figure for artistic over production, the discourse of Bartleby translates 
the quantitative attitude into a subjectivity that yields a productive interface between the 
office and studio. Although creativity is to some extent compromised in the academic 
rationale, the points where the institution tightens up on artistic practice can be exploited as 
joints in the desire for precision, procedure and industrious research. The purpose is to 
materially override institutional conventions, which adhere to standard models of 
educational discipline for regulating and communicating knowledge. The materiality of the 
office info–structure, in particular the documentary apparatus, is rerouted back into the 
productive process, pressing Bartleby into action through irregularities of excess, 
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displacement and distortion; ‘desire baffles knowledge and power.’ (Lyotard, in Gane, 
2004, 107) 
 
The University ‘codes of practice’ favour scientific–technical methods of collecting, 
documenting and verifying data. Repeated attempts to define art as an object of knowledge, 
tell us more about the institutional threshold of sense, in terms of how we arrive at valuable 
‘research outputs’ in a culture governed by systematic rationalisms, rationalisms that are 
the effects of interconnected mechanisms of knowledge production. As both producer and 
produced, the academic artist is evaluated through procedures of measurement, testing and 
performance, in which reliable notions of objectivity are proved within certain conventions 
of knowledge production. The dominant research model accounts for art as an anachronism 
within the University system, lacking a standard methodology or reproducible mode of 
investigation. Instead, the academic artist develops forms of investigation that are 
continually renewed in composition, resistant objects, non-rational but not irrational, which 
must devise their own purposes or succumb to the codes and conventions of existing 
discursive practices. Contorted and often ill-conceived attempts to annex artistic practice to 
‘rigorous’ academic disciplines result in a devaluation of artistic thinking in favour of 
secondary intellectual readings of the artwork. In succumbing to various intellectual models 
of comprehension artists borrow methodology as a crutch, as if they cannot proceed alone 
and without recourse to an expert authority. Art remains an academic discipline by default, 
as artists do not become academic experts in a strict sense even if they achieve a high level 
of technical proficiency, because intellectual expertise is grounded in a scientifically 
orientated form of objective research. Experience and experiment may share the same root, 
but it is only quantifiable data from the experimental method or field study that sustains the 
legitimate form of ‘disciplinary objectivity’. (Porter, 1995, 3)  
 
As an interference pattern in the ‘disciplinary objectivity’ of academia, institutional artists 
can retain ownership of practice and invent new ones by deploying ‘the strategy of the sive, 
the strategy of remaining inside the dominant conceptual regime while carrying out an 
operation of theoretical transformation and translation.’ (Montag, 1995, 66) Art can ‘render 
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visible’ the blind spot of ones own subjectivation to a complex of institutional practices, 
and in the process make differences out of established positions of authority, throwing them 
into relief as social and historical subjectivities. The artist’s code of practice is designed for 
continually working at thresholds of sense without being completely co-opted by the 
systems it engages. In order to avoid copying, the artist must to some extent copy, that is, 
acknowledge his actions as an alternative ‘code of conduct’, a creative modulation of 
academic subjectivity. Creative decisions are negotiated by foregrounding the investments 
that are already made in a semiotic energy that regulates possibility on the basis of being 
objective,   
 
A decision made by the numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has at least the 
appearance of being fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity thus provides an answer to a 
moral demand for impartiality and fairness. Quantification is a way of making decisions 
without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends authority to officials who have very little of 
their own. (Porter, 1995, 8) [my italics] 
 
Discourses underpinned by techniques of quantification, produce knowledge from a 
position of apparent objectivity at the expense of traditional scholarly pursuits such as 
philosophy and art. The scientific model of the world has achieved primacy in the 
University migrating from the physical sciences to occupy new territories in the human 
ones, presenting itself as the only viable ‘objective’ method of investigation. When artists 
take up their research posts with the Arts and Humanities Research Council21 they enter 
into an immediately ambivalent contract, the interminable problem of finding an 
appropriate ‘artistic method’, which in retrospect appears as a contradiction in terms. The 
opposing positions of instrumental researcher and artistic thinker, emerging from an initial 
diagnosis of the institutional artist, resonate with Heidegger’s distinction between the 
traditional scholar and the modern researcher. He argues that the expansion of instrumental 
rationality in the form of scientific-technical knowledge has lead to the dominance of 
methodology in the University, 
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the making secure of the precedence of methodology over whatever is (nature and history), 
which at any given time becomes objective in research. This making secure of research in 
turn guarantees that research always remains industrious and productive – a drive that 
involves self-perpetuating ongoing activity. (Heidegger, in Day 2001, 97) 
 
Maintaining the primacy of the artistic process while qualifying it as academic entails a 
new working out of the scholarly attitude in the subject position of the academic artist. If 
the artwork assumes value only through the assumption of academic office, is it possible to 
know objectively what makes an effective artwork as research? Does the very rationale for 
making distinctions between artworks and academic artworks erode what is unique to the 
productive mode called art? The problem turns on issues of valuation and validation. The 
Latin root of validity means “power”, and it may be that discrete knowledge formations are 
attributed the greatest value as the disciplines that most forcefully and convincingly ‘make 
their case’ on the basis of their proximity to what is produced as objective. In contrast, 
artworks crystallize in a fractal grid of aesthetic and academic values as cultural 
formations, crossing institutional boundaries and connecting University disciplines to other 
forms of social practice. Aesthetic production makes sense in channels between the varied 
intellectual practices of knowledge-based economies, the intelligent artwork assuming 
fluidity of form, crossing institutional and social boundaries as it undergoes a cultural trans-
valuation; switching between registers, it accrues both academic and social value as a 
differential of knowledge and experience. 
 
The institutional artist is in knowledge but not fully of knowledge, the atypical expert, a 
scholar of the anomalous and a maker of differences. Academic office is a partial franchise 
or investment in the regime of objective methodology, even though a distinctly artistic 
purpose takes hold in the industry of production. In the scholarly rendition of the 
quantitative attitude, there is a breakdown of ‘the subject supposed to know’ (Lacan, 1998, 
230–43) or the supposed subject of knowledge. Like Bartleby, the artist breaks down an 
academic subject position in constructive criticism, refusing to copy but in this instance 
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continuing to work out scholarly reproductions of the research subject. In creative 
regulations of the University’s code of practice, the ‘art of subjectivity’ becomes a deferral 
of the knowing subject in the making. Producing the scholarly attitude displaces substance 
as meaning with the material substance of composition, in an attempt to provide an image 
for the research subject in process. The following ‘object lessons’ produce an artistic 
subject at the perimeter of ‘the intellectual’, revealing the partiality of the supposed subject 
of knowledge, who by taking up the role of the academic expert refuses the subjectivities 
on the out–side of that territory.   
 
3.3 Office Management Systems 
File Manager (Figs. 8, 9) forms part of a sequence of procedures for re-negotiating the 
academic info–structure of the University. The territory of the office is deterritorialized in 
the studio, leaving only material quantities of data to be manipulated in the object lesson of 
the critical procedure The electronic procedures of Microsoft Word are made concrete in a 
series of informatic gestures, working ‘performance art’ into a critical code of practice that 
eventually reterritorializes in the composition of Paperwork (Fig. 10). Paperwork is a 
photographic record of a knowledge volume (the data collected during my MA and the first 
six months of doctoral research). The image is extracted from the File Manager series as 
totemic of the ‘in tray’, the excess of paperwork that accompanies the computerization of 
the workplace. Paperwork produces the document as the ball and chain of signification, in 
which subjects are administered and administrating in a labyrinth of bureaucratic excess.  
Internal Document (Fig. 11) puts Paperwork back into administration, turning a quantity of 
emotional data into a form of self-diagnosis. Paperwork mainly consisted of articles, essays 
and references on the psychology of emotion and as such was already something of an 
aesthetic object. The reproduction of Paperwork in the style of a Rorschach inkblot test, 
transforms emotional data into the artistic composition, the Internal Document produced in 
the merging of materiality with psychiatry. This artistic rendering of the institutional 
neurosis experienced in the bureaucracies of Melville and Kafka, anticipates the diagnostic 
machines of schizoanalysis in Chapter 4.   
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Bureaucratic paintings were also produced from ‘post its’, in which the repetition of memos 
act as a pixellation of intent. The ‘post its’ are assembled as signifying units, each one like 
an artwork in itself but always in a state of serial production. The first composition was 
produced from blank ‘post its’ of various colours to suggest a decoded image of the kind 
we see when identities are blanked out on television. The remaining two compositions in 
the series were composed from the statements I has moved and To Do (Fig. 12), in a 
clerical excess of repetition. Additional bits and pieces of clerical practice were produced 
but not documented and include the corrective fluid of the Tippex signature, photocopies of 
pencil shavings, a drawing of a pen entitled Memory Stick and a sheet of A1 sheet paper 
with the words ‘Position Closed’ across the middle. The fragments accumulate into the 
artist’s ‘information management system’, enabling the art of bureaucracy to go into 
overdrive as a critical response to the documentary excess of data collection, claim forms, 
registration documents, annual monitoring forms, surplus emails, literature reviews and so 
on. In practice, institutional knowledge goes into administration, liquidating the assets of 
the ‘subject supposed to know’ in the semiotic flow of the artist’s ‘know how’.   
 
The emerging institutional craft of the artist reterritorializes in the critical character of the 
Emotion Officer22 (Fig. 13). The Emotion Officer stabilizes a subject position for the 
creative processes of the File Manager and becomes a temporary locus for techniques of 
bureaucratic resistance. Created from a simple reworking of a conference badge, the 
Emotion Officer adapts the discourse of ‘the artist in residence’ to the terms and conditions 
of academic tenure. The Emotion Officer is an institutional non-persona, the anomaly of the 
academic artist and the positive materialization of this position in the creation of academic 
subjectivity. In the Emotion Officer art is charged with the official authority of academic 
creative licence, modulating the indifference of the Bartleby machine in the tactical 
materialization of the artist’s subjectivity, a character of bureaucratic excess working with 
and against the grain of the institutional rationale. Where Bartleby began in overdrive and 
receded into inertia, the Emotion Officer negotiates limitations and creates a sense of 
productive momentum. Knowledge in the making finds an image in the objective of critical 
composition, ‘the art of decomposing the actual political context in order to see the 
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movements from which the specific context emerges.’ (Colebrook, 2006, 29) The artist’s 
expertise is to render visible the partiality of ‘the academic’ in an overtly material practice 
of intellectual labour. The ‘subject supposed to know’ becomes a non-expert in the 
subjectivity of the Emotion Officer, a figure for reproducing ‘the academic’ in critical forms 
of knowledge. The ambivalent authority of the Emotion Officer is at once advanced and 
retracted like Bartleby’s preference for the non-preferred. Academic office makes a public 
display of itself in the cultural relay of the artist, who experiments with possibilities of 
institutional experience in a subjectivity retrieved from the ‘disciplinary objectivity’ of the 
expert.  
 
In The Matrix: Or, The Two Sides of Perversion (2002), Zizek identifies a historical 
paradox of reason in the Lacanian split subject, 
 
The objectivized language of experts and scientists which can no longer be translated into 
the common language accessible to everyone, but is present in common language in the 
mode of fetishized formulas that no one really understands, but which shape our artistic and 
popular imaginary universes… The gap between scientific insight and common sense is 
unbridgeable, and it is this very gap which elevates scientists into the popular cult figures of 
the subjects supposed to know. (Zizek, 2002, 247) 
 
The objectivity of scientific knowledge cannot serve a symbolic big Other or what we 
might call the shared social order of experience. The drive for objectivity inherent in the 
complex of the rational ego reveals that there is no objective objectivity, only the desire to 
create it as a symptom of a historical condition of subjectivity. In The Matrix, Neo as ‘the 
One’ becomes the flip side of Bartleby’s ‘No One’, ‘his exceptional role is that of 
transference’ (ibid, 256) occupying a place in signification that is constructed (pre– 
supposed) by others. ‘The One’, in becoming information becomes identical with the 
system and so has the potential to produce a critical ‘instability of form’, to break it down 
by foregrounding the virtual or codified nature of symbolic knowledge. Reality ‘as we 
know it’ is an artificial construct governed by rules and regulations that at any moment ‘can 
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be suspended or at least re–written’ (ibid, 257). In the doctoral research, the machinic artist 
reassembles the subjectivity of ‘the One’ into critical information machines for breaking 
down systems in unstable and destabilizing acts of constructive criticism.  
 
In the next chapter the productive trajectory of the Emotion Officer is modulated in the 
desire of the scientist, as the ‘subject supposed to know’ of the laboratory. An artistic 
method emerges in the suspension of the difference between scientific experiments in affect 
and the artistic experience of emotion. The ‘grid of intelligibility’ (Foucault, 1978, 93) that 
gives rise to a complex sense of emotion, provides a matrix of expression for questioning 
the difference between the ‘scientific image of emotion’ (Dror, 1999b, 355) and its 
aesthetic counterpart. As not dissimilar to artistic compositions, the graphs and diagrams of 
laboratory emotion are investigated as scientific creations of affect.  Emotional reality ‘as 
we know it’ is recoded in the artist–experimenter, a diagnostic machine for rendering 
critical artworks in the material info–structure of the graph and diagram. In the following 
section, artistic experiments in emotion reterritorialize the traditionally aesthetic territory of 
the artist, which since the late nineteenth century has increasingly been occupied by the 
rational–technical models of the scientist. In the making of emotional sense, the subject and 
object of knowledge are critically synthesized in the transitory event of emotional 
experience. 
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4. Laboratory Machine – Emotional Subject 
 
When the Society for Psycho - Physiological Research inaugurated its new journal in 
1964, A.F. Ax argued that the chief theoretical problem in psycho–physiology was 
still to ‘break the code’ by which the organism translated between experience and 
physiology. (Ax in Dror, 2001, 363) 
 
The objective in this chapter is to ‘break the code’ by which the scientist translates between 
knowledge and emotional experience in the scientific study of affect. The chapter reworks 
the initial title of the doctoral research; The Artist as an Antidote for the Modern 
Rationalization of Emotion, which provided a way into subjectivity through an 
investigation into emotion as one of the most subjective specifications of the individual. 
Emotion, or more precisely affect, has to date proved a highly problematic object of 
knowledge for the scientific ‘subject supposed to know’, to the extent that it reveals 
something of the scientist’s desire for objectivity in the persistent drive to isolate, quantify 
and rationalize emotion under laboratory conditions. The primary interest in emotion 
therefore, is the sheer quantity of definitions it yields in the excessive production of 
emotional sense. As a category of experience, emotion proliferates in all directions at once, 
fragmenting into an unstable and destabilizing object of knowledge. The intensive over-
coding of laboratory emotion in physiological graphs and neuroscientific diagrams, 
provides the visual terrain for engaging the ‘scientific image of emotion’ (Dror, 1999b, 
355), as a basis for reproducing the desire of the scientist in the diagnostic assemblage of 
the aesthetic experiment.  
 
The role played by emotion in the formation of subjectivity has a long and complicated 
history. In modernity emotion is usually equated with knowledge of individual experience 
and yet the shifting ground of what counts as emotion makes it a highly problematic 
subject. Emotion is something of an anomaly in the life of the rational individual but is not 
simply in opposition to ‘the rational’, it is central to the formation of subjectivity providing 
the individual with an affective sensibility, which resides at the outer edge of 
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comprehension. In psychological terms, the rational ego must strive to stabilize emotion 
inside its reasonable edge in order to signify the meaningful limits of cognition. Since the 
late 1940’s, emotion has become a primary subject for scientists who carry out research 
into personality mechanisms, especially in relation to theories on creativity, intelligence 
and cognitive processing. The following survey of emotion insofar as it relates to the 
concerns of the doctoral research, reveals how it cuts across boundaries, folds back on 
itself, subverts meaning and disrupts cognition in the repeated attempts to make emotional 
sense. The problematic referent makes emotional knowledge difficult to frame and 
comprehend in instrumental terms as a discernable part of the physical world, and yet it is 
experienced as an embodied force in the unpredictability of affect. The numerous and 
contradictory attempts to explain emotion, both internally within disciplines and externally 
across different fields of thought, situate it as a highly ambivalent object in the formation of 
modern subjectivity.  
 
Since ancient philosophers first began to think about the world, emotion has been annexed 
to thought in various forms: ‘The emotional state is characterized by a mixture of body 
parameters’ (Heraclitus 500BC), ‘Men think and feel with their body’ (Empodocles 490 
BC), ‘Emotional states are characterized by brain temperature, moisture and aridity’ 
(Hippocrates 460 BC) (Salk Institute, 2005). Since Plato there has been a philosophical 
division of body and soul in which base emotions are of a physical body and higher 
aesthetic sensations are of a transcendent immortal soul. Plato’s designation of material and 
immaterial of qualities of being allows a causal relationship to be established between mind 
and body, whereby ‘the soul affects the body and the body affects the soul’ (ibid, 2005). In 
The Republic, Plato is suspicious of the power of affect and sees poetry as a source of 
social disruption, ‘the poet…wakens and encourages and strengthens the lower elements in 
the mind to the detriment of reason’ (Plato in Van Peer, 1997, 216).  Aristotle anticipates 
emotional-mental processes in terms of faculties; ‘capacities and predispositions which 
precede the potential of emotional experience’ and ‘formed habits’ of disposition or 
character, which pattern the experience of emotion in terms of knowledge and social 
conditions (Salk Institute, 2005). Contrary to Plato, Aristotle praises poetry for its emotive 
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interference in reason, ‘as that which leads one’s condition to become so transformed that 
his judgement is affected, and which is accompanied by pleasure and pain’ (Aristotle in 
Kelly ed, 1998, 103). 
 
The precursor to modern scientific theories of emotion is the Cartesian Cogito, which 
marks the beginning of a formal separation of mind and body. In The Passions of the Soul 
(1649) Descartes intuits a theory of emotion that is scientific in intent, proposing an object 
that resembles the modern affective mechanism. In isolating things that bodies can do on 
their own, Descartes attempts to show how ‘the body can react to stimuli without any 
cognitive activity whatsoever’ (Lutz, 2001, 75).  The 18th Century philosopher David Hume 
declared that ‘reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions’ (Hume in Kelly ed, 1998, 
103). Hume situates the ‘sentiments’ as central to an understanding of experience but 
balances this position by arguing for a more thorough conception of emotion as a basis for 
developing knowledge of aesthetics. Also in the 18th Century, Kant’s theory of aesthetic 
judgement emphasizes imagination over cognition in the emotive experience of what is 
beautiful, ‘the judgement of taste therefore is not a cognitive judgement and so not logical, 
but is aesthetic – which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other 
than subjective’ (Kant in Dickie ed, 1977, 643). Kant formalizes the distinction between 
‘reason and what he called the inclinations’ and yet his conception of feelings remains 
integral to an analysis of aesthetic experience (Kelly ed, 1998, 102-105).  
 
By the late 19th Century, Nietzsche reinstates the aesthetic in a central role where passion 
becomes a foil for rationality, which he regards with deep suspicion. As both disruptive 
force and a type of cultural physician, the artist must strive to take up the mantle of the 
philosopher in the ‘art of creating values as the direct expressions or symptoms of will to 
power’ (Zepke, 2005, 13). Heidegger in a similar vein associates aesthetics with preverbal 
practices, arguing that it was through such practices, and not the pursuit of articulate 
philosophy or knowledge, that the world is ‘disclosed’ (Heidegger in Kelly ed, 1998, 105). 
Art is apprehended as an emotive force, not only of expression but as a means for shaping 
the world, causing a ‘rift’ to open up between ordinary experience and the sudden 
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perception of an extraordinary potential (Inwood, 2000, 122). The Deleuzian version of 
affect is primarily in the Nietzschean tradition, to the extent that the expression of the 
artist’s desire is synonymous with Nietzsche’s will to power (the creative force of willing), 
in a concept of sensation that attempts to ‘overcome the Kantian duality’ of conscious 
subject/perceived object in an affective-perceptual theory of the artwork (Smith, 1996, 29–
56). 
 
Nineteenth Century science continues along the trajectory established by Descartes with an 
accumulative breakdown of emotion into mechanisms, processes and functions of the 
human being. Charles Darwin’s Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) 
and William James’s Principles of Psychology (1890) evaluate emotion as a mechanism in 
the biological human in terms of the felt experience of bodily changes. Emotion is 
determined as a ‘function’ of physiology and is explained according to the ‘organismic 
model’ (Hochschild, 1987, 205–211). Alongside James, the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud 
is the most notable exponent of the early organismic model of emotion, which is defined in 
terms of physiological affects. Affect in psychoanalysis presupposes an unstable individual 
who is subject to unconscious desire, emotion being one outward expression of libidinal 
energy in a state of discharge. Emotion in cognitive psychology has been understood as a 
mode of subjective experience in the conscious individual who has the capacity to 
distinguish affect as a change in a bodily state; a feeling is the conscious recognition of that 
change. The cognitive psychologist Paul Young’s 1943 definition of emotion as ‘an acute 
disturbance of the individual as a whole, involving behaviour, conscious experience and 
visceral functioning’ (Young in Lutz, 2001, 139) is indicative of discourses in cognitive 
psychology gradually displacing those of behaviourism, although retaining and adapting 
many behaviourist techniques. With the growth in cybernetics and information theory, 
cognition was increasingly conceived in terms of ‘circuits, appraisals and calculations’ 
(Lutz, 2001, as research shifted toward the field of neurophysiology. 
 
Running parallel to early organismic theories of emotion there emerged an emotion of the 
laboratory, isolated from external factors it was explained in terms of its measurement and 
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quantification as an object of knowledge. In the late 1860’s the first graphical 
representations of emotion were produced as physiological affects. Claude Bernard used the 
cardiograph to ‘read in the human heart’ (Dror, 1998, 173) in 1865, while twenty years later 
in the 1880’s and 90’s Angelo Mosso traced temperature fluctuations as transcriptions of 
emotional patterns. From the 1920’s onwards, a plethora of ‘affect gauging technologies’ 
(Dror, 2001a, 367) were developed including the Ego–Meter, Mechanical Freud, Emotion 
Meter and the Emotograph, which provided ‘a complete emotional diagnosis, inscribing 
emotions in the universal language of numbers or curves’ (ibid, 367). As the bodily 
sensations of the modern individual are formulated as objects of knowledge, laboratory 
emotion is increasingly defined as a patterned physiological affect, rendered in the visual 
numeric of the graph.  
 
Neuroscientific theories of emotion emerge as an interface between physiological models 
that were incorporated into the stimulus–response tradition of Behaviourism, and those of 
Cognitive Psychology, especially Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), which 
‘presupposes mental states and processes existing independently of their manifestations in 
behaviour’ (Sloman in Bullock & Trombley eds, 2000, 521). The diagram is prolific in 
neuroscientific models of emotion as the preferred figure for expressing the complex 
interaction of neural mechanisms. In neuroscience, emotion is currently defined as 
‘affective process… a patterned collection of neural responses to an emotionally competent 
stimulus’ (a perception of an actual object/situation or the recollection of one from 
memory). (Damasio in Manstead ed, 2004, 50) This element of the affective process 
concurs with the aforementioned physiological models in the form of behaviourist reflex 
responses. A feeling in neuroscience is ‘the mental representation of the physiological 
change that occurs during an emotion… but feeling an emotion also includes the mapping 
of changes in the cognitive processing style, as well as the evocation of thoughts that are 
congruent with the feeling state’ (Damasio, 2004, 52). Emotion paradoxically is a mental 
process as much as a physiological affect because the mind in neuroscience is not 
distinguishable from the body, the amygdala and insula being the key interfaces in the brain 
for processing emotion. (Damasio 1994, 1999, 2003; LeDoux, 1996) 
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Against the historical background of an accumulating weight of explanation, What is an 
Emotion? The psychologist William James first asked the question in (1884) and it seems 
that the answer is no clearer and more complicated than ever before. The ‘art of 
subjectivity’ rejoins the question at the point where science tries to resolve the problem in 
the objectivity of number by ‘counting the affects’ (Dror, 2001a, 357). Dror argues that 
numerical emotion is a scientific creation, allowing for the circulation and expression of 
emotions in a form that does not threaten the objectivity of the laboratory as the ‘emotion 
free space’ (ibid, 359). The attempt to isolate emotion and subject it to the scientific gaze 
comes up against a fault line in the production of knowledge. Objectivity is maintained 
along this line in techniques for the quantification of emotion, but at the expense of 
producing emotional facts that are inconsistent with the unpredictable emotional event as 
experienced outside of the laboratory. Emotion is extracted from life in order to try and 
explain it objectively, ‘the vivisection of the human heart according to scientific terms’ 
(Mosso, in Dror, 2001b, 643).  
 
The systematic and calculated abstraction of subjective experience from the experiencing 
subject, involves the complex operation of measuring affects as numerical data and 
translating them into the geometric curve of the graph. ‘Quantification as a social 
technology’ (Porter, 1995, 49), connected to the visual techniques of the laboratory, 
becomes the machinic assemblage of the scientific emotional experiment. The desire of the 
scientist resurfaces in the emotograph as the supposed portrait of objectivity, in which 
emotional mechanisms are cut off from subjects and their social conditions, 
 
Framing - the nature of modern technology holding sway in all directions  - commandeers 
for its purposes a formalized language, the kind of communication which “informs” man 
uniformly, that is gives him the form in which he is fitted into the technological – 
calculative universe. (Heidegger, in Day, 2001, 100) 
 
Framed in quantification, emotion is transformed into information in order to replicate itself 
in objective, exchangeable formats for distribution and use within the wider scientific 
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community. The creation of techniques for capturing verifiable emotional data, anticipates 
the development of emotional laws or formulae, which might be used to predict and modify 
the behaviour of subjects. Not only was it necessary to translate emotion into the common 
language of mathematics, the object itself has to be re- modelled for study in the laboratory. 
Emotion ‘under observation’ is difficult to measure due to the technical problem of 
inducing the required emotional state, unaffected by environmental factors or the presence 
of the scientist. The search for ‘true’ emotion paradoxically involves the surgical removal 
of the experiencing subject through a procedure that extracted either the cortex or cerebrum 
from the brain of an animal. Cannon’s ‘truncated brain’ (Dror, 2001b, 653) was introduced 
into the laboratory as an experimental model for generating virtual emotions as more 
objective than the compromised emotions of living subjects. It would now be possible to 
create ‘objective’ affects that could be abstracted as emotional functions in the complex 
variable of the organism. For the purpose of studying emotional functions as mechanisms 
of affect, ‘emotion’ without a subject is constructed in its dissection, containment and 
codification as data.  
 
Emotions upgraded to the status of ‘hard facts’ are made increasingly abstract in their 
purified forms as physical material reflexes, obtained through the ‘experiential priming of 
the organism’. (Dror, 1999a, 223) Laboratory emotion is situated in an exclusively 
biological model of human experience that for the time being marginalized psychological 
forms of knowledge for the sake of accuracy,  
 
The experiencing subject…still the hallmark of psychological studies on emotions, was 
transformed into a somatic machine that produced emotions without what Sherrington had 
characterized as inward feeling. Cannon transformed the physiological laboratory of 
emotions into a space where psychological forms of knowledge were not only not recorded, 
but simply did not exist. (Dror, 2001b, 653) 
 
The objective methodology of the physical sciences have proved very effective at providing 
us with ‘hard facts’ hence bridges don’t fall down, ships stay afloat and rockets take off on 
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most occasions. It is only when the experimental method drifts into the human sciences that 
the ‘subject supposed to know’ of science comes up against ambivalent boundaries in the 
division of knowledge that are difficult to maintain as objective; when the human being 
emerges ‘as both subject and object of knowledge, but even more paradoxically, as the 
organizer of the spectacle in which he appears’. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, 29) The 
scientist’s authority to make sense out of emotion is destabilized by the shifting ground of a 
problematic referent, causing the ‘scientific image of emotion’ (Dror, 1999b, 355) to stray 
inadvertently into the aesthetic territory of the artist. The historical composition and re-
composition of emotion lends itself to a machinic reconfiguration of the diagnostic 
machine, which ‘primes experience’ in the artistic production of emotional sense. 
Distinctions between scientific and artistic formalizations of emotion are put into process 
by exerting pressure on the fault line in knowledge that differentiates the ‘affect of 
experiment’ (Dror, 1999a, 205) from the affect of the artwork.  
 
4.1 Becoming the Mechanical Freud 
In the studio–laboratory assemblage, the artistic practice of doctoral research enters into a 
machinic relationship with the graphical apparatus, as a basis for over producing the sense 
of emotion in the quantitative attitude. The historical critique of laboratory emotion is 
reproduced in the ‘materialist psychiatry’ (1984, 22) of Deleuze & Guattari, in order to 
‘break the code’ that distinguishes between the subjectivity of artistic experience and the 
objectivity of scientific experiment. The visual experimenter turns experience into the 
research objective and steers desire into the productive experiment, putting into process the 
differential quantity of laboratory emotion. The differential quantity is the artwork making 
differences out of affect in the act of expression, the objective methodology of constructive 
criticism. The subjectivity of the artist and the objectivity of the scientist get mixed up in 
the making, a slippage in the planes of knowledge forcing the sense of emotion outside the 
limits of rational explanation.  
 
The practice of critique and the perspective of the artist are drawn together in the diagnostic 
machine, making the quantifiable emotional facts appear as derivative of truths and ‘truth 
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the element from which the value of value derives’ (Zepke, 2005, 30).  Objective emotional 
knowledge, realized as scientific perspective, in the same instant becomes transformative, 
as the artistic diagnosis reproduces a critical emotional reality experienced in the recreation 
of compositional affects, 
 
The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an 
image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought 
(Deleuze in Zepke, 2005, 19) 
 
In displacing the ‘subject supposed to know’ of science, art generates a trans-valuation and 
becomes in its own right a creative method of evaluating. In order to achieve this objective, 
it must first strive to become identical with its object of investigation, to get it to show itself 
by taking its place and nudging it slightly outside of its frame. The artistic exposure of a 
system’s partiality breaks it down in the positive destruction by making it permeable to 
outside influences, in which it is recomposed in a new frame of reference. The emotional 
breakdown is made positive in the productive unconscious of machinic expression, which 
finds an outlet in the artistic re-calibration of the ‘Mechanical Freud’ (Dror, 2001a, 369) 
 
The ‘Mechanical Freud’23 (Fig. 14a) was one of many affect gauging technologies that 
began to proliferate during the inter war years, as the clinical apparatus of the laboratory 
spread into the social infrastructure. The Mechanical Freud operated as a device for 
converting ‘affective experience into graphic or numeric inscriptions in real time’ (Dror, 
2001a, 367), which in the territory of the doctoral research is appropriated as an auto-
expressive subject position, a default painter who critically translates between the affects of 
the laboratory and the affects of the studio. If the rational ego is a machine for making 
sense in the arts (techniques) of rationalization, the drive to objectify emotion can be 
evaluated in the ‘art of subjectivity’ as the productive unconscious operating in the 
scientist’s desire to be rational. Resetting the Mechanical Freud enables the artist to engage 
in a threefold act of composition, self-diagnosis and critical production. In machinic 
relations between subjects and objects of emotion, ‘going critical’ creates the compositional 
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plane of the rationalesque, (affective rationalization minus a stability of form), in 
combinations similar to those of the Dada machine. Adjacent to the characters Heart 
Calculator, Bartleby, and the Emotion Officer, the artistic Mechanical Freud of 
constructive criticism re-materializes on the same historical plane of composition, a 
performative technique for manufacturing the artist’s desire as a productive attitude, 
 
the characteristically irrational fashion in which the Dada machine moves out of joint, short 
circuits or misfires is only a strategy for establishing connections beyond the limits of the 
rational subject. The leaky machine is the image par excellence of this agency that is no 
longer an agency, but an I feel of the machinic assemblage reunited with its flows (Gaffney, 
2006, 104) 
 
The ‘I feel’ is streamed into a semiotic flow of emotional data generated in the artist’s 
expression of the rationalesque. The laboratory–studio assemblage reworks the art 
historical precedent of the ‘fluxus laboratory…using the trappings of the science 
experiment’ (Saper, 1998, 137) to deterritorialize the Mechanical Freud. It is then recoded 
in the affect of artistic expression, a machinic interface for producing unstable emotional 
compounds, a deferred sense between the territories of art, physiology and psychiatry, 
turning all three disciplines into each other around the singular axis of affect. The 
possibility of identifying an integral artwork is placed in formation by emphasizing it as 
expression and not object; in the same movement, the rational individual loses identity in 
the serial production of affect, the artist as a force ‘under construction’ and not an 
individuated subject. The art of subjectivity is a leaky machine because it finds its place in 
the chaotic flows of sense that move between systems.   
 
4.2 Data Capture System 1: Emotographs 
In the following sequence of images (Figs. 16-22), the Mechanical Freud is modulated as 
the leaky (emotional) machine of constructive criticism, a subject position for introducing 
interference patterns into the graphical rationalization24 (Figs. 15a, 15b) of emotion. As 
artistic variations of Dror’s historical critique of scientific affect, the artworks draw upon 
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the calculative info-structure of laboratory emotion, as a basis for setting up an automatic 
rendering of the artist’s subjectivity in creative adaptations of the Mechanical Freud. In 
becoming the Mechanical Freud of the doctoral research, the artist assumes an auto-
expressive mode of production translating scientific affects into artistic ones, and at once 
suspending the difference between the two. The artist’s pencil becomes identical with the 
needle on the graphical apparatus, producing ‘emotional outputs’ from a machinic interface 
of artistic/scientific affects.  The graphical re-compositions open up a differential affective 
space for destabilizing the calculative rationale of laboratory emotion in the artistic 
expression of affects.  
 
Although it is not possible to conduct the simultaneous practice of irreducible disciplines 
like art and science, there are significant ‘points of interference’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 
216) between different planes of expression25.  An excess of sense can escape the 
restrictions of the signifying harness to which all practices are predisposed. Semiotic 
energies will sometimes breach systems and move between them in sense flows, which may 
have the power to prise the planes apart and cause different ‘regimes of signs’ to slide over 
each other with unpredictable effects. When troublesome combinations are produced,  
 
the interfering discipline must proceed with its own methods…these slidings are so 
subtle… that we find ourselves on complex planes that are difficult to qualify…[for 
example] partial observers introduce into science sensibilia that are sometimes close to 
aesthetic figures on a mixed plane. (ibid, 217) 
 
In the machinic assemblage of the artistic Mechanical Freud, art proceeds as the 
‘interfering discipline’ as graphical re-compositions emerge as ‘aesthetic figures on a 
mixed plane’, in this case the mixture of scientific and artistic variations of affect. When 
scientists try to create mechanisms/functions of affect or when artists create affective 
concepts or mechanisms, a situation arises in which science turns into art and art turns into 
science. The artistic graphs as data capture systems are not simply parodies of scientific 
rationalism but rather attempt to make something new out of it in the art of subjectivity.  
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In Heidegger’s sense of ‘a turning’ (Heidegger, in Rutsky, 1999, 8), the artistic ‘know how’ 
of doctoral research is used to re-programme the Mechanical Freud as a device for 
redirecting the flow of what is unconscious in the subject of science and art. The artist’s 
subjectivity reports itself in machinic outputs of emotional data, auto-poetic assemblages 
for generating sequences of informational expressionism. The informational craft of the 
artist draws the aesthetic into the technical and the technical into the aesthetic, a critical 
combination for unlocking emergent figures by ‘unsecuring them from fixed meanings or 
values – including both use value and aesthetic value’. (Rutsky, 1999, 105)  The 
alreadymades of art and science, that is, of the established discourses of ‘the artist’ and ‘the 
scientist’, are released from a stability of form and put into process in the data capture 
system of the artistic emotograph26. Reproduced as a data stream of emotion they emit 
particular feelings at particular times, the ‘any moment whatever’ of real time sensation, 
formed and reformed in the expressive sequence of artistic production. Neither art nor 
science is becoming each other, but both are becoming something new, and in the process 
unsettle their established frames of reference.   
 
In Self Belief (Fig. 16), a creative trajectory is initialized in the test run, as the artist’s 
initials are drawn into the graphic flow of information. Art is camouflaged in the authority 
of science, a transformative point where the idea of self-conviction slips into a discourse of 
self-discipline in the auto–corrective mechanism of the rationalesque. The act of 
transgression is instantaneously regulated as it gets drawn into the self-belief of the artistic 
data capture system. Belief (Fig. 17) is a modulation of Self Belief and questions whether 
there is a religious hermeneutic still present in the scientist’s desire to witness the inner life 
of the individual. The rationality of pastoral power is reformed along the vectors of ‘hope’ 
and ‘salvation’, expressed in the modernist experiment that maintains belief in the promise 
of a better life. Smile (Fig. 18) continues the geometric turn in a play between the indexical 
and iconic registers of signification. The graph as an index of happiness becomes its own 
smile in the production of the positive charge, ‘you have taken over the job of creating 
desire and have transformed people into constantly moving happiness machines’ (Edgar 
Hoover, 1928, in Curtis, 2002). Hoover was referring to Freud’s cousin Edward Bernay’s
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who invented the arts of persuasion in advertising and public relations in the United States, 
with selective use of psychoanalytic techniques in the media.  
 
(Figs. 19-22) recode the theme of self–regulation as a positive trait in the artist’s profile. 
An auto-corrective function is installed as a check on creative behaviour, whereby the 
spontaneous expression is immediately drawn into the control grid mechanism. The 
Duration of an Angry Moment (Fig. 19) temporarily disrupts the system in a sudden act of 
aggression. The loss of temper is at once off set by its immediate re–capture in the graph, as 
if the emotional outburst is no longer a legitimate form of public expression. It may be 
worth mentioning that this was the most popular of the exhibited images and eventually 
sold to a private collector. Controlled Anger Cycle (Fig. 20) modulates the outburst and 
restores it to a normalizing frequency, the subject ‘on a level’ in the geometry of the 
straight line; (experiments in laboratory emotion use the quantity or intensity of affect as an 
index of excessive mental excitation, which implies the subject’s deviation from a mean or 
normal state. Purple Patch (Fig. 21) and Happy Accident (Fig. 22) recompose the linearity 
of reason in the art direction of the affective trend. The deviation between the trendsetter 
and normative trend produces a geometric space in the graph, which emerges as the figure 
of the ‘interference pattern’, the non art and non science of the rationalesque. Happy 
Accident renders the Purple Patch into a three-dimensional image, the soul model as 
diagnostic info–structure and emotional relief. In 2006 Happy Accident was submitted to 
The Queens Medical Centre, Nottingham as a proposed commission for a new treatment 
centre.  In line with the hospital’s brief of ‘well being’, the graph was worked into a 
sculptural design for the Seat of Happiness to be lit from the inside and sited on the 
forecourt as public seating. 
 
In the gap between the graphical compositions discussed above and the emotion diagrams 
of the following section, (Figs. 23, 24) are two prototype diagrams of the rationalesque, 
based on the minimalist style of modernist painting. The images are a reflexive response to 
the graphical compositions, a reduction of the serial outputs into basic expressive units. 
Positivism (Fig. 23) recomposes the happiness of rationalization as a paradox of scientific 
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knowledge, a form of happiness that above all must be proved through observation and 
verification. The ‘happiness’ expert, whose badge is the output box of the composition, 
correlates with the Emotion Officer as the official of abstract experience, an authority on 
‘well being’ sustained by the objective power of scientific discourse. Socialism (Fig. 24) 
develops a similar visual procedure in the reduction of revolutionary potential to the output 
box of ‘anger management’. The official expert of anger is paradoxically the agent of social 
constraint, as the life of the individual is increasingly tied to institutional discipline and 
control. The prototype diagrams set up a creative dynamic between knowledge and 
experience, cognition and expression, instruction and construction explored in the 
following section through a series of artistic encounters with the emotion diagrams of 
neuroscience. 
 
4.3 Data Capture System 2: Emotion Diagrams  
The emotion diagrams arise at the juncture in doctoral research where the ‘art of 
subjectivity’ and the arts of rationalization merge into a discernable critical method. 
Experiments in neuroscience ‘provide an image’ of the affective mechanism in the diagram 
of emotional experience, the encoding of emotion as informational flow in which 
‘consciousness is the interface between affect and cognition’ (Balleine & Dickinson , 1998, 
57). In reproducing ‘consciousness’ the machinic artist draws upon and gets drawn into the 
semiotic energy of the diagram. The interference patterns of the critical diagrams operate at 
the threshold of cognition, short-circuiting the scientist’s desire to know in the non sense of 
the affective production. Artistic experiments in affect reterritorialize the ‘scientific image 
emotion’ (Dror, 1999b) in the semiotic (informational) flow of expression, the productive 
energy of the unconscious turning into the aesthetic process. In the diagram of affect there 
exists a readymade figure for ‘art as abstract machine’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 496), 
which subsumes the operations of the Mechanical Freud into the auto-critical diagnostic 
production. The artist’s emotion diagram becomes a generator of semiosis, overflowing 
into a plethora of cultural functions and productive forces in the diagnostic of the non-
expert. The emotion diagram as informational flow provides a creative currency, a conduit 
for channelling the semiotic method into the expressive event. Emotional, semiotic and 
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creative flows become interchangeable through an overtly material rendering of affect 
where in the making process and product are composed as one.  
 
The Diagram of Method (2005) discussed below, is the product of a transaction between art 
and science in which the currency of affect undergoes an aesthetic transvaluation. The 
scientist’s desire to turn the subjectivity of emotional experience into the objectivity of the 
affective mechanism is redirected into the abstract machine of art. In the artistic process 
diagram, art becomes like its object of investigation only to exceed its cognitive sense as a 
basis for making differences out of affect. The reconfigured diagram thereby becomes a 
device for generating new trajectories of emotional expression that are resistant to meaning 
by dint of joining in with a metonymy of asignification, ‘the diagrammatic or abstract 
machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real 
that is yet to come, a new type of reality’. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 142) The artistic 
diagrams are shape potentials, which at ‘any moment whatever’ can be rendered from the 
semiotic flow and materialized as critical compositions. 
 
4.4 Producing Information: A Diagrammatic Method ► 
The Diagram of Method (Fig. 25) composes a state of semiosis in which diagrams from the 
neuroscience of emotion are streamed into the critical-differential space of the doctoral 
research, prior to their possible rendering as three-dimensional objects in unstable 
combinations of sense. Machinic vision takes shape as the aggregate of semiotic flows 
between thought and material, hence the necessity of integrating the artistic diagrams with 
the complementary data streams: critical histories of laboratory emotion, neuroscientific 
diagrams and diagrams from the history of art and design, which are subsequently 
combined in the artistic methodology of information processing. In practice, the diagram of 
method becomes an artwork for generating other artworks, which take the form of critical 
objects materialized from an infinite number of potential outputs. The diagnostic 
procedures of artistic method become an expression of the ‘imaginative intellect’ (Sullivan, 
2005), the knowledge of composition with the capacity to transform both experience and 
understanding. In the artworks discussed below, method and image are composed in the 
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diagram as an expression of a method–image assemblage, the ‘how it works’ of the abstract 
machine just at the point where it becomes operational in the ‘what it does’ of critical 
production. 
 
The Diagram of Method demonstrates how an artistic diagram becomes a machinic 
differential of a neuroscientific diagram, in this case the Le Doux Circuit (Fig. 26) taken 
from the Salk Institute online. The neuroscientific diagram is introduced into the conceptual 
assemblage, which consists of the theoretical components outlined in the introduction. 
Working as a type of thought filter, the conceptual assemblage primes the neuroscientific 
diagram with a semiotic potential that proliferates along creative trajectories in connection 
with the other three data streams of the machinic differential. The corresponding artistic 
diagram forms an interference pattern with the abstract space of the neuroscientific 
diagram. Powered by critical histories of laboratory emotion and the diagrams of art 
history, the machinic differential generates a compositional relay between the Le Doux 
Circuit and its decoding in constructive criticism. A transformed Le Doux Circuit emerges 
in the re-composition of Soul Model 16: Amygdala (Fig. 27), recoded in the liminal space27 
of the ‘feeld’. The feeld describes an abstract space of indeterminacy, a discursive non-
space of feeling or ‘field of decoded perceptions’ (Johnston, 1999, 27) for deconstructing 
the emotional interior of the reified laboratory subject. The artworks overproduce the 
abstract potential of the diagrammatic space, in contrast to its use as a space of 
representation in neuroscientific explanations of the affective mechanism. The machinic 
differential, expressed in the ‘leaky machine’ of the feeld, is immanent with wider cultural 
affiliations between movement and emotion: the Latin root of emotion being ex motio, ‘to 
move outward or the outward action/gesture’. In the feeld, the dynamics of the material 
imagination keep emotional experience in process, the critical-differential space of the 
artist’s emotion diagram extracted from the specific rationale and recomposed as the system 
in disequilibria; the producer of problematic images described by Marks on p.29 of the 
doctoral research.   
 
 78 
Soul Model 23: Still Life (Fig. 28) rearranges the Le Doux Circuit (Fig. 26) as a component 
in the critical assemblage. The artwork is informed by the art historical genre of the still life 
and critical histories of laboratory emotion, which cite overly elaborate language as the 
enemy of precision. Conceived as a machinic differential of the still life genre, Still Life 
transforms the semiotics of imprecision – ‘flowery language and dramatizations are out of 
place in scientific exposition…for the facts presented should be convincing without an 
appeal to feelings’ (Cannon, 1945, 40) - into the precision flowers of the rationalesque.  
The art historical genre of the still life provides a discursive frame for the rejuvenated 
emotion diagram, in which ‘flowery language’ is expressed as the diagrammatic reflex, 
‘breaking matter out of its overcoded forms, to put it back into contact with its vitality.’ 
(Zepke, 2005, 8) The arrows follow a critical trajectory that escapes the container of 
scientific-technical discourse; the deterritorialization of the scientist’s desire for accuracy, 
reterritorialized in the ‘leaky machine’ of the Still Life diagram.   
 
Emotional Breakdown (Figs. 29-31) forms part of Inspectives, a three-person exhibition for 
Architecture Week 2006 at the Bonington Gallery Foyer, Nottingham Trent University. The 
light-box installation is an example of an object based artistic output in the Diagram of 
Method (Fig. 25). Emotional Breakdown materializes the artistic diagrams of the machinic 
differential, through the installation of constructive criticism into the social fabric of the 
built environment. The ‘leaky machine’ of the feeld is realized as an electrical circuit 
diagram of light-boxes, the artwork taking place in semiotic flows of expression, which 
spill over into the public display of emotion. The first light-box in the circuit diagram is 
Emotion Encryption (Fig. 32) a scrambled image made from bits of the Le Doux Circuit 
(Fig. 26) Soul Model 16: Amygdala (Fig. 27), an Emotion System (Fig. 33) from the 
Sociable Machines Project (MIT Affective Computing Portal)28 and its artistic re-
composition as Soul Model 17: Emotion Arbitration (Fig. 34). The four scrambled images 
re-materialize in the following four light-boxes only to breakdown again in the following 
three. The ‘leaky machine’ of Emotional Breakdown goes haywire in a semiotic flotilla of 
visual components and combinations, the information architecture of the emotion diagram, 
rendered as the schizoid info-structure of constructive criticism. The info-structure of 
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Emotional Breakdown is constructed as a sculptural diagram whose stability of form is 
maintained only by the formal convention of the art historical relief. It remains impossible 
to make sense out of the composition itself, as the divergent visual components fail to gain 
traction in a process of recoding. The ‘abstract machine’ of Emotional Breakdown ‘gives 
off’ the asignifying energy of affect, the critical ‘soul model’ as semiotic sculpture in 
formation.  
 
The diagrammatic plane begins to function as a productive intersection, a transformative 
space for combining and recombining the arts of rationalization with the ‘art of 
subjectivity’. As approximate to the abstract machine of art, the emotion diagram is 
developed as a creative instruction, an image of production and a productive image, set up 
to work as the auto-expressive composition. Connectivity becomes both the object and 
substance of art, connections between practices, between subjectivities, between 
techniques, between materials, between perceptions, between discontinuity and disjunction. 
The conceptual-productive combinations of the machinic differential break out in all 
directions at once, the abstract machine as simultaneous with the creative info-structure of 
its framework: ‘All boundaries are at risk. Since there are a growing number of problems 
without a discipline, this skill in seeing connections – a skill that fuses creative and critical 
modes of enquiry will become increasingly important.’ (Hughes, 2005, 11) If art has a 
rationale it is to exceed the limits of its own practice and in doing so to outstrip the sense 
inherent in the formation of its objects of investigation. Pushed to its limit art begins to lose 
sight of its authoritative agent of expression (the artist) and instead becomes a creative 
agency abroad in the cultural milieu, the local and unstable institution of composition, the 
diagram differing from the structure and making differences out of it. The following 
chapter attempts to move beyond the limitations of art’s rationale in the construction of a 
machinic info-structure, designed to open up the possibilities for problematic creative 
practices that operate without the frames of established disciplines.  
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5. Mainframe: Information Machine - Creative Subject 
 
Mainframe (2005) was a solo show exhibited at Nottingham Trent University’s 1851 
Gallery as part of Architecture Week 2005, a national celebration of the connections 
between art and architecture supported by Arts Council England and RIBA. In every sense 
a prototype exhibition, Mainframe experiments with the creation of overtly material 
information architectures as an artistic response to the rationalization of information and the 
emergence of the information society. In this respect, the Mainframe concept has 
materialized gradually during the course of the doctoral research, which has tended to 
develop the informational facets of the machine aesthetic. As a documentary assemblage29, 
Mainframe was developed as an extension of the bureaucratic critique developed in Chapter 
3, an expressive locus for generating, archiving and disseminating artworks as a type of 
information. In its bureaucratic mode, Mainframe has developed into a site-specific 
institution of information, or to be more precise, the non-institution that moves between 
institutions as the artwork in formation, a machinic interface for the compositional 
diagnosis of the institutional machine. Mainframe’s compositional space of diagnosis is 
also the material realization of the machinic differential in the Diagram of Method (Fig. 
25). The artwork manifests a differential space of production by turning art into a series of 
creative programmes, enabling visitors to make compositions by occupying the 
operationalized subjectivity of the artist as creative agents in a material-informational 
complex of expression.  
 
The ‘art of subjectivity’ culminates in Mainframe at the point in the doctoral research 
where processes of rationalization become synonymous with computerization and the 
developing info-structure of the information economy.30 The info-structure of the 
intelligent artwork provides a productive plane for composing and redistributing the 
interference patterns of the rationalesque, enabling informational production lines like the 
Heart Calculator, Emotion Officer and the Mechanical Freud to operate as creative 
programmes in a wider info-structure of creation. A multifunctional subject position is 
opened up in critical modulations of subjectivity, in a shift toward the construction of 
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systems for remaking informational practices in overtly material registers of composition. 
The ‘software packages’ of the information production lines become devices for harnessing 
viral practices that are liable to go off in all directions at once, schisms and flows of 
production that continually open onto the semiotic energies of a much wider network of 
affects. Mainframe extends this productive network beyond the frame of ‘the artist’ into the 
information society, its architecture the image of the place and product in formation, a 
machinic blueprint for what is supra-subjective and beyond comprehension in the 
complexity of the social info-structure. The creative info-structure throws into relief the 
vast semiotic flows of the social-connective assembly, modulating artistic processes in 
modular combinations of practices, ‘interference patterns’ in the social production of 
information. My objective is to reproduce instrumental forms of information differently; 
first ‘unsecured’ in the diagrammatic space of information (see section 5.1), and 
subsequently reproduced in unstable info-structures of the Mainframe programme. The 
Mainframe architecture makes manifest the potential of information as a social substance in 
which the viewer participates and reproduces in ways yet to be imagined; critical 
navigations of established discourses in information management, technology and society. 
 
The commodification of information31 and its electronic delivery as a product of the 
information economy shifts the capitalist system of production ever closer to the ‘desiring 
machines’ of schizoanalysis discussed in section 1.4. Distributed across a rhizomatic info-
structure of social ‘communication’, the radically interchangeable experience of 
information intersects with the schisms and flows of Deleuze & Guattari’s ‘productive 
unconscious’. (1995, 75) The critical subject of information takes place in the Mainframe 
assemblage as a modulation of the online individual, not the prescribed consumer of 
connectivity but a producing and produced component in communication with other 
components in the informational abstract machine.  Art in-formation, powered by the 
semiotic energies of the information economy, contains an immense expressive potential 
within its compositional field, which art has yet to realize, primarily because artists are 
seduced by technologies of the machine aesthetic at the expense of developing machinic 
techniques. Discourses in digitization and the emergence of ‘new media’32, have drawn art 
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into instrumental rationale of compositional technique, a predictable stability of form where 
there should be a radical proliferation of practices without discernable disciplines. Instead, 
artworks all too frequently appear as demonstrations of what the technology can do, as 
opposed to experiments with what might be done with the technology, turning it into 
something emergent in terms of Heidegger’s ‘unsecuring’ (Rutsky, 1999, 7) of the 
instrumental framework.  
 
Mainframe turns information into a material practice in formation, deterritorializing its 
instrumentality in the machinic technique of informational craft. The informational ‘know 
how’ of the artist renders visible new potentials of information, making it work differently 
in the machinic register as an open ended social experience. The individual character of the 
‘digital artist’ is re-processed into the creative subject of information, who enters into 
machinic relationships with the semiotic energies of the information economy. In its early 
rendition as a documentary assemblage, Mainframe was informed by Otlet’s vision of the 
book-machine as an energetic exchange of signification, 
 
The Book as an Instrument of Abstraction – As this type of mechanism, the book is a 
condensed intellectual force that, in the manner of steam, electricity and gunpowder, which, 
with a small material volume, after ignition and release, produces a considerable expansive 
force in the brain. The mechanism of the book realizes the means for creating the reserves 
of intellectual forces: it is an accumulator (accumulateur: literally a battery). Exteriorization 
of the brain itself, the book develops to the detriment of the brain as tools develop to the 
detriment of the body. Man … has developed his brain by abstraction, the latter by the sign, 
and the sign by the book. (Otlet in Day 2001, 18) 
 
Otlet’s machinic assemblage of the book-machine posits an instrumental rationale for the 
conservation, accumulation and distribution of thought. Reproduced in the quantitative 
attitude the accumulator of the book-machine is ‘unsecured’ as information in the making, 
an affective programme for extending the limits of the individual creative experience. As 
derivative of Otlet’s book machine, Mainframe harnesses the sheer force of information, an 
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artistic differentiator with an autonomous power to create new paths of signification in 
controlled explosions of sense captured in the compositional programme. 
 
The sketchbook assemblage of Mainframe accumulates an energetic of sense designed to 
overwhelm the authority of the artist as a privileged site of signification. The creative 
possibilities of ‘the artist’ are made to proliferate by reconfiguring the artist’s function as 
the function that creates creativity in the artistic assemblage. The compositional functions 
of art are rearranged in Mainframe as a connective force between practices, a quantitative 
attitude toward the sketchbook, developed as an instrument of the abstract machine. The 
machinic sketchbook sends production into overdrive, a differentiator for tapping into and 
transforming socio-cultural semiotic energies, ‘a rhizome ceaselessly establishing 
connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to 
the arts, science and social struggles’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 7). The rationale of the 
artist as creative ego is first deterritorialized in the Mainframe assemblage, in which the 
sketchbook accumulator is set up as an operation of machinic vision. Early versions of the 
sketchbook assemblage33 (Fig. 35) experiment with creative combinations extending the 
form into a modular palette of versatile connections with books, documents, plans, video, 
audio, the internet, materials, institutions, individuals. The creative subject takes place in a 
series of connections by working as one differential among many in the ‘art of 
subjectivity’. The originator subjugated to a productive matrix becomes differentiator, the 
artistic function accumulating and distributing creative potential across a range of 
compositional possibilities.  
 
The Mainframe info-structure draws together the artistic functions of composition, 
organizing them into a complex of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘productive unconscious’. The 
schizoanalysis of the doctoral research is aligned with an artistic variant of systems analysis 
to produce the constructive-critical system. The interference pattern of the critical system 
contaminates the instrumental rationales of over-coded systems, breaking down and 
reconstructing them in the information architecture of the abstract machine. Systemic 
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components assume an instability of form, corrupted by critical connections that generate 
rhizomatic flows of signification, 
 
detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable with multiple entryways and exits and its 
own lines of flight…the rhizome is an acentered, non-hierarchical, non-signifying system 
without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely 
by a circulation of states. What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality – but 
also to the animal, the vegetable, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial – 
that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of becomings (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988, 21) 
 
In the productive network, the artist’s subject position is activated as differential mode and 
interchangeable creative space, the formalized intelligence key of the combination-
composition for unlocking instrumental forms of informational practice, and opening them 
onto the instability of the abstract machine. The subsequent re-compositions of material-
digital compounds remain resistant to the conventional frame of ‘the artwork’. The artistic 
process remains in formation, connecting, disconnecting and re-connecting to parts in a 
socio-productive assemblage, a compositional continuum made possible by the schizoid 
fluctuations of the capitalist’s information economy. The rationalization of information 
affords a radical intermingling of forms and functions, with lines of production (production 
lines) going off in all directions like Otlet’s informational gunpowder.34  
 
5.1 Creative Discipline: The Mainframe Diagram 
Prior to the construction of the Mainframe prototype, the exploded sketchbook is re-
stabilized in the holding station of the modular technical drawing. Mainframe is literally 
drawn back into the diagrammatic space of Picabia’s ‘machinic blueprints’, a shape 
potential to be materialized and mobilized as the information architecture of the site-
specific institution. The diagrams express artistic desire as the technologized will of 
invention, the leaky machine’s potential for assembling and re-assembling permutations of 
the information machine - creative subject,  
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Assemblages are passional, they are compositions of desire. Desire has nothing to do with a 
natural and spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled desire. 
The rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the 
assemblage brings into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes 
them (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 399) 
 
The Mainframe assemblage functions as a control point for ‘data capturing’ the artist’s 
desire in the process of going critical, becoming one with information streams and at once 
destabilizing them, generating new semiotic flows, re-channelling existing ones, connecting 
new lines of production to information technologies, materializing code in techniques of 
info-structure. The rationality of the assemblage is inseparable from the artist’s desire to 
produce the multiplicity of the rationalesque in the ‘art of subjectivity’. The artist’s 
constitution is systematized in the differential institution in formation, (under construction), 
bringing into play and being played by the infinite combinations of expression, afforded by 
the abstractions of the informational machine.  
 
The artistic assemblage of the information machine-creative subject can be further 
considered in relation to Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s ‘General Idea of a Penitentiary 
Panopticon’. (1977, 200-209) Foucault critiques Bentham’s plan for the Panopticon 
Machine as a potential architecture, which is both disciplinary and creative in its 
conception. The Panopticon intervenes in the established composition of the Juridical-Legal 
system to produce an experimental assemblage for a new expression of punishment. A new 
distribution of discourse, practice and materiality is potentialized in the plan for an 
architectural apparatus, 
 
the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted 
from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and 
optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached 
from any specific use (ibid, 205) 
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The Panopticon is an abstract machine because the actualization of its potential is not 
identical with any given rationale for its use, that is, relations of resemblance cannot be pre-
established between the diagram and its social rendition in specific disciplinary 
apparatuses. The architectural apparatus is diagrammed in a state of expression irreducible 
to established forms, a disciplinary creation immanent in a matrix of productive forces that 
are re-distributed across the diagram. The panoptic diagram is in itself an experimental and 
productive space that is at once creative and disciplinary, connecting to practices and 
connecting practices to other practices and techniques, whereby a proliferation of uses 
become available including behaviour modification, training routines, the monitoring of 
medication and its effects, the implementation of untested punishment regimes, the 
management of tasks and all manner of pedagogical experiments. The Panopticon is a 
‘laboratory of power’ (ibid, 204), and a mechanism by which its functions are autonomized.  
 
A similar rationale is applied to the Mainframe diagram (Figs. 36, 37). As a visual 
technology conceived in the artists ‘know how’, it taps into a materialist semiotic which 
amplifies and disseminates power through an arrangement which ‘programmes at the level 
of an elementary and easily transferable mechanism’ (ibid, 209) Mainframe intervenes in 
established discourses on documentation, information technology and digital art in order to 
conceive of a studio - laboratory assemblage capable of functioning as a creative institution. 
As a product of the information society though, the Mainframe programme updates the 
disciplinary model to take account of emergent codes of control, forged in the informational 
currency of post-industrial societies. The arts of rationalization shifting away from 
traditional disciplinary mechanisms become increasingly dependent on digital processes,   
 
confinements are molds, different moldings, while controls are a modulation, like a self 
transmuting molding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve 
whose mesh varies from one point to another. (Deleuze, 1995, 178–89) 
 
Pedagogic, scientific, bureaucratic disciplines do not disappear they are re-configured in 
accordance with ‘intelligent’ business models of the computational machine, operating 
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according to molecular principles of code and control. The subject of information is made 
increasingly dividual35 (ibid, 180); fragmented and dispersed in the modulations of digital 
currency. Data profiles, data banks, data analysis, the password, the diagnostic, the virus, 
the hacker, identity theft, card cloning, browsing, surfing, sampling, downloading, 
uploading, warping, plug-ins, add-ons, pen drives, shared drives, hard drives, search 
engines, software packages, online, on message, a continuous information stream governed 
by the principle of access, which becomes the basis for creating value out of absolutely 
anything that can be coded and delivered electronically in the information economy.  
 
The Mainframe diagram re-configures the documentary arts of bureaucracy into a site-
specific institution for critically engaging the informational aggregates of the 21st century. 
The productive agenda follows that of Day’s materialist critique that evaluates ‘the history 
of information as a privileged site for understanding the intersection of language and 
political economy in modernity’ (Day, 2001, 2). The artworks are streamed into a cultural 
currency of information in which the documentary disciplines have been gradually 
transformed into hegemonic rationales of computerization (ibid 38–59). The resulting 
dominant discourses of information technology, management and science, distribute 
language and materiality as one and the same product according to the capitalist’s 
instrumental model of ‘communication’. Techniques of communication, computation and 
rationalization are digitally synthesized36, integrating the subject with a technological 
apparatus, 
 
new diagrams of control within open systems… the organization of control subject to 
messy local assemblages and dynamic compositions, to processes of bifurcation, resonance 
and interference between the corporeal and the incorporeal, the material and the immaterial, 
dissipation and accumulation and auto-organization. Open systems and open cybernetic 
networks are radically open to the Outside, that is they are relentlessly traversed by a flow 
of matter that is informationally compressed in logarithms, organized by algorithmic code 
and modulated by technical machines. (Terranova in Krysa, 2006, 12)   
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The Mainframe diagram creates an intelligent material that makes manifest the compressed 
abstractions of information as thoroughly social and material products, which at ‘any 
moment whatever’ can be made to work differently in aesthetic codes of practice and with 
unexpected effects. The Mainframe interference pattern is diagrammed as the information 
architecture of material practice, a public place of artistic production working as a type of 
control point, a holding station and creative exchange in the non place of the electronic 
network. The abstract machine of the diagram plugs into a field of productive potential in 
which the artistic function becomes operational as an auto-poetic differential, a machinic 
de-compression (reverse rendering) of code, which experiments with new combinations of 
material-digital compounds. The unstable compound as place and product in formation, the 
dynamic composition made possible by the rationality of the assemblage, provides a subject 
position of radical permutation in the shared drives of machinic information.  
 
5.2 A Shared Drive: The Inn of Information 
The Mainframe prototype (Fig. 38) reproduces the book machine of information, a site-
specific institution of production, documentation, exhibition and distribution. The prototype 
moves the diagrammatic potential into semi-operational status, testing the rationality of the 
assemblage in the experimental exhibition. The exhibition’s components (Figs. 39-44):  
Mainframe A1 diagrams, prototype 3D model, hardcopy A4 frames, hardcopy production 
room, digital projections and interactive CD ROM, are set up to work together as a possible 
machinic assemblage of the informational machine–creative subject. Visitors can join the 
assemblage by logging into the Mainframe programme, which at this point worked as an 
electronic device for storing/projecting artworks according to a themed drawer or 
compartment in the documentary assemblage. The Animi Duco drawer (see following 
paragraph) was used to calibrate production for this particular exhibition. The 
architectonics of the exhibition materialize the contents of the Animi Duco drawer by 
installing the electronic images as a sequence of hardcopy frames, establishing a continuum 
from the digital to the material experience. Drawing inspiration from both the electronic 
and wall based frames, visitors plug in to the exhibitionary info-structure by creating their 
own diagrams and graphs in the Mainframe production room. The collective semiotic 
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energy is then streamed into the ‘start up’ programme as visitors creations are used to 
modulate the initial sequence of the exhibition on a rotating basis.  
 
Mainframe drawers and compartments are conceived as ‘windows’ of exploration and 
production that once opened by the user begin to calibrate the system with a productive 
theme. The Plan drawer for example, sets up an auto–adaptive mechanism designed to 
modify the Mainframe system as visitors explore its creative functions. The drawer 
contains past and current Mainframe plans, drawings sketches, blueprints, alongside an 
initial selection of machine drawings by Duchamp and Leonardo. The purpose is to explore 
the productive power of invention by connecting the abstract machine of the plan to the 
documentary assemblage. Viewers are invited to enter into a machinic relationship with the 
sheer potential of plans. Driven by the collective desire to make plans the drawer will 
accumulate into a vast potential of drafts, modifications, architectures, devices, blueprints; 
the skeletons of concepts any one of which could be rendered as a three dimensional 
artwork. In the ‘shared drive’ viewers begin to modify the Mainframe programme, as they 
submit plans for operating systems or productive processes for new drawers; connective 
extensions which mutate the system through infinite combinations of semiotic energy37. 
Viewers may also respond to plans stored by previous users, to the artist’s ongoing 
adaptation of those plans, and to the gradual uploading of a much wider resource of plans: 
artistic, architectural, scientific, technical manuals, industrial designs; the material of 
possibility which at the point of conception is actualized in the production of abstract 
potential, ‘plans are realized from the moment they are made’. (Anonymous) 
 
The Animi Duco (Heart Calculator) drawer (Appendix G) was used to calibrate the 
productive register of the prototype exhibition. The drawer is an example of how 
‘production lines’, in this case the graphs and diagrams from Chapter 4, can be streamed 
into the Mainframe hardware. A creative info-structure is set up in the Mainframe 
Production Room (Figs. 42, 43), which opens up the subject position of the Mechanical 
Freud to a shared drive, a public participation in and expression of the artist function in 
which the process of self diagnosis is maintained in formation in the ‘art of subjectivity’. 
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The initial sequence of frames, comprise the majority of the images discussed in Chapter 4 
as an affective production line materialized during the month before the exhibition. At the 
point where the semiotic energy of the artist is exhausted the productive process is 
revitalized by a new supply of creative energy. The quantitative attitude developed in 
Chapter 1 through the collapsing of the productive and exhibitionary space, is reproduced 
in a new phase of production. The overproduction of the breaking down Heart Calculator 
is re-modulated in the shared drive of the Mechanical Freud. The ‘leaky machine’ of the 
collective assemblage generates an excess of affect in which the individual producer is 
connected to a supra-individual force of production, expressed and expressing in the 
exhibition as event. The creative subject of the informational machine emerges as both  
experience and experiment of the assemblage, the auto-expressive artwork with a life of its 
own.  
 
5.3 Intelligent Material: The Information Cube 
The Information Cube (Fig. 45) is a work in progress, the future realization of the 
Mainframe programme as an auto-expressive architecture. The artwork is designed to host 
any individual regardless of their ‘artistic tendencies’, enabling the informational machine–
creative subject assemblage to self-organize into a social platform of composition. The ‘I 
feel’ of the leaky machine facilitates a flow of semiotic energy through the machinic space 
of production, the creative cell revitalized and reproduced in the artist’s network of 
composition,  
 
an autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of 
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i)  through 
their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of 
processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete 
unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of 
its realization as such a network. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, 78) 
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The reconstruction of information as social material enables the creative subject to become 
a component in the info-structure and an agent in its non instrumental re-production. The 
Information Cube provides a structure, architectural and compositional, for the future 
realization of the Mainframe programme, a synthesis of the prototype components into a 
unified space of composition, documentation, exhibition and communication (in the 
productive network). What emerges from this synthesis is the intelligent material of the 
public sculptor as sculpture, the creative subject as object in formation, the artwork 
working. 
 
The development of the Information Cube as public sculpture addresses the lack of non-
instrumental public space, indeterminate spaces of social contestation and experience. In 
this respect, Couldry’s (1995) analysis of Rachel Whiteread’s House (Fig. 46a) has 
informed the development of the Information Cube as an open-ended discursive space of 
expression. Couldry’s analysis of House reveals how, ‘in the gravity of an event’ (1995, 
112) the artwork assumed a life of its own quite apart from the intentions of the artist, as it 
became a public canvas (graffiti, poems, messages, drawings were scrawled on its walls) 
for the ‘multi-dimensional intersection of discursive and non-discursive practices, each of 
them irreducible to each other…or to a single model’ (ibid, 113). The Information Cube 
proposes a public merger of the ‘art of subjectivity’ and the informational arts of 
rationalization, re-composing existing lines of aesthetic subjectivation in the conception of 
production lines or lines of production that become embedded in existing and emergent 
social practices. The intelligent material of the Information Cube will situate creative 
subjects as components within the workings of the modular artwork (Fig. 46b)38, providing 
semiotic energy for its reproduction. The object is the process, the never to be finished 
artwork whose purpose is to create possibilities for production. Intelligent composition is 
realized as a social relation and material relation in the making, ‘a network of processes of 
production’ (Maturana & Varela, 1980, 78) in which the ‘art of subjectivity’ takes place.  
 
The Information Cube provides a standard creative unit, capable of functioning as a site-
specific application, a viral institution of creativity. Art’s capacity for cultural trans-
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valuation is materialized in the Information Cube as a process that is also a place, 
constructed and constructing it finds domains between institutions by plugging into and 
contaminating their existing discursive practices. The host institution could be a museum, 
gallery, university, school, hospital or company whose practices would inform the 
calibration of the creative process, in the same way that the thematic divisions of the 
drawers in the Mainframe prototype were used to set up the experimental exhibition. The 
‘docking’ process builds the machinic interface between established institution and the viral 
institution, the incubation period for mixing up practices and turning one thing into another, 
as was done with the experimental combination-compositions in preceding chapters. A new 
type of aesthetic connection emerges between the Information Cube (abstract machine, 
viral institution) and the institutional machine. The Information Cube goes to work on the 
host institution unlocking its practices with the intelligence key of the combination-
composition just as the institution works the Information Cube, providing it with critical 
territory, semiotic energy, human resources, discourses, histories, procedures, documents, 
knowledge, skills, materials, experience and techniques. Social architecture becomes 
information architecture becomes constructive criticism with the artist as difference 
engineer on the production line between practices.  
 
The Information Cube’s production line unfolds in a continuum of activity. The first stage 
is comparable to ‘field work’, setting up the Information Cube as a mobile laboratory for 
performing artistic experiments on the host institution. For example, a constructive critical 
analysis of a gallery’s exhibition programme, its rationale in terms of artist selection, 
audience development, participation, business strategy and education. The diagnostic 
(docking) phase provides support material for developing a parallel critical programme in 
the Information Cube, devised as a compositional framework for destabilizing the 
established practices of an institution The critical-compositional framework is incubated 
during the research period, and then literally programmed into the motion sensitive walls, 
the intelligent material of the algorithmic artwork.39 The programme might involve a 
simple proliferation of creative energy, an application of the quantitative attitude directed 
against the institutional arbiters of aesthetic value. Visitors walk inside the informational 
 93 
space as if inside a large pixel, activating and exploring and making additions to the 
programme, while simultaneously becoming a component in the intelligent material. A 
seamless flow of material-digital production eventuates in the place taking place, a mode of 
informational expressionism in which movement as semiotic energy (action, information, 
expression), becomes the aggregate in the dance of information.40   
 
The programme is tailored to critically reproduce the institutional discourse in different 
directions, opening out lines of possibility that are closed down by, for example, curatorial 
authority. Visitors/users not only intersect with lines of production and curation, they also 
generate lines of emission. Compositions are instantaneously projected from inside the 
cube onto the surrounding architecture, turning the institution against itself in a critical fold 
of production. The boundaries between artwork, artist and institution are erased in the 
informal flow, as ever-changing projections maintain the exhibition in a state of flux, 
continually modulated by new visitors to the site. Furthermore, it would be possible to 
control the creative process online, enabling virtual visitors to either view the exhibition or 
occupy the cube to produce actual situations from online locations. The multiple and 
critical lines of production are in themselves enough to show the severe lack of creativity 
inherent in the art institution, precisely because the rationing of ‘the artist’ is their 
organizing principle. By replacing ‘the artist’ with a cultural programme of the artist 
function, production goes into overdrive in crossed lines, mutations, deviations, fractures, 
fissures and distortions in the discourse of composition. Artistic production is amplified in 
the materialist semiotic of schizoanalysis, transforming the bourgeois artist of neurosis into 
the subject of machinic expression. Shared drives are realized through intersecting lines of 
production and subjectivation, made available in the ‘art of subjectivity’ when the 
individual is overwhelmed at the threshold of creative possibility.  
 
The standard creative unit of the Information Cube is designed to be reproducible on the 
artistic production line. Conceived as a reproducible system for producing artworks, 
Information Cubes could be manufactured as the cultural products of creative 
rationalization. Once embedded in the social fabric, the Information Cubes will initiate the 
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systematic mobilization of the abstract machine, allowing it to go to work on its material on 
a scale previously unimagined. At various times and places the Information Cubes will 
come together in a general assembly, interchangeable modules sharing information and 
communicating with each other in an evolving productive network The interconnected 
processes are a manifestation of what remains unavailable to experience on a particulate 
level. The microprocessor, the information highway, the computer programme are 
abstractions that elude both comprehension and experience, and yet they generate the 
dominant form of social relations. The degree to which the social info-structure is 
dislocated from its material situation provides art with a plane of permutation whose 
potential is yet to be realized; ‘the more complex a system is, the more abstract its 
boundaries are’ (Bolz, 2007, 121).41 The Information Cube is a method for realizing 
abstractedness in concrete situations, through the construction of a material housing which 
makes manifest the productive potential of the information economy. The composition is 
made possible by the info-structure, but simultaneously remakes what is possible within its 
productive network; the experience changes with the production, the production is the 
experience of what changes.  
 
The challenge for the ‘art of subjectivity’ is to make these new lines of production work. In 
this respect, a similar question emerges to that which informed the production line in 
Chapter 1; faced with infinite creative dimensions of material-digital complexes, the 
Information Cube being just one example, how do we account for the stability of form and 
experience? Art may find a purpose in undertaking research into the conditions of 
possibility for creative action, providing cultures for the generation of new modes of 
subjectivation in which those rare moments of self re-evaluation are made available,  
 
The Self is not knowledge or power. It is a process of individuation that effects groups or 
people and eludes both established lines of force and constituted knowledge. It is kind of 
surplus value (Deleuze, 2006, 341) 
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Art makes a surplus value of self-process, which consistently under performs in the 
rationale of ‘the artist’, a discursive limit on the productive potential of the creative subject. 
The subject of creativity is freed up as the agent of permutation, the intelligent material 
moulded, modulated and modulating in the soul model of the Information Cube. The 
rationalization of information gives rise to a paradoxical moment of opportunity; a release 
of creative energy dependent on the installation of the subject in a complex of auto-poetic 
expression; the opening of art onto the un-thought creative possibilities in Art. In 
diagnosing the conditions of subjectivity, the artist becomes a type of cultural physician, 
not healing the wounds but prising them open, embracing and revitalizing what is valuable 
in a life of flaws and fissures.  
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6. Conclusion: Rationalization, Art and Subjectivity 
 
The ‘creative unit’ of the Information Cube may be perceived in the broadest sense as an 
artist's programme, but in what type of organization would it be welcome? As the 
intelligent but instrumental business model becomes operational in institutions both 
commercial and public, the social control of creative energy becomes a dynamic issue. The 
so called ‘insurgent subjectivities’ (Newfield & Rayner, 2007) of creative organizations are 
‘set free’ to question authority, overturn conventions and adapt outmoded practices; 
employees as artists maybe, although their productive energies are released by the regimes 
that support their positions. The subjectivity granted to challenge established practices 
‘must be made to the extent that the apparatus allows it or makes it possible’ (Deleuze, 
2006, 341), even as it generates programmes of cultural change. The ‘unstable 
environments of post industrial or informational capitalism’ (Newfield & Rayner, 2007) are 
therefore a matter of contention, critical sites in which the production and reproduction of 
knowledge, skills and experience are continually under negotiation.  
 
The doctoral research has strived to prise open critical spaces of contention in the tussle 
between artist and institution, developed as a tactical encounter with the semiotic energy of 
the ‘agonism’ (Foucault in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, 222). What is perceived as unstable 
by one person is far from being unstable, let alone critical, in the eyes of another; as 
Chapter 3 argues, learning organizations do not equate to critical or even creative ones from 
the artist’s perspective. As organizations learn how to learn, they devise creative work 
environments to continually adapt to the fluctuating market conditions of 21st Century life. 
When creativity becomes the buzzword in a global climate of intelligent business, a tension 
develops between order and disorder, compliance and critique. This cultural dynamic is 
consistent with the interference pattern, ‘the material expression of the paradox of control’ 
(Newfield & Rayner, 2007), operating at the threshold of a constantly modulated system 
that aspires to a state of ‘controlled schizophrenia’ (Hardt in Newfield & Rayner, 2007).  
 
 97 
Against the schizoid socio-economic background of ‘controlled schizophrenia’, the doctoral 
research situates all practices, instrumental and non-instrumental, as productive modes of 
expression. Expressed in the interstice, the ‘art of subjectivity’ works in the spaces between 
disciplines and works itself into the flaws within disciplines, enabling art to emerge as a 
critical tool of differential composition, turning established practices into new territories of 
productive possibility. As a discipline in itself, art has established practices of its own with 
creative injunctions and rationales based on the rules that govern its expressive parameters. 
As Chapter 5 suggests, there is something of a discrepancy between the emerging potential 
of digital art and its effective mobilization as an agent of social transformation. The 
intelligent material is only as effective as its composite elements, including the artistic 
component. The idea of the artist as originator with a privileged relationship to creativity is 
eclipsed by the regularity of artistic production and predictability of its forms; faced with 
the infinite possibilities of composition how does one make a difference?  
 
The creative rationale of the alreadymade artist is more of a repeat prescription than 
interference pattern with the inbuilt capacity to go critical and transform the object of 
investigation. In terms of pushing the boundaries of artistic practice, the ‘controlled 
schizophrenia’ of the machinic assemblage is a difficult state to sustain, requiring an 
absolute commitment to losing oneself in the object of investigation in order to destabilize 
its sense in a decoded field of perceptions. As was argued in Chapter 1, critical artists must 
first strive to extract themselves from established aesthetic regimes, especially those 
determined by discourses that emphasize the meaning of art objects above their creation. As 
a cultural and political enterprise, the doctoral project strives to recharge the artistic 
differential of subjectivity in the research of composition, the expression of the constructive 
critical framework, immanent with the productive experience of the research subject. 
Production in all its dimensions may then be restored to art as a basis for ‘insurgent 
subjectivities’, capable of making differences out of themselves and the world.  
 
The contemporary artist strives to compose new differences from the currency of what is 
emergent and problematic in the experience of the social world. Constructive criticism has 
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adopted a similar objective, while acknowledging the limitations internal to art that must be 
worked through before it is able to produce effective antidotes to the insidious filiations of 
instrumental reason. In this respect, the effectiveness of the artwork is dependent on the 
researcher’s knowledge of how to produce the optimum case study when identifying 
problematics as flaws in the objects of investigation. These patterns of interference are 
reproduced in the quantitative attitude as critical folds in established rationalisms, the 
turbulence of turning practices against themselves in techniques of over-production. 
Semiotic energies with deterritorializing potential that are internal to dominant practices 
and contained by them in their stability of form, are released into new ways of doing things 
and new lines of subjectivation, non-rational leakages as channels for emergent 
subjectivities, 
 
What Foucault saw as the current or the new was what Nietzsche called the untimely, the 
non current, the becoming that splits away from history, the diagnosis that relays analysis 
on different paths. Not predicting, but being attentive to the unknown knocking at the door 
(Deleuze, 2006, 346) 
 
In the currency of doctoral research, artistic ‘know how’ has accumulated into the critical 
technique of the combination-composition, the ‘art of subjectivity’ calibrated as the 
intelligence key, the practice for unlocking practices, for making explicit what is implicit in 
their unstable constitution and reproduction, for releasing their semiotic energies along new 
courses into uncharted territories. The intelligence key of art relays experience in the 
critical conduct of decoded practice, configured as the instrument of the un-known taking 
place in the affective-perceptual course of action. The course of the doctoral research 
unfolds in practice as a soul technology of the interference pattern, a disturbance in the 
cognitive register, giving rise to new cartographies of experience in which the remaking of 
practices and subjectivities is one and the same process. Recently completed and current 
projects are variations of this creative frequency, as opposed to major departures from 
existing registers of production. This work in progress follows new lines of production that 
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cut across the parameters of doctoral research, fleeting renditions that for reasons of time, 
resources and consistency, form the outside edge of the academic research frame. 
 
Recent artworks were made in Autumn 2006 for Hinterland, a site-specific project that 
engages with the social history of the River Trent, conceived and curated by the 
Nottingham based curator Jennie Syson. Revitalized (2006) and Freeze (2006) are 
compositions that work with the energy of the river, connecting the semiotic flows of 
constructive criticism to the bio-dynamics of the natural environment. The artworks are 
adjacent to Guattari’s conception of the ‘ecosophic object’ (Guattari, 1996, 199–35), in this 
case the transplanting of artistic info-structure into the creative ecosystem. The 
biodegradable composition moves in the direction of decomposition, a discernable change 
of physical states, which enables a whole ecology of affects to come into play in the 
working relationship between geography and cartography. A critical symbiosis takes place 
in the aesthetic differential of ecology, in which the artist’s creative environment acts as a 
counterbalance to the economic exploitation of natural resources. The compositions 
intersect with current discourses on regeneration, recycling, and sustainability, as art 
territorializes the rationale of the environmental subject.  
 
Revitalized (Figs. 47, 48) is a wreath of the Le Doux Circuit, stripped of words and arrows 
the composition is derivative of Still Life discussed in section 4.4. The poetic vitality of 
‘flowery language’, the enemy of precision, is celebrated in the ritual liquidation doctoral 
research, the forsaking of the need for academic rigour and mental reasoning in the 
conception of art objects. In a similar artistic relay between nature and culture, the motion 
capture system of Freeze (Figs. 49, 50) liquidates the ‘controlled schizophrenia’ of 
rationalization in the glacial transition from frozen arrow to artwork in suspension. The 
dissolution of the artwork resonates with the dissipation of the creative cycle of the doctoral 
research, the liquidation of a creative state based primarily on the dynamic composition of 
the diagram. The decomposition of Freeze melting into the river constitutes an 
intermingling of movements, a fluid semiosis of information, transformation, emotion and 
perception. The experimental and transitional states of Revitalized and Freeze will form the 
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basis for generating future cartographies of expression, in the cultural exchange between 
artistic and environmental movements.   
 
Movement, in all its dimensions, has emerged in the latter stages of research as a key 
differential in the ‘art of subjectivity’. Implicit in the composition of production lines, 
information streams and semiotic flows, is a deterritorialized subject of movement. Moved 
(Appendix F) is a project submitted in November 2006 to Capture 5, The Arts Council’s 
platform for dance for film. The proposal attempts to produce movement differentials in the 
‘dance of information’ by utilizing the emotion diagram as a choreographic template42. The 
purpose is to construct a non-narrative film about movement, overproducing it in a decoded 
field of perceptions that destabilize both dancer and viewer in the moving, moving image, 
 
If narrative subordinates becoming and image towards the fulfilment and realization of 
change towards some resolution, movement and change itself will free the perceiving eye 
and brain from the habits and genres of narrative, opening perception to a duration whose 
end is not given in advance. If this non-narrativity is possible it is because Deleuze regards 
the signs of cinema not as components in a structure, but as productive of relations 
(Colebrook, 2006, 50) 
 
Moved breaks down movement and then remakes it in new complexes of ‘controlled 
schizophrenia’. Movement shows itself in its difference through the splitting up of ‘the 
dancer’ into movement functions, playing out across various planes of composition. In the 
exchange between thought and expression, emotion and information is the slippery 
aggregate of the moving, moving image, the rationale of cinematic representation losing 
traction in the dynamic juxtaposition of discontinuous movements. 
 
A different type of art movement has emerged in the creative affiliation of General Purpose 
Consulting, formed in April 2007 as a response to the cultural blurring of boundaries 
between art, business and consultancy. On one level the project keys into Zizek’s 
comments in section 3.2 on the ‘objectivized language of experts… which can no longer be 
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translated into the common language accessible to everyone’. The prevalence of 
management consultancy as a parasitical mode of expertise provides a common currency 
for working across disciplines, premised on the commercial and public institution’s general 
acceptance of the intelligent business model. The creativity of the learning organization 
drifts into that of the artists’ collective, who generate critical modulations of the 
consultant’s discourse on the ‘business algorithm for value creation’ (Accenture, 2007). 
General Purpose Consulting modulates the business algorithm, shifting constructive 
criticism into the creative environment of ‘value creation’. By tapping into the discourse of 
the ‘insurgent subject’, the GPC consultancy will materialize online with a multifunctional 
website and off line with stationery (business cards, headed paper, brochures), enabling the 
group to pitch for consultancy contracts relating to our skills base, thereby plugging into the 
consultant’s business interface of external performance indicators and diagnostics of an 
organization’s creative environment. 
 
The ‘algorithm for value creation’ has itself become a generative procedure in the doctoral 
research. The cultural value of artistic practice, unfolding along the lines of rational 
procedures but at the same time sending them off course, in the ‘controlled schizophrenia’ 
of the modulating algorithm. The quantitative algorithm of the Heart Calculator 
Instructions (2002), the bureaucratic algorithms of academic procedure, the affective and 
choreographic algorithms of emotion diagrams and the institutional algorithm of the 
Mainframe (2005) programme, form a constellation of generative instructions in which the 
critical diagnostics of constructive criticism find expression in the ‘art of subjectivity’. A 
more overt form of self-diagnosis has begun to emerge in the auto-creative instruction that 
is immanent with the artist’s expressive state. The instructive portrait of (Fig. 51) turns the 
algorithm into the composition and the composition into algorithm; a combination of 
elements from previous artworks it smoothes out the interference pattern through the 
regulation of what remains anomalous in the artist. Thought Processed (Fig. 52) marks the 
end of the creative cycle, a year before completing the doctoral research. As a bridge 
between artistic and intellectual registers the artwork anticipates the written thesis as an 
after-thought of grey matter, the ‘art of subjectivity’ framed in academic thought as a 
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necessary pre-condition for realizing its socio-cultural value as a critical form of 
expression.  
 
The creative relays between academic research and cultural practice, subjectivities and 
social structures, have informed the compositional dynamic during the latter phase of 
research. Through experience and experiment, the artistic assemblages of the doctoral 
research connect and reconfigure the components of the social assemblage, to generate art 
movements that cut across and transform the semiotic material of the social fabric. In this 
respect, the shared drive of the Information Cube contains the algorithmic potential of the 
art movement but is not predicated on the individual artist. The separation of art from its 
creative functions builds an exchange of knowledge, skills and materials in the critical 
performance of the rationalesque, as expression is freed from its ground in ‘the artist’ and 
new lines of aesthetic subjectivation connect with the productive power of socio-economic 
machines. The Information Cube is one example of how to programme the art movement, 
enabling the intelligent material to function as a visual technology for prising open 
permanent spaces of deterritorialization, the ‘primed experience’ which paradoxically is 
made possible by the instrumentality of social relations. The rationality of the assemblage 
‘unsecures’ both art and instrumental reason in the critical form, the ‘art of subjectivity’ 
becoming the fluid existence of living creatively; the desire for life to become more like art 
and for art to become the condition of life.  
 
The dynamic between life and art remains to some degree in a state of disequilibrium, art in 
its abstractedness never becoming completely drawn into the workings of the social 
assemblage. The historical antagonisms between art and society maintain its potential as a 
critical tool of composition, so long as artists continue to translate possibilities into new 
courses of action. In moving against its objects of investigation art finds poetic energy in 
the tactical engagement of critique, turning both its objects and itself into subject matters 
(subjectivities and practices), which take place in creative currents that are critical in the 
discourses that provide them with their energy. The critical engagement, if it has a 
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rationale, provides a reason for living as art is installed into life and life is re-installed as 
art,  
 
alternate forms of existential re-appropriation…may in future become the reason for living 
for human collectivities and individuals who refuse to give in to the death like entropy 
characterizing the period we are passing through (Guattari, 1996, 107) 
 
If the reason for living is to create a politics of lived experience, art has a crucial role to 
play in the production of subjectivity. The doctoral research has rendered visible the 
aesthetic parameters that enable a subject of permutation to challenge what is established as 
rational. Art’s capacity to astonish through the expression of previously unthought forms 
remains available at the threshold of exhaustion and renewal, (semiotic, social and 
subjective), but only if it strives to surmount the limitations of sense imposed by the 
reasonable subject. The task facing the thoroughly contemporary artist is to restore the 
potential for exceeding productive limits, to work out what it could mean to be creative in 
the precarious existence of 21st Century life.  
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Postscript on Conceptual Art:  Critical Reflection 
 
‘What type of practitioner do you consider yourself to be?’ Since embarking upon an MA 
in Contemporary Art in 2002 I have always struggled to answer this question in terms of 
existing subjectivities. Although this may appear a relatively straightforward question to 
the outside observer, from within the context of the doctoral research it remains a challenge 
to identify, name or categorize the types of processes that emerge in the relationship 
between theory, practice and research. I will therefore develop the answer as an issue of 
subjectivity, a response not only to that pertinent question as to the artist’s specialty, but 
also as a pretext for engaging with a wider set of problems that emerge from this critical 
reflection upon the particulars of the doctoral research.   
 
The art historical tradition of Conceptual Art will provide a framework for evaluating the 
relationships between thinking, making and writing in the doctoral research. Conceptual 
Art practice provides an existing discourse for situating my creative practice as a mode of 
expression driven by the aesthetic exploration of ideas. Conceptual Art emerged as a 
distinct form of art practice by the mid 1960’s, partly as a response to the limitations of 
Clement Greenberg’s highly influential Modernist Painting (1961). Greenberg develops a 
formal criticism that delimits a position of self-critical activity for the artist, a medium 
specific practice in which the modern abstract painting is accorded the highest value. 
 
By the mid 1960’s this critical position was being challenged on all fronts by a number of 
emerging Conceptual Artists of which I will consider three: Sol LeWitt, Mel Bochner and 
Joseph Kosuth who have helped define my aesthetic sensibility. The Conceptual Artworks 
of the 1960’s established a precedent for using a wide range of media and materials, in 
conjunction with cultural, historical and political discourse from across the social spectrum. 
Despite the eclectic approach there were a number of principles being applied to the 
production of Conceptual Artworks. Firstly, concepts or ideas take precedence over the 
traditional issues of aesthetics, materials and technique. Secondly, as an effect of 
conceptual primacy language predominates in the production and perception of Conceptual 
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Artworks, to the extent that intelligent viewers were expected to ‘finish off’ the 
compositions at the level of understanding. Thirdly, Conceptual Artists were motivated by 
the problematic condition of the post-modernist artwork, interrogating its status as art, its 
social function and non-aesthetic properties.  In this respect a key objective in Conceptual 
Art was to produce a critical analysis of the discourse ‘art’, as opposed to original forms of 
composition.  
 
To this end, Le Witt, Kosuth and Bochner wrote influential essays that qualified the 
conditions of possibility in which Conceptual Artists might realise their artworks. In Art 
After Philosophy (1969) in (Alberro ed. 2000, 158 – 177) Kosuth explores the complex 
relations between language, image and referent by investigating how meaning is constituted 
in signs, as a basis for the representation of reality. Conceptual Art applies an emerging 
knowledge of semiotics as a tool for criticising Art’s traditional signifying practices. The 
Conceptual Artwork is considered an arbitrary designation, which emerges in the 
relationship between the critically minded artist and viewer; there is no need for the 
Greenbergian critic as aesthetic middle-man and arbiter of good taste.  
 
Sol LeWitt’s Paragraphs on Conceptual Art (1967) in (Alberro ed. 2000, 12 – 17) defines 
the relation between idea and expression as it was understood by Conceptual Artists from 
the late 1960’s into the early 1970’s, 
 
The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. This kind of art is not theoretical or 
illustrative of theories; it is intuitive, it is involved with all types of mental processes and it is 
purposeless. It is usually free from the dependence on the skill of the artist as a craftsman. It 
is the objective of the artist who is concerned with Conceptual Art to make the work mentally 
interesting to the spectator…it is only the expectation of an emotional kick, to which one 
conditioned to expressionist art is accustomed, that would deter the viewer from perceiving 
this art. (LeWitt in Alberro ed. 2000, 12) 
 
Le Witt’s emphasis on the concept as generative, and the intuitive aspect of the artwork’s 
formation resonate with the doctoral research in their affinity with Adorno’s perspective on 
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the affective non-concept. Conversely, LeWitt’s separation of an emotional and cognitive 
register is typical of Conceptual Art’s demarcation of the senses, which in part results from 
the rejection of the Greenbergian aesthetic of material specialisation. In this respect the 
doctoral research aims to reconnect the mental and emotional in a revised aesthetics of 
materiality, based on the premise that a critical Conceptual Art generates its force in the 
immanent philosophy of affects.  
 
Finally, Bochner’s The Serial Attitude (1967) in (Alberro ed. 2000, 22 – 27) develops an art 
in which ‘serial order is a method not a style’. (ibid, 22) argues that the variations in 
Conceptual Art practice must be determined by a serial attitude and not a style, which 
accounts for work that is at once systematic in its composition and diverse in its formal 
appearance. The serial attitude derives from a ‘numerical or otherwise systematically 
predetermined process (permutation, progression, rotation, reversal)’ (ibid, 23). As an 
example Bochner cites Milton Babbit’s Three Compositions for Piano in which  
 
arithmetic is used as a compositional device resulting in a sort of programme music… The 
composer is freed from individual note-to-note decisions, which are self- generating within 
the system he devises. (ibid, 25) 
 
The Serial Attitude has influenced the development of the ‘quantitative attitude’ in Chapter 
1 of the doctoral research, which is an attempt to think qualitatively and critically about the 
numerical basis of social and political relations, by reproducing those relations in 
modulated forms. Hence the artworks function from within the system as oppositional, their 
radicality qualified as their transformative potential, which cannot be reduced to artistic 
intention. The emergent artwork is neither caused by the artist nor is it the effect of a 
discourse that is already practised as art; it is conceived as an expressive potential waiting 
to happen at ‘any moment whatever’. 
 
I am now in a position to critically evaluate what is unique in the relationship between 
theory, practice and research in the doctoral thesis. The evaluation is based upon the extent 
to which the doctoral research develops the art historical tradition of Conceptual Art, by re-
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shaping key aspects of its practice into effective critical instruments. I will also evaluate  
Conceptual Art practice based on a wider critique of the relationship between philosophical 
theory, Conceptual Art practice and the specific methods of the doctoral research. Finally I 
will reflect upon the radical and politically motivated art forms that have grown out of 
1960’s Conceptual Art movement. I will situate my work in relation to these practices and 
will argue that it is radical in its similarity to as opposed to its difference from the object of 
critical investigation.  
 
The doctoral research aligns itself with Conceptual Art practice, while at the same time 
breaking down some of its philosophical and critical tendencies. The purpose is to 
reconsider elements of Conceptual Art practice and assess their suitability as component 
parts in the critical assemblage. In the first instance, and from a philosophical perspective, 
it is debatable whether any conceptual artist has ever produced a concept. It would be more 
accurate to describe such practices as conceptual analogues; compositions that attempt to 
communicate ideas in and through artistic practice. In a similar vein the doctoral research 
does not strive to produce concepts but rather allows concepts to become generative of 
compositions. Furthermore, the concept manifests itself in Conceptual Art through a 
polarisation of mind and body, thought and material, word and image, to the extent that 
there is a move toward the de-materialisation of the art object in the perceived 
immateriality of cognitive experience. The doctoral research employs an immanent 
philosophy of creation in order to avoid the transcendence of the concept into the realm of 
the metaphysical. It has proved more productive to treat the concept as a material affect, 
emerging not from an individual source but in a set of changing material relations that give 
rise to both ‘the individual’ and ‘the concept’.  
 
There is no doubt that the doctoral research continues along the trajectory of Conceptual 
Art by realising artworks that are generated by thought as a creative force capable of 
instigating a compositional process. I also attempt to convey ideas ‘in the process’, by 
engaging with forms of practice that are approximate to Conceptual Art’s affiliation with 
the discipline of philosophy. Unlike Kosuth and many of his contemporaries, there is no 
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attempt to construct a relationship of representation between a critically minded artist and 
viewer, in which a theory is made manifest as a pretext for exploring the mechanics of 
meaning.  The primary meaning of ‘convey’ is to transport, move, shuttle or carry to a 
place; the communicative sense is secondary. In this respect semiotics is deployed in the 
doctoral research as tool for moving across the signifying practices of different disciplines 
in order to decode those practices and find similarities between them, before the artwork 
emerges in a new set of relations. 
 
The relationship between theory, practice and research can me made explicit as the creating 
of relations between theories, practices and research. The creating of these relations is the 
artistic practice in process, emerging from the relations that are created and finding 
expression in them. In the doctoral research the diagram is a device for re-organising the 
creative lexicon of Conceptual Art into a semiotics of production. The diagram is 
approximate to a theory or concept insofar as it expresses an abstraction, a space of 
possibility for the emergence of practical encounters with actual material situations. The 
practical encounters can take on a multiplicity of forms and are situated across a range of 
established practices. The diagram transports elements of Conceptual Art practice into new 
domains and connects them to the signifying practices of other disciplines. In effect the 
diagrammatic approach frees Conceptual Art from the limitations of the transcendent 
concept and its formation in the artist as identity, facilitating a transversal practice of 
intersections that are contingent with the object of investigation and emergent in the 
transformation of that object. 
 
What is a transversal practice? In the context of the doctoral research it involves a 
movement across different fields of research and a movement within a single field, as the 
disciplines of architecture, science, social science, economics, politics, philosophy, 
literature and contemporary visual art are all brought into play. The purpose is to develop 
singular practices that can be described as creative processes in terms of how they work and 
what they produce, but which cannot be easily categorized as identical with existing 
disciplines. In the singularity of the creative encounter, one type of practice does not take 
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precedence over another, it is more a case of composing a creative contingency between 
practices, as a basis for the emergence of what could simply be termed ‘the new’. The new 
is therefore a material effect of an original relationship between theory, practice and 
research. Conceptual Art production was based on the representation of ideas, and was 
critical at the point of reception; quite simply it was an art that was about something. The 
doctoral research is critical at the point of production, the points where representations of 
things begin to take shape as meaningful or the points where things begin to lose a 
meaningful coherence. 
 
In this creative exchange between theory and practice, research plays both a critical and 
constructive role. First in order to generate a productive momentum capable of meeting the 
demands of a properly transversal art practice, it is necessary to identify and connect 
specific research areas across a number of disciplines, in order to fully explore the 
possibilities for creating relations that give rise to emergent practices. This does not mean 
trying to be ‘all things to all people’, nor is it a case of being a ‘jack of all trades and master 
of none’. It is more a case of sifting for components in different disciplines, extracting them 
from a range of practices and re-assembling them into productive techniques with a 
capacity for transforming the initial object of investigation.  
 
In Chapter 4 for example, research was conducted into current aspects of the semiotic 
method with the aim of identifying semiotic applications that could facilitate a productive 
process. Semiotics is not in itself a theory, but is based on a theory of the linguistic sign 
proposed by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1916). It is a method for the analysis 
and interpretation of signs, which has been used in different ways across different 
disciplines as a critical tool. Saussure’s insistence on the arbitrariness of the sign has 
greatly influenced Structuralist and Post-Structuralist philosophy, which has in turn 
informed Conceptual Art practice since the mid 1960’s, of the type we have examined in 
this critical appraisal. In visual practice and critical studies, semiotics is primarily 
associated with the reading of images as communicative structures. In the doctoral research 
the semiotic method is deployed primarily as a tool for decoding visual information such as 
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the graphs of laboratory emotion and the physiology of affect. The decoded information is 
extracted from its original domain ready to be connected to other method components in the 
differential space of composition. The ‘decoded field of perception’ emerges only when the 
semiotic material has been subjected to other methods of analysis discussed below.  
 
The practice of discourse analysis is connected to semiotic analysis as a tool for critically 
evaluating the scientific and psychological texts that work to make sense out of the visual 
material. Recurrent statements provide a discursive parameter for understanding the visual 
codes as expressions of numeric objectivity. Breaking down this frame of reference to 
analyse its instabilities and contradictions involves a systematic critique of documents 
relating specifically to laboratory emotion, and to adjacent sources in the form of critical 
texts from the history of science. The identification of sense patterns in the shape of 
repeated statements and visual codes sets up the productive parameter for the composition 
of the ‘interference pattern’, described in detail throughout the doctoral research as the 
creative modulation of sense in the decoded field of perception. The interference pattern is 
a complex effect of travelling between disciplines and across methods, which is made 
possible by the research into method components, their assemblage into critical tools and 
their subsequent activation in the compositional process.  
 
In Chapter 4 there is an additional method component of Lacanian Psychoanalysis at work, 
which in the doctoral research has focused on the ‘subject supposed to know’. Like 
semiotics and discourse analysis psychoanalysis is very much a method, a clinical practice 
based on a theory of the unconscious. The psychoanalytic component gives the critical 
assemblage an additional facility for questioning the authority of the emotional scientist in 
the productive dynamic between knowledge and desire. The three method components of 
Chapter 4 are in a continuum with artistic practice insofar as all three address the 
mechanics of signification, through an emphasis on the production of discourse, desire and 
meaning respectively. The aggregate of signification allows the emerging form of art 
practice to stream into the other three method components in a fully functioning critical 
assemblage, designed for a specific inquiry into the ‘scientific image of emotion’ in 
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Chapter 4. Once absorbed into the critical and contingent method, it is no longer possible to 
identify art in the singularity of the compositional process or to extract it from the 
productive momentum of the creative event.  
 
What is the role of philosophy in this complex dynamic of theory, practice and research, 
and why has a certain type of philosophy taken precedence over others? The immanent 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari has proved an effective thought framework because it 
emphasizes the creativity inherent in all practices, and consistently sustains an ontology of 
creation as a basis for remaking them. On reflection, Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual 
oeuvre has encouraged a fruitful exchange between the Conceptual Art movement, 
modernism and critical practice. A dynamic has emerged between the inter-disciplinarity of 
Conceptual Art and the intra-disciplinarity of immanent practice. The material reflexivity of 
modernist painting is to some degree evident in the singularity of the transversal 
composition, but paradoxically as a method it is not exclusively artistic in character and so 
resembles the eclectic approach of the early Conceptual Artists. 
 
The attempt in the doctoral research to develop a palette of practices under the umbrella of 
‘art’, and the subsequent territorialization of art’s specific qualities may appear to be at 
odds with a transversal practice, which in generating its singularities must subsume discrete 
practices into a multi-directional process. Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy 
(1994), was initially utilized as a means of holding apart the disciplines in order to 
temporarily abstract them from an environment of increasing interdisciplinarity and 
multiple intersections of practice. This has allowed a space to critically reflect upon their 
qualities in terms of fundamental differences, primarily as a means of evaluating art’s 
specific nature as a creative process. Although differences between disciplines have been 
elaborated, in practice the similarities between them provide the compositional plane with a 
degree of consistency. In Chapter 4, the status of affect in art and science draws the two 
disciplines together in a discourse on sensation. The ground upon which the two intersect is 
an emergent creative territory where similarities are engaged to ‘force the issue’ of how 
differences are created and sustained. On the one hand, the artist-philosopher requires a 
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palette of techniques for mixing theory, practice and research into the types of method 
discussed earlier. On the other hand, if art bleeds into too many other disciplines its power 
to produce generative combinations of the sort that are manifest in the doctoral research 
will diminish. The ‘affective non concept’ is under tension and available for critical 
negotiation at the boundary between identifiable practices and practitioners, enabling the 
discourse ‘art’ to hold open the boundaries between disciplines for just long enough to 
allow new creative forces to escape and interact, in what might be termed Conceptual Art in 
the fullest sense. 
 
Why have other philosophical positions been marginal to the creative process in the 
doctoral research? To answer this question it is necessary to reflect once again on the issue 
of establishing an artistic position and how that position can be interpreted as critical. 
Chapter 1 of the doctoral research works through the contemporary status of the critical 
artist in practice but neglects to provide critical reflection on this position, precisely 
because critical reflection had already been identified as an impediment to the productive 
process.  
 
A more balanced view is required in order to make explicit some implicit assumptions that 
were in play while developing the ‘quantitative attitude’ toward artistic practice. In order to 
reassess the relationship between my practice and philosophy in general, I will adopt a 
critical position as if I were explaining to another artist the advantages and disadvantages of 
assuming a particular philosophical position or critical perspective. The externalising of this 
cognitive process, whereby one type of thought is taken up, another held in abeyance and 
another maintained as marginal, will reveal that the employment of a philosophical 
discourse is less important than the deployment and use of the concepts. It should 
immediately become apparent why this thought process was not fully documented in the 
doctoral research, as it could have warranted another PhD entirely. 
 
It is worth remembering at this point that the primary objects of critique were 
rationalisation and rational subjects. I was therefore keen to avoid philosophical traditions 
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that in some way identify the reasoning, cognitive, psychological being in a privileged 
individual consciousness. The prime candidates for marginalisation are phenomenological 
perspectives where they have given rise to conscious identities, individual essences or 
intentions and human beings. The artwork in this respect has an inbuilt political dimension, 
which challenges the desire to be critical as a limited state of affairs when it comes to the 
vitality of creation in all its forms. The individual artist as creator was therefore an initial 
problem in the research, which proceeds to set up a subject position in production, as 
opposed to one individual who produces; thus forming a basis for rethinking the terms and 
conditions of Conceptual Art practice outside of an artist – critic – gallery system that 
continues to identify artworks as originating from artists often despite protestations to the 
contrary.  
 
The critical position however is formed in representational structures that support a variety 
of cognitive identifications, semiotic readings of sign systems being one example, and as 
such is seldom free from reason and reflection. In this respect the reflexivity of the doctoral 
research – which to some extent activates its autopoetic and self-organising qualities - is a 
necessary condition of its intelligence. The reflexive position itself has roots in the 
phenomenological tradition and can be located in historical materialist philosophies that 
operate within their systems a broadly transcendental mode of thought. Embedded in the 
relationship between phenomenology, in particular Hegelian phenomenology and historical 
materialism, is a logic of subject–object relations in which the conditions for understanding 
are determined by a complex movement between identities and differences. Broadly 
speaking the practice of critical activity can be said to have its roots in Hegel’s reading of 
Kantian dualism, where for Hegel the mind is in a dynamic state as it tries to conceive 
subjectively of the possibilities for objective knowledge. This process is both rational and 
critical as it involves ‘standing outside of oneself’ to reflect on what one knows, which 
entails drawing upon a historical body of knowledge that has accumulated over time and 
through the efforts of many people, in order to transcend that knowledge and reach a new 
level of understanding or consciousness. 
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In relation to the model of practice developed in the doctoral research, a critical tendency 
operates less on the level of cognitive reasoning than that of experience and production. 
The emphasis on art-work as a critical form of practice is informed by Marx’s use of the 
Hegelian dialectic in his critique of political economy. The means and relations of 
production are the primary cause of an individual and collective conscious, a material effect 
of how work is organised and experienced. What remains transcendent in Marx is a belief 
in the truth of class consciousness, which once transformed by a new set of productive 
relations will lead to a social revolution in thought, perception and experience. 
 
Although not mentioned overtly in the doctoral research, elements of Marxist philosophy 
are embedded in the critical tendency, as there would be no conception of ‘desiring 
machines’ without the critique of historical materialism.  The emphasis on artistic 
production as a transformative potential is sympathetic to a Marxist perspective with regard 
to the material relations of production. What differs in the doctoral research is critique at 
the level of subjectivity, based on a departure from what is essentially an anthropological 
model of experience, a human science originating in the Hegelian dialectic of 
consciousness. It should also be noted that Lacan’s ‘subject supposed to know’ of 
transference is located in a Hegelian dialectic of desire where an unconscious subject 
makes up for a lack by perceiving knowledge to be in an unobtainable, transcendent Other. 
In this respect Foucault critiques psychoanalysis as disciplinary and prohibitive in its 
negation of a desire founded on a lack, a moral regulation of the unconscious subject’s 
potentially ‘amoral’ reality. This paradox of an anthropological unconscious is not lost on 
Deleuze and Guattari, who seek to re-ground desire in an ontology of creation, a primary 
force of production, critical and radical in its immanence with Life. 
 
In illuminating the philosophical network of the doctoral research it becomes apparent that 
all philosophical positions are in some way connected to others, containing within them the 
potential to transform their concepts. In the doctoral research the transformation takes place 
in practice, as one theoretical tool is connected to the network if it proves to be more 
effective than another in the compositional process. At this level of ‘developing 
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applications’ it is more a question of where to stress, emphasize and intensify parts of the 
conceptual network, allowing the philosophical mix to emerge in practice and to merge 
with the treatment of content. The incompatibility of theories is not problematic on the 
plane of composition, the intersection of concepts being contingent with the specifics of 
emergent productive processes, which in the doctoral research are chapter specific in the 
assemblage of case studies. In the final section I will consider how specific modes of 
criticality emerge in my practice and how they have been influenced by the artworks of 
other practitioners who are seen as inheritors of the Conceptual Art legacy; evaluating how 
the doctoral research is similar to and different from practices which purport to be radical in 
conception and creation.  
 
We Aimed to be Amateurs (Alberro ed. 2000, 442 – 8) is the title of a paper first delivered 
by the Conceptual Art group Art & Language (Michael Baldwin, Charles Harrison, Mel 
Ramsden) at the ICA in 1995. The paper is a critical reflection on the historical status of the 
Conceptual Artist and Conceptual Art practice whose identity it is argued is founded on a 
paradoxical position. The paper will form a background for reflecting on how the paradox 
shapes ‘the type of practitioner I would consider myself to be’, insofar as being amateur 
involves developing  a specialism in contingency, and it is immanent philosophy more than 
any other that allows this paradox to become a fully productive position. 
 
The paradox is elaborated through a consideration of the amateur as a partial non-identity, 
which derives from the problem of identifying Conceptual Art practice as a whole. The 
open, inquisitive and contingent nature of Conceptual Art, especially concerning its own 
self-description makes it resistant to categorization. In an exhaustive discussion of 
contingency in Contemporary Art (Buskirk, 2003), examines how Conceptual Art’s legacy 
has influenced post-modern artworks that come to be defined as ‘contingent by design’.  
 
Art & Language view the paradox of the amateur’s contingency as a strength, in that 
practices take on the characteristics of devices, applications that can perform a number of 
functions because they are not conceived with a particular end in mind. The rationale of 
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Conceptual Art is ‘radically incomplete’ (Art & Language in Alberro ed. 2000, 444) its 
instruments approximate to critical tools that operate in the ‘gaps and connections 
…between the pictorial and the textual, spaces in which much cultural aggravation was and 
is possible’ (ibid, 445).  The amateur specializes in being out of joint with the times and 
therefore assumes a position between word and image that facilitates a critical production 
of prevailing conditions, which in its contingency does not become an identifiable picture 
of the world.  
 
The photographer Jeff Wall adopts a similar strategy for conceiving of the photograph as a 
thing to be produced as a critical analysis of a socio-historical condition either subjective or 
objective. In terms of technique and production Wall is a highly skilled professional 
photographer who adopts a very deliberate and organised approach in utilising the 
contradiction in Conceptual Art of the document as simultaneously information and 
pictorial mode, which provides a basis for re-introducing the picture into to contemporary 
art practice (Edwards, Photography out of Conceptual Art, 2004). As part of his critical 
method Wall considers how photographs function as ‘theoretical diagrams’ (161, 2004) for 
restaging the realist conventions of modern visual experience in post-modern terms.  
 
Citing the example of Wall’s Picture for Women (1979), Edwards argues that it reworks the 
desiring gaze of modernity, shifting and adjusting the compositional parameters used by 
Manet in his famous A Bar at the Folies-Bergeres (1889). Manet’s image is considered by 
art historians as diagrammatic of the complex relations between desire, sexuality, capitalist 
production and visual perception. Wall, influenced by the feminist film-maker and theorist 
Laura Mulvey’s Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (1975), modulates the phallo-
centric gaze in Picture for Women by re-assembling the visual components of Manet’s 
image into a photograph that signifies a critical analysis of the relationship between looking 
and being observed, the subject and object of the gaze. The photograph becomes a picture 
for a feminist viewer who by definition would be looking critically at how the camera 
reproduces the historical and culturally constituted gendered relations of visual experience. 
In shifting visual registers and positions, Wall’s image subverts the to-be looked-at-ness of 
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the female figure, revealing how cinema and mass culture more generally, mechanise, 
direct and constrain patterns of sexualised looking’ (Edwards, 2004, 163). 
 
At the level of production the polished ‘look’ of the images is rendered deliberately, a 
stylistic signifier of a critical inquiry into the specular experience of capital, which takes 
place on its own ground of a mediatized discourse of naturalisation made possible by realist 
conventions of representation. The photograph as ‘theoretical diagram’ becomes a device 
for breaking down the subjectivity of viewer at the level of perception in the process of re-
working the codes and conventions that support it.  The result is a practical discourse of 
visual critique in which Wall plays a part and is apart from at the same time. Like the 
amateur position the photographer does not aspire to produce what one might expect or 
identify as a documentary or realist image, but instead makes an image out of sorts with 
dominant conventions of looking. Although the images are perfectly produced, the 
perceptual shift outside the prevailing visual register has the effect of exposing it on its own 
ground, whereby similarities to Manet’s painting act as a type of camouflage for covert 
activity in the photograph. 
 
The doctoral research formulates a critical attitude through a similar method, working with 
the non-position of the amateur while simultaneously supporting that position by importing 
various types of specialist knowledge (semiotics, psychoanalysis, philosophy, discourse 
analysis). In the case of Wall’s Picture for Women an adjacent discourse which has its roots 
in a combination of feminist political theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis, gives the 
practice a radical edge, albeit one that remains embedded in phenomenological conceptions 
of subject–object relations discussed earlier.  
 
At the level of production practices do not have to correspond with their original historical 
relationships to radical or critical theories from other disciplines. Wall’s process has 
influenced the semiotic decoding and re-production of the visual register in the doctoral 
research, and resembles graphic techniques used in Chapter 4 which unfold on a ground of 
similarities between the category of affect in art and science, as a premise for developing a 
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differential mode of critical and covert production. The philosophical network in Chapter 4 
is primarily Deleuzian but is informed implicitly by a critical tradition that adheres to a 
Lacanian feminist analysis of the male gaze, bringing to bear a gendered dynamic of desire 
on the subjectivity of the emotional scientist. In her book Irrational Modernism: A 
Neurasthenic History of New York Dada (2004), the art historian and theorist Amelia Jones 
develops an adjacent critique in the register of desire that has also informed the critical 
aspect of the doctoral research. Her analysis situates the leaky machine of male subjectivity 
in a wider critical framework for evaluating the relationship between rationalization, 
subjectivity and masculinity.  
 
In this respect the radical potential of the Emotion Officer in Chapter 3 is not fully realized 
in the doctoral research. As an artwork its transformative potential draws upon a strand of 
critical art practice which develops out of Conceptual Art in the 1970’s and 80’s. In 
developing a broadly performative methodology, a genre of radical feminist art practice 
focuses on the material aspect of the body and its historical and discursive relationship to a 
range of social practices. Also informed by Carey Young’s performative critique of 
organizational practice, the Emotion Officer is an attempt to formulate a non-identity in the 
manner of the amateur, supported by a range of specialist knowledge and inserted into the 
institution as a means for the covert distribution of affects. In this respect the character of 
the Emotion Officer could operate as something like the psycho-analytic abroad in the 
world, a model not of transference but of transversal practice imported into the organisation 
at the level of its similarities to the bureaucratic symptom, but differential and radical in the 
production of a critical diagnosis. The Emotion Officer, camouflaged in a discourse of 
‘human resources’ and ‘occupational health’, conceives of a politics of affects played out in 
practice as radical and transformative in experience. Making the world a more emotional 
place would act a premise for making it more creative, as along the way histories and 
subjectivities are re-negotiated and re-produced.   
 
To conclude, what emerges in the criticality of the doctoral research is a creative position of 
transformation, a subject between structure and dissolution. The similarity between this 
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subject position and others is what makes it distinctly radical. The facility of camouflage 
enables art to perform a transversal activity as it participates in other practices and 
disciplines through its assimilation as something recognisable and therefore useful. Once 
connected, art can unleash a transformative power to change the subjective experience of 
the other disciplines, and at the same time realise new potentials contained within its 
inexhaustible facility for composing critical methods, explored in detail throughout the 
doctoral research. In re-making practices the critical artist can build a new specialism as the 
ability to design creative instabilities into the experience of an already structured subject 
position, not from a point of view of its representation but through its critical reproduction. 
The doctoral research designs creativity as the experience of an identity in production 
whose only pre-requisite is a critical imagination. 
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Endnotes 
1 Throughout the text I refer to ‘the artist’ as opposed to ‘my work’, ‘my intention’ or ‘my practice’. For 
reasons of clarity and consistency the reader can assume that ‘the artist’ refers in the first instance to works 
produced by Jonathan Willett (often in a productive constellation with others), for the purpose of the doctoral 
research. Implied in the use of ‘the artist’ though is a function of discourse that makes possible the historical 
construction of the individual as originator, founder or source with a privileged relation to cultural production. 
In this respect, ‘the artist’ of the doctoral research is also the effect of discourses on originality, the expression 
of aesthetic, artistic and wider cultural models of creativity. By considering ‘the artist’ in this way I am 
generally adapting Foucault’s analysis of the ‘author function’ in What Is an Author (Foucault, 1998, 205-
222) to a consideration of the subjectivity of the artist as a differential in discourse. By analogy the ‘artist 
function’ can also be considered as ‘characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of 
certain discourses within a society’ (ibid, 211) that are reasoned to be artistic. The ‘artist function’ culminates 
in the expression of Mainframe (2005) in Chapter 5, the explicit division and reproduction of compositional 
processes from any given ‘real’ individual that we continue to frame as ‘the artist’. It is at the readers 
preference as to whether they work within the discursive frame of the individual artist making an ‘original 
contribution to knowledge’ in the doctoral research, or situate the artist as a contingent subject of creativity in 
the complex of rational processes that are themselves the object of investigation. 
 
2 The creative modulations in the doctoral research are approximate to the modulations of musical 
compositions, where modulation is ‘most commonly the act or process of changing from one key to another’ 
(Persichetti, 1961). The ‘intelligence keys’ in the doctoral research are combination-compositions or 
interference patterns resembling ‘common chord modulations’ whose ‘closeness is determined by the number 
of notes in common between keys, which provide more possible pivot chords’ (ibid 1961) for the structure of 
the musical composition. The artworks in the doctoral research function in a similar way to the ‘pivot chords’ 
of music where ‘modulation in the common chord is labelled with its function in both the original and the 
destination keys, as it can be seen either way’ (ibid, 1961). The ‘original key’ in the doctoral research is the 
yet to be modulated object of investigation, the ‘destination key’ is the interference pattern which retains 
aspects of the ‘chord quality’ (ibid, 1961), in this case the formal and functional qualities of rational processes 
of that object.    
 
3 Foucault (1998, 459-60) poses the question of subjectivation as follows: ‘The problem is to determine what 
the subject must be, to what condition he is subject, what status he must have, what position he must occupy 
in reality or in the imaginary in order to become a legitimate subject of this or that type of knowledge 
[connaissance]. In short it is a matter of determining its mode of subjectivation…But it is also and at the same 
time a question of determining under what conditions something can become an object for a possible 
knowledge [connaissance], how it may have been problematized as an object to be known, to what selective 
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procedure [procedure de decoupage] it may have been subjected, the part of it that is regarded as pertinent. So 
it is a matter of determining its mode of objectivation…depending on the type of knowledge [savoir] that is 
involved.’ In this respect the research subject in the ‘art of subjectivity’ is both a subject and object of 
knowledge, a creation in discourse and a creator of discourse. Butler’s (1997, 83-84) reading of Foucault has 
further informed my understanding of processes of subjectivation as ongoing modes of production that are 
liable to remain unstable even in their repetition, ‘Subjection is literally the making of a subject, the principle 
of regulation according to which a subject is formulated or produced. Such subjection is a kind of power that 
not only unilaterally acts on a given individual as a form of domination, but also activates or forms the 
subject. Hence, subjection is neither simply the domination of a subject nor its production, but designates a 
certain kind of restriction in production.’ [original italics]. Art clearly has a role to play as a creative principle 
of deregulation, for at least in theory it should be able to activate experience along multiple lines of 
possibility, as the practice of least restriction. 
 
4 Constructive criticism refers to the critical role developed for art in the doctoral research, an affirmative 
mode of critique taking place in and through the act of production. Deleuze & Guattari’s (1984, 1988) 
conception of the ‘machinic’ provides a productive register for the activation of constructive criticism in 
which it becomes amalgamated with the destabilizing force of desire.  
 
5 The artist’s ‘know how’ is applied as an aggregate form of knowledge which is immanent in processes of 
composition. This know how approximates the philosophical ‘know how’ described by Sellars (1963, p 1-40) 
as a manifest form of knowledge derived from ‘knowing ones way around’ the disciplines, the ‘seeing all 
things together’ (ibid, 3) which becomes ever more difficult when faced with exponential quantities of 
knowledge and their breakdown into corresponding specialities. In making connections philosophers 
approach ‘things in general’, while to some extent developing a working knowledge of the specialities, in 
order to produce philosophical concepts in a ‘stereoscopic vision’ (ibid, 5) of the world. Constructive 
criticism develops artistic know how along similar lines but with one important difference: in the 
indeterminate space of composition art has the capacity to perceive things differently and simultaneously 
change the referent, in this respect art does not represent the world it remakes it as a differential ‘know how’ 
of rationalization. 
 
6 The ‘object lesson’ of the doctoral research shifts the emphasis from the comprehension of things to their 
creation. Artistic knowledge is developed as an affective and perceptual mode of experience, realized in the 
indeterminate zone of the compositional space in process (see Appendix E for an art historical application of 
this principle to recent work by the visual artist Ellen Bell) 
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7 The socio-cultural techniques of instrumental rationality are the primary objects of investigation. Weber’s 
(1970,1903) interpretation of instrumental rationality remains influential as one of the most sustained 
critiques of modern rationalization’s expansion of a means to ends culture in the name of ‘progress’, which 
today dominates all aspects of life through the rationale of the balance sheet. My understanding of Weberian 
theory is primarily supported by Gane (2004), who provides an insightful analysis of Weber’s rationalization 
thesis and its thematic parallels with the critiques of Foucault, Lyotard and Baudrillard. Schroeder’s (1992) 
evaluation of Weber’s social theory has also been of value for its analysis of the cultural dynamics between 
instrumentality and social life. Gellner (1992) has informed my wider understanding of the history of Reason, 
in particular the chapters The Mundane Enemies of Reason and Counter Currents that assess the philosophical 
and critical arguments highlighting the limitations of instrumental reason. 
 
8 The decision to focus on processes of rationalization allows art to engage with the general condition of life 
in post-industrial societies. The general condition though is not presumed to be society as a whole in terms of 
it being a definitive object of investigation, but rather the interconnected, local and contingent filiations of 
practices, techniques and knowledge that are immanent with subjective experience, determine its condition 
and contain the potential for its reformulation. Instrumental rationalities and the subjects of reason are 
encountered in specific domains of practice, while at the same time artistic connections are made between 
those practices. Art assumes a purpose as a differential practice of composition and is developed as a non-
instrumental mode of critique, whose objective is to create formal diagnostics of the social condition. In this 
respect Georg Simmel’s sociology (1971) has acted as an early influence on the conception of the critical 
framework in terms of his understanding of society as ‘a constellation of forms of sociation, including 
emergent as well as permanent forms…grounded in the experience and knowledge of its participants’ (Frisby, 
2002, xv-xvi). 
 
9 In Schizoanalysis and Baudelaire: Some Illustrations of Decoding at Work, Holland (1996) shows how 
processes of decoding in Anti Oedipus (1984) are effective only in connection with historical contexts. In re-
connecting schizoanalysis to the poetry of Baudelaire, Holland attempts to show not what decoding means but 
how it works and what it can do in terms of a cultural analysis of Baudelaire’s modernism. In the doctoral 
research the emphasis is on what art can do in terms of how it acts upon the objects of investigation. The 
poetry of the constructive-critical composition is to be located in the process of an object’s transformation; in 
the subsequent recoding of the object, the ‘what does it mean’ of art is seen as a restriction on art’s potential 
to destabilize what it has already put into process. Meaning and creativity compete for the rights to make 
sense, as one produces comprehension and the other generates expression. 
 
10 The ‘alreadymade’ refers to Duchamp’s Readymades such as the infamous Urinal  (1917). The readymade 
takes the form of a mundane object which is designated an art object as a premise for its submission as an 
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artwork for public exhibition. Duchamp’s intention was to show that the nomination of the ‘art’ object by the 
artist was a function of discourse, any object could be subjected to the same process as the arbitrary condition 
of its becoming art. The alreadymade artist is synonymous with the Readymade as the self-nominating artist 
who makes generic artworks ‘in the style of’ without ever pushing the parameters of what art can do. 
 
11 Chapter 2 of Chaosmosis (1995, 34-35), Guattari lists the components of machinic assemblages which in 
various combinations are aggregates of the unconscious as productive: ‘expanding the limits of the machine, 
stricto sensu, to the functional ensemble which associates it with man…implies taking into account multiple 
components:  
- material and energy components  
-semiotic, diagrammatic and algorithmic components (plans, formulae, equations and calculations which lead 
to the fabrication of the machine) 
- components of organs, influx and humours of the human body 
- individual and collective mental representations and information 
- investments of desiring machines producing a subjectivity adjacent to these components 
-abstract machines installing themselves transversally to the machinic levels previously considered (material, 
cognitive, affective and social)’. 
In Chaosophy (1995, 75-92) Deleuze & Guattari argue that machinic assemblages of desire are best 
understood by referring to the category of production. Desire is not the effect of a lack as is argued by clinical 
psychoanalysis, but is productive of flows, schisms and connections. Desire in a state of assemblage is 
‘revolutionary by nature because it builds machines capable – when inserted into the social structure – of 
exploding things, of disrupting the social fabric’ (ibid, 76). They go on to consider the productive process of 
artists who are in some way designated mad, as the creative dynamic of the ‘breakthrough’ followed by a 
collapse. In the doctoral research the breakthrough and the collapse are characteristic of the critical 
breakdown of systems or practices, but it is only in Chapter 4 that the breakdown leads directly to a 
productive, machinic assemblage of the mental/emotional diagnosis of the artist. Examples of machinic 
assemblages are provided in Balance Sheet Program for Desiring Machines (ibid, 119-150), which include 
Buster Keaton’s collapsing houses, Kafka’s literary machines plugging into bureaucratic and technocratic 
machines, the telephone exchange in which ‘one easily recognizes the very form of perverse artificial 
societies, or a society of Unknowns. A process of reterritorialization is connected to a movement of 
deterritorialization that is ensured by the machine’ (123), and Duchamp’s Tu m’ which shows how ‘the 
machine stands apart from all representation…because it is pure Abstraction’ (128). The abstractedness of the 
machinic assemblage is thoroughly social in nature because it draws its productive energy from ‘inside the 
social and technical machines themselves’ (137) in which it is already a part. 
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12 ‘Informational craft’ designates the artistic ‘know how’ of recomposing information as a material substance 
to be mutated in the pattern of interference. As the thesis develops the ‘corrupting’ of information becomes 
the critical infection of rationalization as it increasingly comes to rely on the computerization of its processes 
of discipline and control. Informational craft deregulates the information of rationalization in the 
compositional space in formation. For example, Mainframe (2005) materializes abstract processes of 
information in manifest objects not as metaphors for what remains outside of experience and invisible at the 
particulate level, but as processes in themselves, which facilitate different experiences of information in the 
cultural currency of the artist. Simple techniques of informational craft such the flower arrangements of Still 
Life (2005) and Revitalized (2006), the mosaic of Emotion Encryption (2006), hand produced Heart 
Calculator (2002) casts, the paper stacks and ‘post its’ of Chapter 3 and the colour pencil diagrams of Chapter 
4, off set the objective seriousness of the rationalisms under investigation 
 
13 See the ‘Plan Drawer’ in Appendix G for an indicative selection of Leonardo’s sketches and drawings. 
 
14 See the ‘Plan Drawer’ in Appendix G for an indicative selection of Duchamp’s drawings and technical 
diagrams. 
 
15 Maciunas’s assemblage of the artist’s toolbox corresponds with Deleuze’s conception of theory as a thing 
of use; ‘theory does not express, translate or serve to apply practice, it is practice. It is local and not 
totalizing…a theory is like a box of tools…it must be useful’. (Deleuze in Ferguson ed, 1990, 7) Art becomes 
a critical instrument in the doctoral research through the activation of critical theory, the critique of 
composition utilizing artistic practice as the application of the theoretical procedure. 
 
16 The Heart Calculators were first exhibited in May 2002 at Ennepetal, Germany. An expanded series 
incorporating Still Life (2002) formed part of Sense, my MA exhibition at Nottingham Trent University, 
December 2002. I would like to make further additions to the Heart Calculator series based on their treatment 
in the doctoral research. 
 
17 The Lacanian ‘subject who is supposed to know’ describes a complex dynamic of desire (a transference) in 
knowledge, which comes into being with the symbolic nomination of an authoritative, knowledgeable subject. 
Freud was the subject supposed to know of psychoanalysis, there being a degree of transference between 
Freud and Lacan via his re-reading of the Freudian unconscious through the techniques of structural 
linguistics. Because language is a supra-subjective structure we do not own the words with which we speak, 
therefore in order to enter the symbolic order of words we are occupied by language and spoken by it. Both 
the desire to communicate knowledge and the desire to know is located elsewhere in the knowing place of the 
Other (society as the symbolic order of words). The place of the Other remains empty since in reality (which 
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for the Lacanian is the desiring subject of language) no actual person is able to occupy that place; the 
occupying force of language remains foreign because it fails to recognize the place we imagine we experience 
as ‘individual’. We therefore imagine that there is a place in language where someone speaks with certainty 
and that place is occupied by authority figures such as God, Jesus, Buddha, Marx, the lawyer, the detective, 
the scientist, the teacher and the doctor. The desire to know is the cause of knowledge in the place of the 
Other, which at the same time sustains the knowing subject in an authoritative place of reason. In this respect 
the only true knowledge for the psychoanalyst is the uncertain knowledge of the unconscious, it is the 
knowledge that desire in the field of the Other distorts all attempts to know an objective reality (Lacan, 1998, 
230-43). The expert’s recourse to the ‘objectivity’ of number attempts to overcome the problem of uncertainty 
only to reinstate paradoxical objects of knowledge that are increasingly abstract and virtual in character, and 
whose sense is only accessible to the ‘subject supposed to know’ who produces them. The autism of the 
expert’s knowledge makes the possibility of a public platform of understanding or common knowledge 
increasingly problematic (see Zizek in Chapter 3). Neither does it follow that numbers are less subject to 
desire than words, one need only think of the virtual economics of the stock market or the desire to quantify 
subjective intentions, recently investigated by Curtis in The Trap (2007). It is no coincidence that John Nash, 
the proponent of a mathematical model for predicting behaviour based on mutual suspicion between 
individuals, was later diagnosed as schizophrenic. 
 
18 The Ministry of Information was also the name of the central government department responsible for 
publicity and propaganda during the Second World War. The Ministry of Information provided George 
Orwell with material for his novel 1984 (1949) in which Winston Smith rebels against the totalitarian state in 
which he lives. The Ministry of Truth in 1984 was based on Orwell’s first hand experience of the Ministry of 
Information while working for the BBC’s overseas service. (www.netcharles.com/orwell/articles/1984/-
background-info.htm) 
 
19 The Austrian based artist’s group ubermorgan.com operate in this same surreal space of the information 
society gone mad, which amongst other things gives rise to an excess of bureaucratic production. Bureaucrazy 
(2006) is a project based on software generators such as the ‘bank statement generator’ and ‘identity 
generator’, which are designed to question the arbitrary authority of all bureaucratic systems. 
(www.turbulence.org/blog/archives/002038.html) 
 
20 A reference to Nottingham Trent University’s Academic Standards and Quality Handbook: Section 14A, 
Regulations for Research Degrees (2006). The document contains minutiae of codes, conventions, terms, 
procedures and protocols, which must be adhered to in order satisfy the institution that ‘the candidate’ has 
progressed according the rules. I am also referring to the stages in the academic’s progression through the 
knowledge chain; the official application for admission, the application to register the thesis, the transfer from 
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Master of Philosophy to Doctor of Philosophy, and the candidate’s declaration form. Besides the mundane 
politics of academic office was a wider dynamic of power as to the question of art’s value as a research 
discipline at NTU. Attempts to annex art to the dominant research model based in part on the disciplinary 
objectivity of the scientific method, resulted in a climate of institutional interference in which art had to 
continually justify its existence as a valuable and discrete form of practice, which need not look to other 
disciplines for validation.  The doctoral research has thrived on this power dynamic with its own patterns of 
interference, which to some extent are designed to counteract those of the current institutional regime. 
 
21 With regard to the ‘Reasons and Purposes’ section in the AHRC’s Application Form (2006) and the 
Guidance Notes for Applicants (2006), which is insured by the scientific rationale in terms of situating 
instrumental research as a function of a research problem or question that is identified in an established or 
emerging field of investigation. In the traditional sense, a thesis should grow out of this research parameter, 
which the AHRC expects to be known in advance. In forecasting a ‘particular contribution to knowledge and 
understanding’ (Guidance Notes 2006, 5) at the application stage, the artist begins to forsake what is 
particular to critical artistic practice, in terms of its re-evaluation in this doctoral research. Furthermore, the 
AHRC fails to acknowledge the possibility that art has the potential to be an investigative method in its own 
right, as it will not support ‘only a creative outcome or piece of work’. For whatever reason it is imperative 
that artistic practice be accompanied by a legitimate form of ‘textual analysis or explanation to support its 
position and to demonstrate critical reflection’ (Guidance Notes, 2006, 6). The constructive criticism of the 
doctoral research goes some way toward undermining this rationale.  
 
22 The Emotion Officer designates the administered artist of the workplace, the creation of a non-authoritative 
academic post insofar as there is no official position of the Emotion Officer. It is an interfering subject 
position adjacent to the institutional academic and the psychologist (psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, counsellor). 
As a diagnostic device of critique, the Emotion Officer instigates a discursive frame for the research in 
Chapter 4, in which the artist becomes a type of cultural physician of rationality. 
 
23 The Mechanical Freud was also referred to as the Affectometer, Emotograph, Lie detector, Stressometer, 
Emotion Meter, Polygraph, and Psycho-Deteco-Meter. (Dror, 2001a, 367) Fig. 14a is indicative of how the 
technology was transplanted into the social infrastructure as a diagnostic device for extracting bio data from 
the subject in numerical form, which was then translated into graphical information. Fig 14b Dror (1999b) 
argues that the correspondence between the experience of the emotional event and the after effect of the 
graphical representation is highly questionable.  
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24 Figs. 15a and 15b show how once abstracted into numbers an emotional geometry could be utilized to 
depict any type of emotional event in a new discursive space of expression. The graphical records of the 
1930’s 40’s and 50’s are prototype versions of what we know today as biofeedback. 
 
25 In What is Philosophy? (1994) Deleuze & Guattari conceive of planes of expression in which art, science 
and philosophy are defined as irreducible creative practices that think about and produce their objects in 
different ways. Science discovers the physical reality of the world through a plane of reference, constructing 
partial states of affairs (particulate objects of knowledge) with its functions, Philosophy is the virtual event of 
thought in the process of creating and combining concepts, which extract a singular image of the world but 
never refer to its actuality and Art preserves in the artwork a singular monument, ‘a bloc of sensation, a 
compound of percepts and affects’ which stands for itself as that which is rendered from the world. Science 
unfolds on a plane of reference, Philosophy unfolds on a plane of immanence, Art unfolds on a plane of 
composition. Science deals with variables, Philosophy with variations and Art with varieties as each extracts a 
particular type of order from the virtual possibilities (multiplicities) of chaos  (163– 199).  
 
26 See the ‘Animi Duco’ drawer in Appendix G for a full selection of artistic emotographs, emotion diagrams 
and related images. 
 
27 In An Essential Disorientation (2007) John Newling develops an artistic engagement with ‘the 
disorientation of the liminal process’ in which ‘place, time and self are open to new experiences and new 
knowledge’ (ibid, 41). Infused with a ‘quality of betweeness... the liminal experience of the threshold, once 
encountered, leads to new understanding, and often, but not always, to new connections between things’ (ibid, 
41-42). 
 
28 The Emotion System was designed for an intelligent robot called Kismet by Professor Cynthia Breazeal at 
MIT Media Lab. Breazeal aims to construct ‘robots that engage with meaningful social exchanges with 
humans’ leading to ‘cooperative and capable robots that can work and learn in partnership with people’ 
(Breazeal, 2007). To some extent the machinic productions of the doctoral research break down the 
distinctions between artificial intelligence and human life insofar as affects are independent of a conscious, 
human entity, and are instead constituent in the emergence of the vital assemblage, ‘not all Life is confined to 
the organic strata: rather, the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a 
life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 503). 
 
29 Mainframe (2005) was conceived as a documentary assemblage of production in an attempt to reconfigure 
the archive as an object ‘under construction’, open to continual interpretation and reinterpretation as discussed 
by De Landa in The Archive Before and After Foucault (2003). As an archive of experience, Mainframe 
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generates artistic compositions designed to challenge the over determined subject of official documentation. 
From an art historical perspective the early Mainframe assemblage was influenced by Art and Language’s 
Documenta Index (1972), an artwork that operated as a public facet of the imaginary Art & Language Institute 
to which ‘authorship of the Documenta Index was briefly and strategically attributed’ within ‘a corpus of 
ideological commitments comprising a field’ (Harrison, 1991, 63-4 & 269). This process of institutional 
critique via documentary production and exchange was conceived as a search for ‘a general methodological 
horizon’ (ibid, 269). 
 
30 My understanding of this process as social and historical is based on Day’s analysis in The Modern 
Invention of Information (2001), in particular Chapter 2: Information Theory, Cybernetics and the Discourse 
of Man for a lucid account of how informational techniques lead to the subjugation of the individual in 
systems of communication, and Chapter 5: Heidegger and Benjamin, The Metaphysics and Fetish of 
Information for a critique of the reification of knowledge as information in the technical organization of mass 
culture.  
 
31 Perry (1999) outlines how information has gradually become subject to ever more sophisticated economic 
rationales, to some extent made possible by the information machines that are both commodities in 
themselves and the means for the distribution of information as a commodity, that is, as a thing of exchange 
value. Day (2001) argues that the commodification of information has emerged as the prevalent form of social 
relations almost by stealth, due to difficulties faced by critical theorists when attempting the separation of 
information as discourse from the discourse of information. When language, communication and information 
merge, the commodification of information becomes the premise for the absolute micro-management of 
individuals as feedback mechanisms in increasingly rationalized systems of control. 
 
32 To date, the most comprehensive overview of the connections between art, technology and new media is 
Stepehen Wilson’s Information Arts: Intersections of Art, Science and Technology (2002). 
 
33 See the ‘Plan’ drawer in Appendix G for more examples of early Mainframe assemblages and technical 
drawings, which were eventually translated into the prototype scale model (Fig. 38) 
 
34 Virilio’s The Information Bomb (2000) provides a useful background to the concept of information as a 
type of controlled explosion. In exploring the relationship between speed, war and information technology, 
Virilio attempts a sustained critique of modern science as exclusively ‘techno-science – the product of the 
fatal confusion between the operational instrument and exploratory research’ (ibid, 1). 
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35 Colwell (1996) assesses ‘dividualization’ against Deleuze’s control forms of power, which operate through 
‘the fragmentation of identity instead of its formation’ (211). She proceeds to argue that the ‘multiplicity of 
databanks and their interconnection in the network generate the ability to assemble an individual out of the 
electronic text that documents a person’s dividual nature. Control…enables the assembling of more than one 
individual out of the same person’ (ibid, 212). 
 
36 In considering Jean-Luc Godard’s Histoire(s) du Cinema, Valiaho (2001) argues that the digital synthesizer 
although referring to the ‘digital imaging processing techniques in Histoire(s), exceeds a purely technological 
definition…as a concept that describes the digital Idea – an idea which Deleuze defines as a “system of 
multiple, non localizable connections between different elements which is incarnated in real relations and 
actual terms.” (Valiaho, 2001) In a similar vein, Mainframe (2005) produces the digital idea of information in 
a material-analogue/electronic-digital composition of experience. 
 
37 Collaborations with the artist and writer Samson Kambalu have developed my understanding of semiotic 
energy from a Nietzschean perspective, which in the broadest sense corresponds to Deleuze &Guattari’s 
materialist semiotic, encountered in art through the force of affects. (see  Colebrook, 2006, 63-72) Kambalu 
generates an aesthetic discourse of the ‘Solar Ethic’ (see Appendix A), which offers a poetic framework for 
considering the power of signification as the will to power of creation, in which the artist becomes a cultural 
transformer of semiotic currency. The subject position of the artist as transformer is reworked in Mainframe 
(2005) as transformative in the social currency of information.  
 
38 Whiteread’s installation Embankment (2005) (Fig. 46b) has further informed the development of the 
Information Cube as a modular artwork in terms of the recurrent dynamic between framing, containment and 
the leaky boxes of the doctoral research: the modulations of To Do (Fig. 12), the info-structures of Mainframe 
in Chapter 5, Maciunas’s Fluxus Year Box (Fig. 3b), the diagrammatic boxes in Chapter 4, and the regulatory 
boxes of rationalization designed to contain subjects within certain types of discursive frame.  
 
39 In Intensive Media: Modernity and Algorithm (2007), Lash argues that in the information economy of the 
21st Century, ‘Rules and reason are generative. They are informational. More precisely they work like 
algorithms. As sets of instructions’ (ibid 72) for accomplishing tasks or solving problems. The intelligent 
walls of the Information Cube would be algorithmic in the sense that users would make compositions by 
retrieving information according to a set of pre-programmed compositional potentials. The walls function as 
the artistic equivalent of those in the film Minority Report (2002), which act as an electronic canvas for 
retrieving visual, textual and audio elements using hand gestures, for combination and alteration in the 
compositional space  (see Aquaplayne in Appendix D for an art historical application of this process to the 
techniques of Abstract Expressionism). 
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40 The ‘dance of information’ is discussed in the conclusion as the synthesis of movement, expression and 
information, developed through the emotion diagram as choreographic template, a set of instructions for 
generating the dancer’s performance as an interference pattern in the Le Doux Circuit (Fig. 26).  
 
41 My understanding of complexity theory and complex adaptive systems is informed by Gell-Mann’s lucid 
overview of this emergent discipline (1995). According to Gell-Mann’s account, Mainframe (2005) will take 
on a higher degree of complexity with the capacity to self organize as the irregularity of its information 
content increases, but only if, at the same time, it is able to build multiple platforms and connectivities into its 
accumulating creative system.  
 
42 The choreographic algorithm is equivalent to labanotation, the technique of inscription devised by Rudolf 
von Laban for encoding the complexity of the dancer’s movements in notational form for use in future 
performances. Jones (2006) re-evaluates labanotation against the ‘bureaucratizing sensibility of modernity’ 
(ibid, 163) and its similarities with the time and motion studies of Taylorism, discussed in section 1.1 of the 
doctoral research. 
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Appendix A 
 
Holyballism: A Brand New Religion  
Interview Text: May 2004 
 
Interview between artist and writer Samson Kambalu and Jonathan Willett, exploring the artist’s 
philosophical and aesthetic attitudes towards life, art and self-expression. The interview was 
compiled from an ongoing exchange of taped conversation, informal meetings, written and emailed 
correspondence. 
 
Kambalu has recently completed his first novel The Jive Talker to be published by Jonathan 
Cape in Spring 2008. I provided critical input and a first edit for the original manuscript, 
prior to the artist’s publishing deal in summer 2006.  
 
Web Links: www.holyballism.com 
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Holyballism: A Brand New Religion 
 
JW: We were talking about Nietzsche and the Death of God. Explain what you mean by the Death 
of God, in particular your view of faith in a Godless world? 
 
SK: For me Nietzsche is specifically writing about a Christian tradition and how a Christian 
conception of God has become unbelievable in Western society. There is a wider metaphysical 
question about what to believe in beyond the material, day to day conditions of everyday life. This 
marks a crisis in Western thought and my work is a personal response to that crisis. I am working in 
the void left by the unifying force of a Christian God, as I attempt to define a post– secular 
existence. 
 
JW: In Africa you were raised with a Christian set of beliefs and received a European education. 
The belief may have faded but the knowledge has been retained and integrated into your practice. It 
seems as though the awareness that comes with the knowledge has released you from superstition 
and that somehow the work is the process of this realization. You retain some religious forms but 
they are emptied out of their essential or spiritual value. 
 
SK:  Yes that’s right. I can identify with Nietzschean thought as a way of dealing with the Christ I 
inherited as a child in Africa. It is a way of shedding that ‘old housing’ and overcoming the 
restrictions on self-expression. I am not a victim of God, nor a product of the Colonial missionaries, 
nor am I the starving child we see in the Oxfam appeals. I have used Nietzsche as a tool to carve out 
my own post secular position, based on my life experiences. My art is a way of creating new values 
for myself, an ongoing process of re-evaluation. I take some of the ‘old housing’ with me and use it 
as creative material. As I have said to you before, it is like moving from the Christian Madonna to 
the Madonna of postmodern culture. 
 
JW: Art as a vehicle for self-expression leads us to the second and for me the most significant 
aspect of Holyballism, Solar Ethics. If the Death of God has been your starting point, then I see 
Solar Ethics as the energy source for your creative process, a way of externalizing and affirming the 
re–evaluation of your life; ‘bringing the work to the world’ as you say.  
 
SK: My interest in Solar Ethics comes from the Church of England theologian Don Cupid who talks 
about Solar Ethics as a way of life, it’s all about expression, living like the sun. I thought it was cool 
to live like the sun, to just go out there and express myself. It’s almost like Expressionism - just do 
it, don’t think too much, don’t search for meaning, meaning comes from having a creative life. It’s 
just energy you know and me coming from Africa I found the Solar Ethic seductive, to just rise and 
shine and be in the here and now. And so I realised that inevitably Solar Ethics embraced things like 
fashion and music and all forms of contemporary expression in the here and now. This is also part 
of bringing the world back into my work, it’s affirmative, another way of just doing it. 
 
JW: Although Holyballism cannot be simply reduced to consumerism or the global spread of 
brands, it does engage with the productive energy of capitalism and the pursuit of happiness through 
material goods. For example when you say ‘just do it’ are you playing with that same advertising 
slogan for Nike sportswear? 
 
 145 
SK: For me it’s all about attitude. Whereas Nike says ‘just do it’, Holyballism explains why you 
should do it. The self-conscious consumer can be more creative, more expressive. It’s not just about 
engaging with the kinds of individuality or self-expression that capitalism bestows on us. I am using 
a contemporary language of consumerism to communicate an ethos that goes beyond consumerism, 
it will transcend the language it employs but needs that language for the Solar Ethic to shine 
through. When the light goes on the ‘old housing’ no longer eclipses the sun and the sun just shines. 
Instead of filling the void left by God with consumer goods we can affirm our own lives by 
producing our own artefacts and ideas. I use contemporary art as my medium but the engineer, 
teacher, shop assistant, secretary can all go Solar, they can all find something in their everyday 
experience that will lead to a more self-conscious and affirmative life. Everybody can have a life 
that unfolds as a creative process.  
 
JW: Solar Ethics and attitude seem to be about choosing how to live. They are not really dependent 
on money or belief but involve creative choices about how to insert yourself into culture. As a 
friend said to me recently, being cool is about being yourself, not trying to construct a personality or 
search in vain for who you ‘really’ are. Would you agree? 
 
SK: Yes I like that. It’s all about choices, it’s about looking at life and making choices. Robert De 
Niro once said that the talent is not in the acting it’s in making choices. You make choices and you 
make your own cool. There is no prescription, I improvise like the Jazz musician, I borrow from 
everywhere and play my own tune. To some extent my work is an improvised act of self- creation. 
This is why I am also interested in the entrepreneurial spirit of hip hop, the self promotion of rap 
stars who tap into the solar power of the market, even though they may not consciously be engaged 
with the kind of Solar Ethic that I have been describing.  
 
JW: As the gap between contemporary art and celebrity narrows, is there a danger that all creative 
activity will be reduced to localized acts of self expression, the whole world as a Fame Academy 
where everyone becomes ‘famous for 15 minutes’; in other words, can we still refer to something in 
art that has a wider social importance beyond the individual act?  
 
SK: As I said when we were talking about consumerism it is necessary to adopt a contemporary 
language as a way of connecting with the world. The culture of celebrity and self-image dominates 
in today’s society, so I use it self-consciously as another vehicle for expression. Today we worship 
brands and pop idols, people wait for hours to audition for the ‘X Factor’ but they are not really 
tuned into their own cool. Consider how society now treats the artist, he is something like a 
religious being; when we ask What is art? we may have to return to the ‘old housing’ of religion. 
Art no longer serves the Universal of God, it has been displaced onto the canvas of the self and I 
use this canvas in a meaningful way. Once the self becomes the universal form then the artist should 
address this as a wider objective structure. It’s almost as if people cannot live without the 
opportunity project themselves, they die if they don’t appear. Solar Ethics could be about a poetics 
of this self. For me its quite simple really, with the Death of God art becomes a self-conscious 
thing, an existential thing, almost as a way of identifying your existence. The artist finds meaning 
through self-expression when he is conscious that meaning can be found in the creative process. It 
is inevitable that art gravitates towards a Solar Ethics; in our culture the self is the new church.  
 
JW: It seems to me though that the artist works something like a switch between the subjective and 
objective experience of the world. On the one hand he taps into the vast forces of expression already 
at work in the social structure, but at the same time learns how to recompose those currents 
according to a more philosophical creative register. The artist remains aware that his own sense of 
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self is always in question and dependent on the wider social arrangement. If he manages this 
balancing act it might be possible to move towards an objective critique of the self through the 
aesthetic re-conception of self–expression.  
 
SK: One way to think about this balancing act between the subjective and the social is to consider 
Solar Ethics as a dynamic energy of expression. The myth of Phaeton springs to mind, who borrows 
his fathers sun chariot (the sun) only to let it get out of control; he crashes and burns so to speak 
because he is not able to properly harness its power. In tapping into the vast semiotic energies of 
cultural production, the solar artist must learn to be more like the transformer in an electrical circuit, 
switching between currents he moves up a level to handle high voltages and steps down a level for 
lower ones. Sometimes the artist becomes overwhelmed by the sheer potential of semiotic energy, 
but like a transformer maintains the capacity to handle the currents and avoids getting burnt out by 
them. This energy exchange of expression might offer possibilities for moving towards new ways of 
thinking objectively from a subjective position. The form of the individual has taken central stage so 
I look at my own life through the expressive energy of that aesthetic, and from my art it is possible 
to derive a more universal experience of truth. Maybe life is not so different now, even without 
God. Art is a way of facing the inevitable and what is most objective, that being our own mortality. 
We know for sure that one day we are going to die and nothing transcends death. Nietzsche 
challenges us to live life for what it is without belief or superstition, to affirm it. At a personal level 
Holyballism is about me affirming my own life, it represents a faith in my art. Beyond that, 
Holyballism is also about a wider imperative that echoes Nietzsche ‘find your own Holyballism, 
live life in the here and now – ‘Exercise and Exorcise’ as the slogan goes.  
 
JW: I think this brings us to the final aspect of Holyballism, Eternal Recurrence. My reading of 
Eternal Recurrence is that it is one of Nietzsche thought experiments, allowing him to beg the 
question ‘Without God and with no possibility of beginning or end, how would you live your life’? 
It is a way of making the choices you talked about earlier; when faced with decisions about our 
lives what could we live with over and over again for eternity. How can we make life bearable by 
understanding the art of living? Is this what is existential about Nietzsche’s philosophy and by 
proxy what is existential in Holyballism? In other words, ‘Souls are as mortal as bodies’ and we 
have to live accordingly. 
 
SK: Yes we are going nowhere and that’s why there can be nothing transcendent, there is no 
afterlife. In postmodern society we ask the question ‘Where do we go from here?’ According to 
Fukuyama, Capitalism is about Eschatology, it’s about the end of history. Holyballism is built on 
the ruins of this Judeo–Christian perception of history that makes God the author of the Beginning 
in a sequence of events. Holyballism is part of this historical fallout that now manifests itself as the 
cyclical time of the commodity. Eternal Recurrence comes in here because it is about the attitude 
that emerges from this historical impasse – how do we live creatively with the repetition of the 
workaday world and be happy? This attitude is expressed as the Solar Ethic, and takes the form of 
Hollyballism as an inquiry into the here and now. ‘Choose Life’ as they say in Trainspotting 
because it is all that you’ve got anyway. With this realization there comes a kind of enchantment 
and disenchantment at the same time, it depends on how you look at it…its difficult and easy all at 
once. Life unfolds as we go and Art can draw our attention to this fact - what you see is what you 
get. In a way Holyballism kills a postmodern anxiety about meaning but still manages to re-enchant 
life in itself. The artist does not represent life to us on a stale canvas, he becomes fully aware in 
order to understand that the canvas is life. Imagination powers the Solar Ethic, live everyday as if 
you have seen the sun rise for the first time. 
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JW: I would like to conclude with Nietzsche who illustrates Zarathustra’s teaching with a parable 
of the sun: ‘Happiness for the sun is that its plentiful light is absorbed by the things for which it 
shines’. Zarathustra in comparing himself to the sun overcomes his ignorance and turns into the 
‘light of the world’, which replaces the light of God. Could Holyballism be another parable of the 
sun with Samson Kambalu asking us to live creatively and return to the light of the world? 
 
SK: Holyballism is the rapture of an age. It is happening here and it’s happening out there. I only 
gave it a name. To return to the light of the world means to return to life. I am one of the many 
people who are replacing negative attitudes that renounce the world, with those that are an 
affirmation of life, of the here and now. Like the rap artist Puff Daddy has said, ‘The sun don’t 
shine forever, but as long as it’s here then we might as well shine together.  
 
Samson Kambalu & Jonathan Willett 2004 
 
Works cited directly or as background for the interview. 
Adams, Philip. Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence at 
http://personal.ecu.edu/mccartyr/great/projects/Adams.htm 
Cupitt, Don. Solar Ethics. SCM Press. Canterbury. 1995 
Fink, Eugen. Nietzsche’s Philosophy. Trans. Goetz Richter. London. Continuum. 2003. 
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. Perennial. 1993. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science, with a Prelude of Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs. Trans. 
Walter Kaufmann. New York. Random House. 1974. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human All Too Human : A Book for Free Spirits. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. 
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1986. 
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Appendix B 
 
The Inward Tourist (2006) 
 
Exhibition text by Jonathan Willett for Stuart Simpson’s solo show, 3 Piece Suite at The 
City Gallery, 90 Granby Street, Leicester.  
ISBN 0-9543211-8-9 
 
Exhibition dates: 22nd April – 27th May 2006 
 
Web Links: www.leicester.gov.uk/citygallery 
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The Inward Tourist 
 
In the Leisure & Tourism industry the phrase ‘inward tourism’ refers to people who tend to explore 
their own backyards. Instead of travelling overseas they visit sites of national significance or 
rediscover places of local interest that were previously overlooked. Stuart Simpson takes inward 
tourism a step further by embarking on an odyssey of the imagination that leads us along European 
boulevards, neighbourhood avenues and the memory lanes of the photo album. As inward tourists, 
visitors to 3 Piece Suite explore the gallery space as memento, the bits and pieces of everyday life 
recomposed in the art of memory. 
 
At first sight Smile: Formaggio con Queso is a journey outwards into a distinctly European territory 
but as the piece unfolds the viewer experiences the inner geography of the tourist’s imagination. We 
encounter the act of tourism as a sideshow to the main attraction, the art of documenting oneself in 
the performance of sightseeing. Random sequences, snapshots and glimpses, continually reroute the 
viewer through short cuts and detours in the tourist landscape. What really travels in Smile are signs 
in all their cultural mobility, reframed and recombined in a moving postcard of the tourists gaze. 
The Kiosk will supplement the piece as the artistic process travels beyond the installation, allowing 
the public to play with the digital components of Smile, including the diaries, notes and maps from 
the field trip. 
 
4 Walls literally brings us back home. The viewer becomes an armchair tourist, a voyeur looking 
out from a domestic interior onto aspects of the surrounding neighbourhood. We are reminded of 
James Stuart’s inquisitive gaze in Hitchcock’s Rear Window or The Fast Show’s comic character 
Michael Pane ‘nosey neighbour’. The curtain twitch becomes a kind of neurotic condition for 
individuals who have retreated into ‘the safety of their own homes’. The 4 Walls narrative reflects 
an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust that is projected from the security of the home onto an 
uncertain, unpredictable outside world. In a subtle movement between place and imaginary space, 4 
Walls represents the erosion of neighbourliness and the side effect of self confinement. Margaret 
Thatcher’s now infamous proclamation ‘there is no such thing as society only individuals and their 
families’, echoes around 4 Walls as an allegory for the disintegration of community in the 1980’s 
and its subsequent resurrection in signs: television as a window on the world, where Neighbours are 
now safely confined to an Australian soap.  
 
Slide Show completes the trio of works that make up 3 Piece Suite.  In Slide Show the artist portrays 
himself as a tourist in his own and other peoples lives. A process of self discovery and self recovery 
unravels in the narrative, as the family photograph becomes a raft upon which we sail out into a 
personal and collective sea of memory. What is retrieved is sometimes private and sometimes a 
public document of the act of remembering, the shared ritual of piecing things together, of making 
sense. The autobiographical slides into the cultural and back again, a Slide Show of self portraits 
and a portrait of the self as a collection of social fragments. 
 
In 3 Piece Suite memory and place are inextricably linked to a sense of identity. But like the restless 
tourist the self is always on the move, formed and reformed from the substance of new memories 
and experiences. There is something nomadic about life whether or not we are predisposed to travel 
because by its very nature it is always changing. Memory is just the souvenir of ‘having been there’, 
or should I say souveneer, the surface that fluctuates between documentation, situation and 
experience: ‘My image is a picture that can never be taken’.  
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Appendix C 
 
Mine: A Brand of Uncertainty (2005) 
  
Exhibition text by Jonathan Willett for John Newling’s solo show, Mine at The Haggerty 
Museum of Art, Marquette University, Milwaukee.  
 
Exhibition Dates: 2nd June – 28th August 2005 
 
Web Links: www.john-newling.com 
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Mine: A Brand of Uncertainty 
 
‘Catechism Seven: A Soul is Worth the Dollars Therein’ 
David Mitchell, Cloud Atlas 
 
Cloud Atlas depicts a not so distant future where to be human is to be endowed with the rights of 
consumption; individuals are branded with an electronic implant that literally gives them a purchase 
on life. The value of being is reduced to an economy of the soul, a kind of pious materialism that 
accords with the law of the balance sheet. Although a fiction, the image of an existence that is 
utterly accounted for and devoid of mystery creates a feeling of unease, we are forced to question 
what sets us apart from this bleak prophecy as our lives become increasingly guided by material 
values. 
 
In Exodus xxxii the golden calf is forged during a period of uncertainty. Moses is with God on 
Mount Sinai and has been away for some time. The people grow impatient while they are waiting 
for direction from Moses who is expected to return with Gods word.  One might say that a void of 
meaning is filled by the substance of the calf, it gives weight to uncertainty and so becomes a form 
of reassurance in the meantime. On returning Moses destroys the idol, reduces it to dust and throws 
it into the brook from which the Israelites are made to drink bitter waters. God is angry because the 
people lose faith. They install belief and worship a false idol not realising that ‘faith is trust in an 
entity that cannot be proven’. 
 
This interstice between meaning and material gives rise not only to Mine but to Newling’s wider 
engagement with the cultural negotiation of substance. Mine asks us to put faith in the artist who is 
prepared to reside in the difficult place between what can be understood and what lies beyond 
knowing, to prise it open and forge questions from the stuff of uncertainty. In this respect Mine is 
the descendent of Newling’s Riddler piece and related works that negotiate the architecture of 
public statements. Mine makes a statement in the density of the word ‘mine’ forging further 
questions from the intangible, without ever offering us solutions. Is this the mine that belongs to 
me? Or is it the mine that belongs to the other? ‘What’s mine is yours and what’s yours is mine.’ In 
the sense of the verb we are invited to extract something, to mine the nuggets of wisdom that are 
embedded in the artwork. Like a form of compound interest Mine compacts substance as meaning 
and substance as material into a transaction in our beliefs about ownership and how we mark those 
beliefs. The doubtful identification is the art of Mine, it is a brand that marks uncertainty and calls 
the doctrine of ownership into question. 
 
In this respect we are reminded of Samuel A.Maverick (1803 – 1870) the Texan cattle owner who 
neglected to brand his cattle. Unbranded cattle were known as Maverick’s and the term usually 
applied to stray calves that roamed the plains while open range ranching was still practiced. 
Mavericking was outlawed in 1866 when the order was given to brand all cattle. The territory of 
ownership and identification is destabilized by the absence of a mark. Mine reopens this territory 
and explores the fields of signification that support the act of making impressions. All art makes 
some kind of impression but Mine is totemic of representation per se, a gold standard in the art of 
making sense and a reminder that all meaning is installed at the expense of some other meaning. 
Only a Maverick like Newling, who subtly resists identification through the tacit dissolution of the 
boundaries between things, could render such a complex work in such a simple form. 
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A monument to the beauty of absence and the poetry of the unknown, Mine is at the threshold of 
sense, it tinkers with the mechanics of how beliefs are made from the stuff of the world, even 
otherwordly beliefs. It is the hole in signification itself – ‘they have eyes so they might not see’, 
might not see what? Samuel Maverick points us in the right direction, he made a mark that left no 
impression, a brand of uncertainty. Maybe life is also an uncertain brand, the hole gets bigger as 
time passes, ‘mine self’ is continually replenished with meaning to avoid the inevitable. The only 
certainty is that one day our substance will disintegrate, ‘souls are as mortal as bodies’ said 
Nietzsche. What matters is how we live in the meantime, if ‘a soul is worth the dollars therein’ then 
perhaps those dollars are redeemed in Mine as yours. 
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Appendix D 
 
Aquaplayne (2006) 
 
Exhibition catalogue text by Jonathan Willett for Giles Askham’s installation with the same 
title, which featured as part of Game Play a touring show commissioned by QUAD, 
Derby’s Contemporary Art and Media Centre and HTTP London. First exhibited at Q 
Gallery, 35-36 Queen St, Derby. 
ISBN 0-9553538-0-7 
 
Exhibition Dates: 22nd July – 10th Sep 2006  
 
Web Links: www.http.uk.net  
  www.derbyquad.co.uk 
  www.game-play.org.uk 
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Aquaplayne 
 
The structure of play absorbs the player into itself and thus frees him from the burden of 
taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence.  
 
Hans–Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method 
 
The ‘strain of existence’ is the work of responsibility. We are tested, evaluated and determined by a 
world that would prefer know everything and leave nothing to chance. In the work of art though we 
find relief from the burden of knowledge, the need to know loses traction in the flux between sign 
and substance. We are absorbed into play as the artist is carried along by the creative process, it has 
a momentum all of its own, the happen chance of discovery where one thing leads to another. Art 
emerges as the unpredictable condition, between order and chaos it lays out permutations and 
activates them. The artistic mode is the creative ‘set up’, a fluidity of experience whose only burden 
is the sheer weight of possibility. The artistic composition is a calibrated form of that experience, 
replayed in the viewer through the perception of forms. There is a moment of stillness for 
contemplating the work of art, precisely because it has the power to move; to be moved is to be 
played by the work.  
 
There are Art movements and there is the movement of art. For art historians the dynamic of a work 
can be observed in the conventions of effect. There is a play of light and colour, the interplay of 
forms, the gesture, the stylistic progression, the school, and at some point a Movement. Conversely, 
the movement of art as a creative event replaces recognition with action. In the case of Abstract 
Expressionists like Jackson Pollock art literally becomes a movement. To create was to move 
directly into experience, to become in play by ‘getting into the picture’. Pollock would layout his 
canvas on the floor to feel closer to the painting, walking or even dancing around it in a painterly 
performance. The pouring, dripping, skimming and splashing of patterns across the surface, capture 
the immediate forces of intention; ‘When I am in my painting I am not aware of what I am doing’. 
The unconscious gesture emphasized the physical act of creation [in German spiel, ‘to play’ 
originally meant dance]. The unthought experience of ‘automatic painting’ is the play of 
composition, a sign not of representation but of the event. As Paul Klee once remarked ‘not to 
render the visible, but to render visible.’    
 
Aquaplayne lays out a new field of expression by extending the framework for immediate 
experience. The horizontal plane bypasses recognition and ‘sets up’ an interactive surface, making a 
play of art by providing the viewer with instant access to the creative flow. In the movement from 
observation to participation we interface with an intelligent canvas through the automatic rendering 
of action into effect. The ‘body in motion’ plays across a field of sensation, making the ripples of 
possibility appear as an ever - changing artwork. Unlike the action painter, whose technique is to off 
load creative energy in the painterly gesture, the activator retrieves what has already been deposited 
as data and brings it to the surface, aquaplaning on a stream of information. The virtual is restored 
to the actuality of expression, brought back to life in the flux between cause and effect, between 
code and composition. The calibrated experience of Aquaplayne is the art of permutation, the 
programmed initiative played and replayed as the artwork in formation. 
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Appendix E 
 
Ellen Bell’s Object Lesson (2007) 
 
Exhibition text by Jonathan Willett for Ellen Bell’s touring show, Speaking Soul, first 
exhibited at The City Gallery, 90, Granby Street, Leicester.  
 
Exhibition Dates: 20th Jan – 24th Feb 2007 
 
Web Links: www.leicester.gov.uk/citygallery 
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Ellen Bell’s Object Lesson 
 
The artworks produced by many Conceptual Artists in the 1960’s, represent a philosophical inquiry 
into the relations between objects, words and images. Artists were questioning how things came to 
be defined as artworks and who had the authority to define them. Frames of reference sprang up 
everywhere like scaffolds for visual experience, mediating between words and things, shaping 
perceptions. Concepts were valued above their material execution and became the essential 
currency for being ‘in the know’, as artworks were ‘finished off’ at the point of reception by an 
educated audience.  
 
Joseph Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs 1965, consisted of a chair, a photograph in the same 
dimensions of the chair and an enlarged dictionary definition of the word ‘chair’ beside the 
photograph. Kosuth was drawing attention to the problem of communicating the universal idea 
‘chair’ in a contingent and partial knowledge, which is established second hand through signs. In 
1968 Lawrence Weiner exhibited a book entitled Statements, each page contained a description of 
an artwork, which had either been made or could be made in future. The work was reduced to the 
materiality of language itself, one need only access the language to understand ‘the work’. A few 
years earlier, Marcel Broodthaers exhibited a sculpture entitled Pense - Bete in 1964; copies of a 
book written by Broodthaers were inserted into a rubber ball stuck into in a mound of plaster; to 
read about the work you would have to destroy the sculpture by removing the books. Broodthaers 
figured out a paradox between cognition and creation in which knowledge diminishes experience, 
because it has the power to divide things. As the philosopher Michel Foucault noted, ‘knowledge is 
not made for understanding, it is made for cutting’. 
    
Ellen Bell works with and against the grain of 1960’s Conceptual Art by re - negotiating the space 
between intellect and experience. Her exercises in comprehension embellish concepts with histories 
and create substances that are both meaningful and material. Language is reformed through an 
artistic ‘study’ on its power to make differences and forge identities. Where words insured the status 
of Conceptual Artworks by underwriting them with intellect, Bell inserts a narrative of inscription, 
cutting back into knowledge and undermining our desire to understand. The very word ‘book’ is 
derived from the German for beech, with reference to the beech wood tablets on which runes were 
inscribed and to the tree itself in which people carve their initials. The loops, hinges, tabs and 
incisions are like so many techniques in the informational craft of the artist, unfolding the word in 
all its dimensions through the making of sense. The page turns in on itself in feedback loops and the 
power of vocabulary cuts out, as her ‘object lessons’ lose their sense of gravity.  
 
In uncertain places between definition and dislocation, diction and contradiction, words fail to 
adhere; the book stutters and communication falls short. The psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan used the 
term ‘the subject who is supposed to know’ for the place in language that we imagine is occupied 
by someone who speaks with gravity. The teacher, the scientist, the detective, the lawyer, the 
doctor, the artist and the analyst himself are figures with the power to define, to interpret, to make 
things meaningful. The catch is, no individual is really invested with the authority of language 
because we do not own the words with which we express ourselves, on the contrary, we are 
‘bespoke’ and ‘cut off’ by words even as we master them; ’My words fail me’, ‘I am lost for 
words’. The occupying force of language remains foreign, because it doesn’t recognize the territory 
we call ‘individual’. 
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Only the desire for a sense of order sustains the ‘knowing’ subject in a place of authority, lest there 
be a break down of all that is reasonable. In the film noir genre, the detective occupies this tenuous 
place of the subject who is supposed to know. He discovers clues and reads the signs, always 
believing that he is on the right track. Eventually he ‘throws the book’ at the suspect and takes a 
statement, in an effort to shed some light on the situation. Visibility and knowledge go hand in hand 
which is why the Venetian blind is a recurrent device in film noir, left half open the shadows 
fragment the detective and his suspect the dangerous woman, who are both depicted as flawed 
characters in relation to the letter of the law.  Partial illumination is a state of confusion and we are 
left with a desire to know how things are going to be resolved. 
 
Ellen Bell’s Venetian Blind gives substance to a problem that is never quite resolved: the apparent 
transparency of words. It is an apology for a language that is ‘speaking in tongues’ and like her 
books it binds the word to its material condition of possibility. Language makes possible not the 
illumination of truths but rather the conditions for misunderstanding. I didn’t know how to say he 
was wrong so I had to say sorry is a statement opening onto the gap between experience and 
description, the place where meaning loses traction over and over again. The half-light of the 
transparent blind covered in words, is the sign that language can’t speak up for itself and tell of its 
errors, which is why we turn to art and poetry for answers.  
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Appendix F 
 
Moved (2006) 
 
Artist’s proposal for Capture 5, the Art’s Council England’s dance for film platform. The 
proposal is based on a research residency conducted in January 2006 by the dancer and 
choreographer Claire Cunningham. The research experimented with techniques for 
generating a movement language from the emotion diagram of the Le Doux Circuit.  
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Moved Project Proposal 
 
Concept: to produce a dance for film, which uses an emotion diagram as a choreographic template 
and visual/narrative device. The diagram offers a ‘readymade’ expressive sequence for creating the 
dancer’s movement language, which is then streamed into the filmic space of the moving image: a 
film about movement. 
 
Theme/Idea: ‘the dance of information’. The diagram is taken from neuroscience and depicts 
emotion as an informational flow in the Ledoux circuit. The objective is to make the invisible, 
emotional event available to the viewer by re - composing it in diagrammatic space. The dancers 
will revitalize the diagram by transforming its static form into a moving one, as the kinetic 
expression of information.    
 
Style: a minimal style will form a dialogue of gestures between the modernist appearance of the 
diagram, the discourse of ‘information’ and the technique of the dancers. ‘The tension occurring 
when abstraction (the geometric, neutral body) strives for traction (the kinetic, invested person) will 
inform the dynamic spectrum of the piece’ [Matthias Sperling, choreographer]. In this respect the 
modular and cellular component will be emphasized as that which links together bodies, 
expressions, sequences and frames in formation.  
 
Look & Sound: the visual design of the film will be informed by twentieth century modernist 
painting whose abstract and diagrammatic qualities key into the emotion diagram. The visual 
dynamics of the paintings are released from the static surface of the canvas in the perspectives and 
perceptions of the moving image. Following the philosopher Nietzsche’s proclamation ‘I am an 
arrow’, the dancers will become the trajectories of the composition, in which emotion and the 
moving image stream together in a synthesis of movement. The sonic template will be designed to 
modulate the visual economy of the piece, through the phased breakdown and subsequent 
transformation of the manifest dancer into particulate flows of digital information. 
 
Structure: the structure is provided by a series of sequences and layers that take elements of the 
diagram as starting points. For example the film will begin with a ‘sunrise’, which becomes the 
circle of the amygdala in the diagram. Each consecutive element in the diagram is engaged in this 
way by the dancers, until all the potential movement is converted into kinetic form. The final 
sequence involves the culmination of previous elements, as the dancers exhaust the existing sense 
of the diagram and begin to overwrite its code with their own diagrammatic drawings, creating both 
image and movement as they go. The impetus for the structure came from a research week 
supported by Arts Council East Midlands, during which Claire Cunningham began to develop a 
movement language for the piece.  
 
Rhythm, Feel, Atmosphere: are calibrated by the diagram. The introduction is developed as a 
gradual intensive engagement with the diagram, it captures the dancers in its process and they 
follow its rhythm in a claustrophobic space of composition. Gradually this space unfolds, as the 
dancers move ‘outside the box’, drawing across and defacing the diagram. This second phase is 
characterized by an expansive feel, it is extensive and re-connects the abstract process of the 
diagram with the movements of the exterior world. Emotion comes from the latin ex motio, which 
means to move outwards.    
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Technical: the piece is made from discrete layers that will help with the management of material.  
Stage one: Andrew Love will produce the initial visual sequences digitally and they will be given to 
the dancers prior to rehearsal week. The dancers will then develop the previous research into the 
movement language by responding to the sequences. Stage two: the sequences will be modified just 
prior to the filming week, which will take place at the blue screen facility at Nottingham University 
and the motion capture facility at Nottingham Trent University. Stage three: the footage will be 
digitally manipulated and 3d animations added, so the sequences and dancers become as one in the 
information stream described in ‘Look and Sound’. This will be much easier to achieve by using the 
blue screen facility for stage two. Geoff Litherland and his video production unit will provide the 
necessary technical support for filming during stage two.  
 
Audience Engagement: the aim is to produce a piece that will appeal to both contemporary art and 
dance audiences by developing an experimental filmic space for thinking about our perceptions of 
movement. This space will offer dancers an approach for abstracting movement from the domain of 
dance, by conceiving of the creative process primarily in terms of moving images. Conversely, 
visual artists and people with an interest in contemporary visual art will realise the potential for 
working with dancers/performers, not so much in terms of an ‘interdisciplinary project’ but rather in 
terms of a synthesis of form. In this case the image of movement cannot be reduced to dance, visual 
art or film, it is a singular and distinct composition, which happens to take shape in and get 
channelled through the dance for film format. 
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